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Abstract 
Equity culture is underdeveloped in Central and Eastern Europe. The corporate sector's 
dependence on debt as an external source of capital, scarce and illiquid capital markets and 
distrust in corporate sharing are the reasons for this. Yet, according to a number of surveys, 
firms are dissatisfied with the existing forms of debt driven external capital. The barriers of 
access to capital and the cost of capital are high resulting in unattractive and inflexible 
financing options. However, the availability of capital is a necessity for corporate existence 
and economic growth. The question of the viability of equity financing development as an 
alternative to the traditional debt financing in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe puzzles many. National policymakers as well as domestic and foreign 
investors need this question answered so that time and effort is not wasted on pursuing 
unviable strategies and creating unrealistic investment plans. 
The development of an equity culture in the CEECs is the main focus of this study. 
We develop a theory-bridging conceptual framework through which we attempt to 
demonstrate what factors contribute to its formation. We maintain that firms seeking equity 
finance are the main drivers for equity culture development in a country. This demand is 
affected by the size of transaction costs these firms incur in the process of searching for, 
establishing and co-ordinating contractual relationships with equity providers. We establish 
that the size of transaction costs is determined by a set of conditions stemming from 
internal (managerial) and external (macro-economic and institutional) environments 
impacting the firm. 
The conceptual framework is empirically tested using quantitative data on ten 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) (EU member countries since 2004 and 
2007) for a continuous period of thirteen years (1996-2008). Firstly, a relatively new 
graphical display method - the Co-Plot method - is applied to cluster the gathered data. 
This method facilitates benchmarking against two representatives of the equity oriented 
financial system (UK and USA) and two representatives of the bank (debt) oriented 
financial system (Germany and Japan). The outcome of this analysis is the identification of 
three separate groups within our sample of CEECs (Leaders, Potentials, Laggards) in terms 
of the potential for equity culture development they exhibit. Secondly, a regression 
analysis follows. It determines causal relationships between the demand-based dependent 
variables and independent variables represented by equity culture supportive conditions. 
Regressions are performed while controlling for different firm sizes (Large firms, SMEs, 
Micro firms and the total number of firms) to determine the driving factors of equity 
culture development for each firm size individually as differing effects are expected. 
Furthermore, we carry out the regression analysis while controlling for the groups of 
Leaders, Potentials, and Laggards on a case by case basis. Finally, a qualitative 
comparative analysis for three CEECs, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, (each being a 
representative for a group with different potential for equity culture deVelopment) is 
provided. 
Our findings suggest that CEECs belonging to the group of Leaders have the macro-
economic and institutional conditions necessary for the development of an equity culture in 
place and that it is the equity-oriented financial institutions and the managerial capabilities 
which require further attention so that equity culture can be fully developed. By contrast, 
countries from the Potentials group have the macroeconomic performance required for the 
development of an advanced equity-based financial system, however the . conditions 
stemming from the institutional (including both quality as well as adequacy of equity-
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oriented financial intennediaries) and the managerial environment need improving. The 
results for the group of Laggards indicate that in order for an equity culture to be able to 
develop, a complex set of macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions 
requires attention. Furthennore, we establish that large finns do not necessarily require the 
presence of adequate managerial conditions for them to become the drivers of equity 
culture development. In the case of SMEs we find that it is primarily the presence of 
appropriate institutional rather than macro-economic and managerial conditions that have 
to be satisfied in order for these finns to opt for equity finance. Finally, our results for 
micro finns imply that although the presence of adequate macro-economic and institutional 
conditions is important, however, it is not sufficient. It is the presence of appropriate 
managerial conditions which motivate micro finns to consider equity finance. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it contributes 
to theory by providing a new conceptual perspective on the financial system development 
and finn financing options in transition economies typical for their limited experience with 
equity financing and an underdeveloped equity culture, such as the CEECs. Secondly, it 
provides contributions to practice by proposing managerial and policy recommendations, 
how to identify best investment targets, and how to support equity culture development 
should it be desired. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The recent economic crisis (i.e. the global financial crisis of 2008-2009) has confirmed that 
without adequate access to capital, firms in all types of economies suffer. The fact that the 
financial sector has been unable to provide adequate financing for many firms since 
2008/2009 has resulted in corporate standstill or even declared insolvency of some 
formerly well-performing firms. As a result, most financial analysts and economists agree 
that the ultimate challenge for any economy at the time of such a serious economic crisis is 
to restore financial confidence and stability among all financial sector participants (the 
firms, investors, Government and financial institutions), to enable the adequate flow of 
capital and to facilitate the efficient functioning of different financial systems. 
Capital finance is essential for firm growth and by implication for economic growth 
(Stoian and Filippaios, 2007). This leads to the question of how firms can best finance 
themselves and what types of financial systems are likely to form in the future. This is 
particularly relevant for countries with historically weak and underdeveloped financial 
systems, such as the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEECs). 
Limited availability of capital, poor access to finance and low quality financial institutions 
form the characteristics of weak financial systems present in the majority of the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). It is clear that 
without access to stable and adequate financial markets these countries' ultimate goal of 
catching up with their more developed counterparts is unachievable. 
1.2. Research Problem 
We intend to investigate the financial systems of the CEECs which until the 1990s were 
operating under a State socialist system. In any political establishment, whether democratic 
or socialist, progress can only be achieved if there is economic growth (Kolodko, 2000). In 
the late 1980's, the socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe were experiencing 
serious economic, financial, social and ultimately political difficulties (Stiglitz, 1995). This 
resulted in the region's inability to expand, satisfy its population's social needs, attract 
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investment and boost productivity, and ultimately resulted in the need to change the 
existing centralised political and economic regime. 
Today, two decades after the start of their transition process from centrally planned 
to market oriented economies, CEECs still have to face many challenges in order to catch 
up with the developed systems of their Western European counterparts and other 
developed nations worldwide. The creation and enhancement of an efficient and 
sustainable financial system is without a doubt one of the key challenges (EBRD, 2006). 
Indeed, the underdeveloped banking system (overwhelmed with low capital, large volumes 
of non-performing loans to state enterprises, small branch networks, inexperienced staff 
and management, limited competition, etc.) and an even less developed capital markets 
system (with weak legal infrastructure, non-existent institutional investors, etc.) (Morelli, 
20 I 0), both legacies of the previous political regime, have impeded the financial 
liberalisation process and thus also the CEECs' growth and development potential. 
Unlike the CEECs, more advanced economies have successfully adopted one, or the 
combination of, two financial system models (bank-based or equity-based) and have 
accordingly created corporate governance structures, established financial institutions and 
legislative systems which function in support of each individual system (Amable, 2003; 
Morelli, 2009). In an effectively and efficiently functioning bank-based system there is a 
significant presence of banking tradition in a country, with strong historical roots and 
embedded trust within the banking sector (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 2002; Beck 
and Levine, 2004; Detragiache et aI., 2006). On the other hand, the equity-based model 
requires the presence of a strong and developed equity culture in a country (Bekaert et aI., 
2001; Bekaert et aI., 2002; Smith, 2003; Kim and Kenny, 2007; Li, 2007). A number of 
scholars point out that in advanced forms of financial systems bank financing is often at 
some stage followed by equity financing (Geschenkron, 1962; Pagano, 1993). Indeed, 
Smith (2003) observes that bank lending and government-determined allocation of capital 
are currently giving way to private equity financing in many advanced economies. 
1.3. Research Aim and Research Questions 
In this study we intend to examine if equity has the potential to become a 'competitor' to 
debt as an external source of capital in the CEECs. As these countries are still in a 
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transition process to a more developed financial system\ establishing whether equity-
based financing could be seen as an effective, firm-friendly and corporate growth-
supportive alternative to debt-based financing is vital. In order to provide an answer to this 
we investigate the phenomenon of equity culture - the bedrock of a well-functioning 
equity-based system. We define equity culture as a financing culture adopted by a 
country's corporate sector implying this sector's bigger freedom to opt for equity-oriented 
financing as a result of present feasible market conditions. We thus consider the firm and 
its demand for equity finance to be the driver for the development of an equity culture in a 
country. We maintain that firms demand equity financing if the costs associated with this 
demand do not exceed costs associated with other sources of available external capital, 
such as debt. In our study, we examine several aspects of an equity culture. 
Firstly, we aim to conceptually establish which external and internal environments to 
the firm shape the development of a financial system in such a way that it generates the 
existence of an equity culture. Thus we put forward our first research question as follows: 
1. What are the main environmental forces that shape the direction of a financial system 
development towards creating an equity culture in a transition economy? 
Secondly, we intend to conceptually and empirically determine the nature of 
conditions, stemming from specific external and internal environments, which have to be 
satisfied in order for an equity culture to be able to develop. Thus we formulate our second 
research question in the following way: 
2. What conditions stemming from the environmental forces guide the process of moving 
towards the creation of an equity culture in a transition economy? 
Thirdly, by empirically examining a sample of ten CEECs we aim to establish which 
specific factors have an effect on the firms' strategic2 decision to opt for equity finance. 
Because we see the firm and its demand for equity financing to be the driver for the 
development of an equity culture, we believe, the identification of such factors informs us 
about the specific nature of conditions which make equity culture development in the 
CEECs feasible. Therefore, we formulate our third research question as follows: 
I In 2008, Czech Republic was the first CEE to abort the status of a transition economy and adopt the status 
of a developed economy (EU, 2009). 
2 In this thesis, the term 'strategic fmancing' refers to 'long-term financing' as opposed to day-to-day, short-
term financing. 
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3. Under what specific external and internal factors is the creation of an equity culture 
feasible in the CEECs? 
Lastly, deriving from the conceptual and empirical results we intend to conclude our 
study with a set of managerial and policy recommendations for the CEECs. We expect 
heterogeneous results among the CEECs group in terms of their status of equity culture 
development, and therefore we aim to propose recommendations for three individual 
groups - CEECs demonstrating the best, medium and the lowest potential for equity 
culture development. Thus we formulate our fourth research question in the following way: 
4. Which strategies should be followed by business practitioners and financial institutions 
and what policies should be adopted by governments and financial organisations in 
order to support the development of an equity culture in the transition economies of the 
CEECs? 
Collectively, our research aims to provide a valuable contribution to the existing 
research through an analysis of the financial system development in the CEECs and offers 
a new insight into a research area not yet fully explored by the academic community - the 
potential for equity culture development in the transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
1.4. Research Justification and Research Contributions 
We have been prompted to research the potential for equity culture development in the 
CEECs for several reasons: paucity of previous academic research and high business and 
policy-making relevance. We believe that our research makes significant contributions to 
theory and practice. 
1.4.1. Paucity of Previous Research 
Most of the academic research on financial system development (including research on 
financial liberalisation, financial intermediation, types and systems of financing, etc.) has 
been primarily focused either on developed economies or the BRIC countries (Abiad and 
Mody, 2005; Kim and Kenny, 2007). However, European and World organisations and 
political institutions have recognised the increasing role of the transitioning CEECs for the 
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whole European and World economy, and started directing their research and funding 
activities towards these countries. For example, the United Nations' annual conference on 
trade and development (UNCTAD) focused its 2006 'World Investment Report' on trade 
and development in transition economies of the Central and Eastern European region. 
So far,· researchers have been investigating the extent of general financial 
liberalisation (Abiad and Mody, 2005), the timing together with the causes of equity 
market liberalisation (Kim and Kenny, 2007), the conditions under which investment 
liberalisation results in market development (Hargis, 1998), the level of financial 
intermediation (King and Levine, 1993; McNulty et aI., 2007), historical determinants of 
financial development (La Porta et aI., 1997; Beck et aI., 2000), the role of financial system 
design during economic transition and the role stock markets in the process of financial 
intermediation (Hermes and Lensink, 2000b), financial system architecture (Scholtens, 
2000) in less developed economies, in some cases addressing specifically the CEE 
transition economies. 
The reasons for an increasing number of academics turning their attention to 
transition economies vary. Kim and Kenny (2007) state that there is little known about the 
determinants of equity market liberalisation in developing countries and, that on the whole, 
it is an under-explored research area. Hargis (1998) investigates this subject due to a 
conflict between the empirical studies and alleged fears of policy makers. Although 
McNulty et aI. (2007) agree with King and Levine (1993) that more research is needed on 
the development of financial institutions in the transition economies, they differ in their 
research approaches. McNulty et aI. (2007) use a sample of newly formed transition 
economies which were previously not available and consider the determinants of 
intermediation, particularly in a sample of three groups of developing countries: the former 
Soviet countries, the Non-Soviet transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and 
developing countries. Hermes and Lensink (2000) observe that financial system 
development in transition economies has gained increasing attention in academic as well as 
political circles. 
However, despite this increased scientific work, some scholars point out the 
existence of gaps in previous research and call for more attention to the area of financial 
system development in transition economies. For example, Purda (2008) points out that 
there is a need to further study transition countries as 'caution should be used in extending 
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the results from research on financial systems of developed economies with well-
functioning financial markets to the context of transition and post-transition countries'. 
Previous to that, Bekaert and Harvey (2002) stress the requirement for a better 
understanding of the combination of factors (macro-economic and institutional) 
influencing financial system reforms in transition markets. Similarly, Klapper and Love 
(2003) emphasise the need to re-focus the research in transition economies from country-
level to firm-level, or a combination of these two levels. Pinkowitz et al. (2002) highlight 
the need to analyse corporate governance mechanisms when assessing financing choices of 
firms, in particular equity capital, in transition economies. Fisher et al. (1997) and later on 
Kornai (2006) add at the corporate level, the motivations behind firm financing choices 
should be more closely examined. Bakker and Gross (2004) call for more attention 
specifically to the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe as 'these markets 
are particularly interesting since they provide us with a number of comparable, yet in many 
interesting respects, different cases'. Also, the need to provide empirical knowledge on 
factors affecting the CEECs' future financial systems' developments and direction has 
been accentuated by many (e.g. Hermes and Lensink, 2000; Nord, 2000) with some 
particularly stressing the importance of an assessment from the equity financing 
perspective (EBRD, 1998; Smith, 2003). 
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the financial system development in the CEECs 
with the focus on equity culture development has not been given the attention it deserves 
by the academic community and such studies are requested by business practitioners. 
Interestingly, we observe that despite the popular use of the term 'equity culture' by the 
business people, its use in the academic literature use is not as popular and is defined in 
different ways. 
We believe that Central and Eastern European countries are likely to play an 
important role in the globalised world. Through our research work we attempt to close the 
gap in the academic area and provide a knowledgeable insight into the financial system of 
the CEECs with the focus on the equity culture development, areas of interest highlighted 
by both the business community and international organisations. The knowledge that we 
aim to obtain from our research work will add significant value to future business 
planning, will help local businesses determine their financing and growth options and 
identify areas that need to be improved in order for them to achieve growth efficiency. 
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Furthennore, it will provide governments with an agenda for change, and highlight present 
system weaknesses. 
1.4.2. High Business Relevance 
Based on articles published in business related publications (e.g. the Harvard Business 
Review or the Business Week), academic reports aimed for non-academic institutions (e.g. 
the AIM (London-based stock market for growing companies) report by the London 
School of Economics for the London Stock Exchange), general observations from the 
world of finance and also personal conversations with the business and finance community 
it appears that the financial system development in Central and Eastern Europe and 
specifically the subject of equity culture are important current issues. The question of 
which CEECs have the best potential to develop and adopt an equity culture requires 
attention for business-related as well as policy-oriented reasons. 
Importantly, as a result of our previous work on AIM's3 potential future expansion 
into the area of Central and Eastern Europe (Stone, 2006) we identified the lack of 
knowledge on equity culture development in the CEECs. This research project revealed 
AIM's limited expansion interest into the Central and Eastern European region. Whilst it 
was beyond the scope of that project to identify the list of factors causing this reality, a 
phenomenon of limited equity culture presence in this geographic area was clearly 
recognised. This became a research inspiration for our study. 
1.4.3. Contributions to Theory 
The paucity of previous academic research on equity culture development in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe has an impact on our research approach. Firstly, 
we start by developing a conceptual framework which bridges traditional theories used in 
the Economics and Finance research (Transaction Costs Theory) with new strategic, 
managerial and institutional theories (The National Competitiveness concept, The 
Resource Based View, and the Theory of Varieties of Capitalism). Through the conceptual 
framework we establish which are the environmental aspects that shape the development of 
an equity culture in transition economies as well as what is the nature of conditions 
3 AIM _ Alternative Investment Market, the London stock exchange for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) (www.londonstockexchange.comlaim 
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stemming from such environments that have to be satisfied so that equity culture can 
develop. The research focus of our study - the financing of business activities at a strategic 
level, where internal capital is no longer adequate and external capital is necessary - has 
been instrumental in our conceptualisation and explains our theory-bridging approach. The 
conceptual framework is in detail introduced in Chapter 3. 
The complexity of the conceptual framework is reflected in the empirical 
examination we apply. Firstly, we collate a database which consists macro-economic, 
institutional and managerial data. Secondly, we apply a three-tier research methodology 
through which we test our collated data. We start by clustering and benchmarking using 
the Co-Plot methodology, then we apply a fixed effects panel data regression analysis and 
as the last step of the empirical examination we perform a qualitative comparative analysis 
of three selected CEECs. 
A contribution to theory also lies in the choice of method we apply for data 
benchmarking and clustering. The relatively new clustering method of Co-Plots is designed 
for multi-criteria analysis and enables us to visualise the position of the CEECs relative to 
four chosen benchmarks (UK, USA - representatives of the Anglo-Saxon equity oriented 
system and Germany, Japan - representatives of the German-Japanese bank-dominated 
system) by reflecting a complex set of macro-economic, institutional and managerial data. 
To our knowledge, the Co-Plot method has not been applied to CEECs' analysis before. 
Instead it has been used to cluster the banking institutions within the Greek banking 
industry (Raveh, 2000b), in an exploratory study on mergers and acquisitions (Weber et 
aI., 1996), in a car selection problem analysis (Raveh, 2000a), and a few others. 
1.4.4. Contributions to Practice 
Our study makes practical contributions in the form of managerial and policy-making 
implications. Firstly, as equity-based financial institutions (e.g. AIM) are considering a 
business expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, and existing and potential investors in 
the CEE region are looking for new investment opportunities, it is essential to have the 
information as to which countries in this geographic area would be a viable expansion and 
investment target. Secondly, as the financial systems in the CEECs are still in the process 
of developing, it is appropriate to address the issue of equity culture so that focused 
domestic policies are formed in those countries wanting to develop an equity-based 
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system. Furthermore, with the recognition of the significant role transition economies are 
expected to play in the future globalised world, bilateral international organisations have 
signalled their interest in research related to macro-economic, institutional and financial 
advancement of these countries. 
1.5. Thesis Overview 
In this section we present the research map (Fig. 1.1.), which outlines our research process, 
and the structure of this thesis. We divide our study into two main research blocks: a 
theory-building (conceptual) part and a theory-testing (empirical) part. Firstly, the theory-
building part of our study entails a thorough literature review (Chapter 2) followed by the 
introduction and justification of our conceptual framework (Chapter 3). Secondly, the 
theory-testing part of our study contains three analytical approaches: 
clusteringlbenchmarking (Chapter 6), regression analysis (Chapter 7) and qualitative 
comparative analysis (Chapter 8). A brief introduction of each of our chapters follows 
next. 
Chapter 2 - the literature review and Chapter 3 - the conceptual framework form the 
theory building section of our study. The literature review reveals a gap in our research 
area and justifies the need to create a new theoretical concept. The conceptual framework 
is introduced, justified and applied with the outcome of propositions creation in the 
conceptual framework chapter. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are our methodology chapters. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology 
we adopt in order to empirically test our theoretical concept. It starts with the discussion of 
the philosophical, and within this context also methodological, perspectives. Then it 
outlines the data collection techniques and describes the sample. Before offering a debate 
on the legitimacy of our research, it examines our three-tier methodology of data analysis -
clustering, regressions and the application of a qualitative comparative analysis. It finishes 
by stating the research limitations. Chapter 5 discusses the transformation of our data into 
measurable variables. With the help of the ANOV A method it also examines the fit 
between individual variables. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are sections on the empirical testing of our conceptual framework 
introduced earlier. Firstly, we apply the Co-Plot methodology, an interesting alternative to 
Principal Component Analysis, to discuss the gathered data. Benchmarking the CEECs to 
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the representatives of two different financial system models enables us to perform 
clustering and thus handle the data in a manageable way. Secondly, to find out the causal 
effects between independent and dependent variables we perform a regression analysis. 
Finally, to provide a soft data interpretation we offer a qualitative comparative analysis of 
three CEECs - Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. These countries represent three individual 
groups characterised by different levels of equity culture development - the Leaders, 
Potentials, and Laggards. 
Chapter 9 outlines the key research outcomes and proposes recommendations 
concluded from our study. Here we discuss the contributions to knowledge as well as 
consider the research limitations. Finally, we make recommendations for further academic 
research in our field. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide a critical overview of the existing literature 
related to our research interest - equity culture development in transition economies. To 
accomplish this aim several other objectives have to be met. We provide the background 
and context to our research interest and thus 'frame' our research problem. By relating our 
research topic to a larger pool of closely-related literature we are able to offer possibilities 
of extending it and distinguish between what has been done and what needs to be done. 
Furthermore, we find that the literature review serves as an instrument for identifying 
relationships between our ideas and practice and enables us to create a general framework 
for establishing the importance of our study. 
This chapter is organised as follows: First, we provide a brief discussion of the 
literature reviewing model we adopt - our search strategy. Then we apply the same model 
to our research as we discuss relevant literature to our study. In particular we evaluate 
existing literature on financial system development, financial system models, bank and 
equity financing, and an equity culture creation. Finally, a concluding section of the 
literature review follows. It summarises the main facts discussed and identifies gaps that 
are covered by our research study. 
2.2. Our Search Strategy 
We see the literature review investigation as a continuous process and we use a diagram 
deVeloped by Booth et al. (1995) to show this (Fig. 2.1.). Indeed, the literature review is a 
building element of our solution development process as theory development (provided in 
Chapter 3) and individual methodological approaches (provided in Chapter 4) flow from its 
specifics. It is part and parcel of our scientific work as it not only helps us to formulate the 
topic of our interest but also contributes to the generation and justification of related 
research questions. Perhaps most importantly, it enables us to state unsolved problems and 
thus establish gaps in our research area. With our literature review we aim to ensure that 
the research we perform is not duplicated and that literature searches put forward the best 
available evidence of other research undertaken in our scientific area so far. 
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Figure 2.1.: A Flow Diagram ofa Literature Review 
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In our search strategy we follow the recommendations of Machi (2009) to include 
three different types of resources: core, recommended and additional. Firstly, core 
resources are searched as a minimum requirement and are given priority to other sources. 
Our group of core resources consists journal articles related to financial system 
development, firm financing, equity financing in general, in transition economies and then 
specifically in the CEECs. These resources are predominantly published in journals 
relevant to International Business and Strategy such as the 'Journal of International 
Business Studies', 'Strategic Management Journal', the 'Management International 
Review', the 'Academy of Management Review', the 'Harvard Business Review', the 
'Journal of Financial Economics', the 'Journal of Development Economics', the 'Journal 
of Banking and Finance', and the 'Journal of Transitional Economies' etc. Although the 
International Business and Strategy fields are the primary sources of information we also 
employ literature from other closely related areas. According to Cooper (2010) this 
approach increases a study's reliability and contributes to the completeness of the theory 
formulation. Furthermore, within this group, we research books with details of relevant 
theories and methodology. We believe that effective searches across these sources ensure 
that our literature review covers the significant part of research performed in our field and 
thus lays fundamentals for our own scientific discovery. 
Secondly, we include recommended resources of unpublished literature including 
theses and conference proceedings, which we located through the search of library 
catalogues, Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and the Web search engines. 
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Recommended resources are useful as they usually confirm that the scientific work is not 
duplicated (Machi, 2009). We, however, find that access to some of these sources is 
limited and use them when available. Thirdly, we take account of additional resources as 
these further increase the comprehensiveness of our research. Our key examples of 
additional resources are discussions with people from the field or hand-searching of key 
journals. 
In addition to identifying the appropriate set of literature resources we must also 
impose limitations on other aspects of the literature search. In order to deal with the vast 
amount of information available we realise we have to be clear on the terminology we use 
for the search of references, the research time period of relevant literature we aim to cover, 
and the organisational mode we adopt to group and present our material. The research 
model that best suits the purpose of setting the scene, introducing the main ideas of our 
topic, and consequent in-depth reporting on the specific issue our research focuses on is the 
from general to specific approach, commonly applied by many science practitioners (Booth 
et aI., 1995). Following this model we not only perform the initial reference search but also 
group material together for the purpose of its presentation in this chapter. 
Although the primary goal of this study is to investigate the potential for equity 
culture development in the CEECs, we first need to observe the process of a financial 
system development with the system of influences and factors that affect its direction. 
Then we progress onto the examination of specific financial system models and their 
determinants. In addition, we investigate what the catalysts of moving from one financial 
system model to another are. These two areas of investigation serve as prerequisites to the 
viability of an equity culture based research. This research approach has an effect not only 
on the type of terminology we use for the reference search but also on the order in which 
this terminology is arranged. To be specific, the type and order of the terminology we 
research is 'financial system development', 'financial system architecture', 'financial 
system models', 'corporate decision-making', 'financing choices of firms' 'bank 
financing', 'equity financing', and 'equity culture'. It is important to note that the search is 
applied first at a general level - for developed and emerging economies and then 
specifically for transition economies and the post-communist economies of the CEE 
region. We attempt to restrict the period the review covers to the more recent works. 
However, if historical underpinning of an aspect is necessary we reach to an earlier 
literature. 
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2.3. Financial Systems: Their Role and Sources of Effectiveness 
The link between financial system development and an economic growth has been 
established early in the 20th century (Schumpeter, 1911). More recently, a number of 
financial analysts have empirically confirmed that a more developed financial system has a 
positive impact on the economic growth both at the macroeconomic level (King and 
Levine, 1993; Beck et aI., 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003a) as well as at the 
microeconomic level (La Porta et aI., 1997; Beck et aI., 2005) as financial constraints 
stemming from a less developed financial system can negatively affect growth. Despite the 
popularity of the topic of financial system development in discussions of economic growth, 
there is still little agreement on how to define it and measure it (Levine, 2002). For the 
purpose of this study we adopt a definition of a financial system development as developed 
by the World Economic Forum (WEF). It defines financial development as the 'factors, 
policies and institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, and 
deep and broad access to capital and financial markets' (WEF, 2008, p. 3). The process of 
financial development depends, among other factors, on how the financial system's 
supporting mechanisms in a particular country are designed and established (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2000). This includes the type and role of financial institutions, the design of the 
regulatory and supervisory system, and the role of government policies that are related to 
controlling that particular system (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003b). 
Thus it can be said that the direction, speed of development and quality of financial 
systems is determined by a number of inputs: the combination of local (political, 
economic, legal, sociological and cultural) environments, evolving financial institutions 
and global factors; and the level of effectiveness these inputs employ. The combination of 
the input factors leads to specific financial system outputs: the availability of and access to 
capital. 
The availability of capital and attractive terms on which firms can access capital are 
signs of a developed financial system. Advanced financial systems fulfil many roles in an 
economy. They allow firms to finance their corporate growth (Levine et aI., 2000); permit 
more efficient mobilisation of savings for households and the corporate sector (Beck et aI., 
2000); allow greater investment in human capital and facilitate risk amelioration (Stein and 
Jeremy, 1997); reduce information costs (King and Levine, 1993); permit better 
monitoring of managers and improved systems of corporate control (Berglof and Pal, 
2005); allow larger scale operations and facilitate financing of small and medium 
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enterprises (SMEs) (Klapper and Love, 2003). Recent finance literature (Beck et aI., 2006) 
also suggests that in terms of resource allocation, developed financial systems with 
sustainable financial markets are invaluable. It is suggested that if these are not present and 
international lenders/investors are approached to provide financial services, a number of 
challenges may potentially arise. For example, due to institutional heterogeneity between 
the lender's and borrower's financial systems, problems such as biased court systems, 
different loan development procedures, different accounting rules and standards, capital 
controls and so forth may have to be overcome. Taking all these issues into consideration, 
it may then become too costly and inefficient or simply impossible for the firms to finance 
their investments adequately. 
The efficiency factors that contribute to the development of an advanced financial 
system are of political, economic and institutional nature. Firstly, although the role of 
government as a financial service provider or financial regulatory body has been disputed 
(Beck, 2006), its role and contribution to a financial system development has been 
commented on by many (e.g. Strange, 1995; La Porta et aI., 1999). This is because 
financial system development can only progress to an advanced level if political forces 
support and do not go against economic and institutional reforms necessary for such 
progress. This viewpoint goes in line with Rajan and Zingales's (2003a) findings who 
point out that favourable ( or unfavourable) political outlook on financial development is 
the main reason for cross-country differences in the quality of a financial development. In 
fact, it is believed that in some less developed countries financial system development has 
been prevented by special country interests (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). Scholtens (2000) 
takes the view that local politics shapes the economic and institutional conditions in a 
country, and through these influences the type of financial intermediaries that are able to 
develop and the level of efficiency they can function at. In a more recent assessment of 
financial systems and their functionalities, Purda (2008) calls for a compatibility between 
economic policies and the existing political economy in a country, which encompasses the 
areas of institutional quality, politics and economics. In our study, we follow the view of 
Scholtens (2000) and account for the political influences conceptually and empirically 
through economic and institutional indicators. 
Secondly, macro-economic stability is not only a pre-requisite for a financial system 
development but a necessary building block for an effective financial system (Beck, 2006). 
Monetary stability perceived through a low and stable inflation rate and feasible interest 
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rates provides investors with confidence that their returns on investments will materialise 
and that they can commit to payments in real terms. Indeed, it has been empirically shown 
that countries with lower and more stable interest rates have more advanced financial 
systems and thus are able to offer more financing options to their corporate sectors (Levine 
et aI., 2000). Furthermore, Choi and Jeon (2007) point out that higher levels of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) also contribute to a financial system development. Domestic firms 
learn and observe the financing practices of their parent companies (usually coming from 
more developed systems) and the knowledge they gain enables them to make more 
informed financial decisions or even 'experiment' with new sources of capital. In our 
study, we assess the macro-economic performance by conceptually referring to the theory 
of national competitiveness. We go in line with Beck's (2006) observation that sound 
macro-economic performance has a positive impact on the development of a financial 
system. We thus consider the 'health' of a nation's economy the main building block of an 
advanced form of a financial system. 
Thirdly, institutional quality, pointing both to legal efficiency and competent 
corporate governance, is another crucial pillar of an effective financial system. The 
certainty of legal rights of borrowers, creditors and other investors can only be secured 
through an enforcement of contracts and their adherence to these. Importantly, the 
significance of creating a sound legislative framework before considering the set-up of a 
particular financial system (bank-based or market-based) is according to some scholars 
(e.g. Kaufmann et aI., 2000; Monks and Minow, 2001; Levine, 2002) essential at the early 
stages of a country's financial system development. Countries with good investor 
protection laws, competition laws and proper disclosure of information have financial 
systems represented by larger and broader financial markets which means better 
accessibility to external finance for individual firms (La Porta et aI., 1997; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005). Moreover, good governance practices in the financial and corporate sectors 
are critical for the development of an effective financial system (La Porta et aI., 1999; 
Kaufmann et aI., 2000). The studies of Klapper and Love (2004) and Francis et aI. (2005) 
find that the quality of corporate governance is positively related to growth opportunities 
of firms and their need for external financing. Simply put, governance provides assurance 
that the market is honest, that investors make decisions based on reliable information and 
that management is running the enterprise for the stakeholders' benefit (Monks and 
Minow, 2001). Committing to better corporate practices might not be easy in less 
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developed economIes and in countries with poor state investor protection as the 
mechanisms to do so might not be present or are too expensive (Doidge et aI., 2007). Firms 
that have an access to foreign markets are less dependent on the progression of their 
domestic financial systems and often if they pursue better corporate practices, it may be 
because of the foreign country governance requirements, and not of their own. Some 
suggest that cultural differences across countries provide explanations to the existence of 
different corporate governance models (e.g. Peng, 2004; Kim and Kenny, 2007). Thus a 
corporate governance model in one country may not be adequate and effective in another 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). This is to say that each nation may develop a unique 
corporate governance system based on individual country characteristics, local cultural 
norms and political arrangements. However, irrespective of the type of corporate 
governance model applied in an economy, its role as a building block of an advanced 
financial system cannot be disputed. 
Attention has been drawn also to the fact that in efficient financial systems firms are 
able to benefit from the presence of institutions which support their mode of managerial 
coordination (Peng, 2004). The existence of institutions that monitor the firm network, 
secure the exchange of information among firms, monitor firm behaviour and sanction in 
the case of defection can significantly affect the terms on which firms access external 
capital and secure finance for their business activities (Newman, 2000). For instance, 
investors who have little access to inside information of a firm and have to rely on data 
shown on the balance sheet are more hesitant in providing capital than those who have 
inter-firm networks with available data on hand (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Interestingly, a 
number of researchers (e.g. North, 1990; Peng, 2004) agree that formal institutions alone 
are not sufficient to secure an efficient working of a particular economy. Other factors such 
as the role of culture, historical experience and informal rules should be taken into 
consideration. Drawing on the earlier literature we include the examination of individual 
countries' institutional systems in our study. We consider the nature of an institutional 
system to be another essential determinant for the type of a financial system developed in a 
country. However, in addition to existing literature on financial system development which 
assess the quality of institutional systems by focusing on the legal and corporate 
governance aspects (e.g. Boot and Thakor, 1997; Hermes and Lensink, 2000a) we go 
further in the institutional assessment. We examine what type of financial intermediaries 
have emerged in individual countries under observation as a result of the quality of their 
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institutional systems. This perspective adds more depth to our analysis of the financial 
system development of our chosen groups of countries. 
2.4. Financial System Models 
Although it is assumed that an equilibrium financial structure consists of an optimal 
combination of bank credit and market finance (Boot and Thakor, 1997), experience shows 
that one particular model usually dominates (Allen and Gale, 2000). Traditionally, there 
have been two main financial system models, the Anglo-Saxon - market-oriented model 
commonly adopted in the UK and US, where businesses have access to highly liquid and 
sophisticated capital markets such as the London and New York stock exchanges; and the 
German-Japanese - bank-dominated model where business has relied more upon debt from 
financial institutions and banks and where the stock markets are active but smaller (Allen 
and Gale, 2000; Beck, 2006; Li, 2007). While the market-oriented model has commonly 
been referred to as the 'equity-based model', the bank-dominated model has been known 
as the 'debt-driven model'. 
The qualities of debt-based versus equity-based financial systems as substitute 
sources of finance have been debated for over a century now. A wide range of Banking and 
Finance literature has researched both financial system models and their respective 
determinants (Beck and Levine, 2004; Del' Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Clarke et aI., 2006; 
Detragiache et aI., 2006; Deidda and Fattouh, 2008). Although some believe that 
differentiating between debt-based and equity-based systems is unfounded as they both 
equally contribute to an economic growth (Levine, 2002), the sequencing pattern of these 
two systems cannot be disputed. It has been suggested that in the process of financial 
development, bank lending as a form of financing generally appears first, followed by 
stock and bond market development while consumer credit and insurance markets are 
created last (Geschenkron, 1962; Pagano, 1993). This is because bank-based financial 
systems are believed to be better at promoting economic growth which is associated with 
the development of more advanced forms of financial systems. Boot and Thakor (1997) 
also maintain the view that as the financial system reaches higher levels of development, 
capital markets are likely to expand at the expense of banks and to the advantage of equity 
based financial intermediaries. 
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Global financial liberalisation has led to the opening up of financial markets, higher 
bank concentration and also consolidation in the banking sector (Singh, 1997). This has 
had a significant impact on the development of bank-based systems in many countries. It 
has been observed that banking financial intermediaries have more market power in 
concentrated markets where they can raise interest rates and restrict access to long-term 
loans (Sudarsanam et aI., 2001). On the other hand, in concentrated bank markets, high 
credit supplies allow for economies of scale from which small and medium-sized 
enterprises seem to benefit the most (Scholtens, 2000). Highly concentrated bank markets 
have been identified to have a higher participation of foreign banking institutions. A large 
number of studies report that firms (both smaller and larger) generally experience better 
financing opportunities in the case of higher levels of foreign bank presence as it tends to 
increase the cost-efficiency, lending and welfare of banking institutions (e.g. Beck and 
Levine, 2004; Detragiache et aI., 2006). However, Clarke (2006), points out that foreign 
bank entry can cause 'cream-skimming' and lead to an overall decline in cost-efficiency, 
lending and welfare, especially for SMEs. Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004), on the other 
hand observe that domestic banks (i.e. lenders with informational advantage) competing 
with foreign banks (i.e. outside lenders with cost advantage) choose to focus on SMEs, a 
particular niche in the market. As a consequence, credit thus becomes more easily 
accessible for this kind of borrower which might have been neglected previously by 
lenders. 
Nevertheless, there are exceptions which do not appear to be affected to a great 
extent by the level of concentration and consolidation in the banking sector. Large firms 
with relatively easy access to foreign markets, face fewer constraints in accessing long-
term capital than the smaller firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). In less 
developed economies specifically, a large proportion of large firms are foreign owned, 
often subsidiaries of firms from developed countries. These firms have fewer problems in 
accessing capital as they have access to financing from their 'parent' countries or 
international markets. It is generally believed that access to long-term loans is of lesser 
constraint in countries with more developed financial markets, higher per capita income, 
more competitive elections and in countries that are growing more rapidly than in those 
with less developed and slower equivalents (Rostowski, 1995; Hermes and Lensink, 
2000b; Clarke et aI., 2006). Some studies further report that lack of bank supervision and 
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regulation are the hurdles preventing a more advanced banking financial system (Levine, 
2002; Detragiache et aI., 2006). 
On the other hand, equity-based systems function better in those countries that 
firstly, from the economic point of view, have better performing economies and trade with 
developed countries. This trade offers a number of benefits, such as skilled job creation, 
development of more sophisticated products and increased investors' interest from foreign 
countries (Bekaert et aI., 2001). Secondly, the existence of equity-based systems depends 
on the overall financial development of a country, such as the extent of development in the 
banking sector, the bond markets and the use of trade credit (Li, 2007). It can thus be 
suggested that financial development is crucial in determining whether a country is ready 
to open its equity markets. From the political and institutional point of view, equity-based 
systems are observed in countries that have good institutional quality, are democracies and 
receive more FDI (La Porta et aI., 1997; Kim and Kenny, 2007). Bekaert et aI. (2002) also 
note that equity-based systems are prevalent in countries that have improved their 
macroeconomic and institutional conditions but add that a noticeable improvement in 
financial technologies is also necessary. Examples of innovations in financial technology 
are financial liberalisation in a given country, large and small scale privatisation and 
enterprise restructuring. Smith (2003) maintains the existence of equity-based systems is 
positively associated with the activity and liquidity of equity-oriented financial 
intermediaries and trade openness. It has also been observed that laws that protect 
shareholders rights, accounting standards that produce high quality, comprehensive and 
comparable corporate financial statements, good country credit ratings and greater 
economic freedom in a country tend to foster the development of conditions necessary for 
an equity-based system (Alexandrou and Sudarsanam, 200 I). 
Some financial experts warn (Wyplozs, 2002; Prasad et aI., 2003) that there is little 
advantage in opening up equity markets if the macro-economic conditions and the 
institutional infrastructure are not adequately developed. If the transition is premature (e.g. 
when there is inadequate financial regulation) the country faces more risk and instability 
than what it had to absorb when initially liberalising the financial market. The risks 
incurred are typically exchange rate instability and the inability to handle the influx of 
foreign investors, consequently resulting in the loss of business confidence and investment 
interest (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). In this case the change from a bank-based system to 
one in which equity-finance dominates or even bank-finance and market-finance coexist 
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together might have an adverse affect on economic growth (Deidda and Fattouh, 2008). In 
addition to this, Li (2007) comments that countries sometimes subsidise their equity 
markets, as a matter of pride. This suggests that some countries end up with larger equity 
markets than would otherwise be created with the help of efficient institutions. The 
sustainability of such equity markets has been questioned by many (e.g. Bekaert et aI., 
2001; Kim and Kenny, 2007). In our study we examine equity financing as a feasible way 
of securing external capital regularly considered by firms and as an alternative to debt 
financing. We maintain that in order for this newer more advanced form of financing to be 
successful in the transition economies and to lead to a sustainable equity-based system, an 
equity culture has to be developed. 
2.4.1. Equity Culture: The Bedrock of an Equity-based System 
For the development of an equity-based financial system it is necessary that an equity 
culture is created (Myners, 2001). It can be said that equity culture develops alongside an 
equity-based financial system. Existing literature offers several definitions of the 
phenomenon of an equity culture. Some claim that equity culture denotes shared ownership 
receptive by firms and stock company formation (Bekaert et aI., 2002). Others suggests 
that a solid equity culture means that firms are able to finance their business activities 
through financial assets of which share investments account for a significant proportion 
(Beck and Levine, 2004). Equity culture is also defined as 'the route to a wider shareholder 
democracy' (Myners, 2001) or even seen as an expansion of share ownership by 
individuals (Bilias et aI., 2009). Claessens (1995) in his earlier work states that equity 
culture means a market economy that has a corporate sector in which individuals are 
enabled to participate. In some works, however, an exact definition of equity culture is 
missing and authors refer to a 'bundle' of definitions. For instance, Smith (2003) first 
defines the equity culture as the culture of stock markets themselves. Then he implies that 
equity culture actually represents public willingness to invest in stocks. This confuses the 
reader. To avoid confusion, for the purpose of this study, we draw on these earlier works 
yet offer our own definition as we see equity culture as a financing culture adopted by a 
country's corporate sector implying this sector's bigger freedom to opt for equity-oriented 
financing (built on the principle of wealth creation through shared ownership) subject to 
feasible market conditions. Indeed, we see the firm - the basic organisational unit - to be 
the driver for the development of an equity culture. The demand for equity financing by 
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firms as a source of finance necessary for business decisions at the strategic level is a 
determinant of an equity culture's existence or nonexistence. Therefore, we see the 
willingness of individuals to invest in stocks or the expansion of stock markets as supply 
conditions contributing to the development of an equity culture and not its driving 
elements. 
We believe and in this respect are congruent with earlier literature (Bekaert et aI., 
2002) that a developed equity culture requires a broad investor base which can only be 
sustained if the investor confidence is strong. The investor must be confident about the 
regulatory and legal aspects of the financial market environment. Without an adequate 
regulatory and corporate governance system in place that secures fairness and transparency 
the existence of an equity culture is not viable. The investors must be convinced that they 
are making decisions based on reliable information (Monks and Minow, 2001) and that the 
management is running the business for the benefit of shareholders (Myners, 2001). In 
addition, the investor/shareholder must be willing to undertake riskier business behaviour 
(Kwok, Tadesse, 2006) and must be flexible with his decision-making (Guiso et aI., 2003). 
Traditionally, equity culture, as defined in this study, is best developed in countries 
with liquid stock markets. Such markets normally encompass a broad range of economic 
sectors (e.g. industrial, financial and resource), offer a wide range of financial instruments 
(e.g. share futures, index derivatives, etc.), manage the risk with hedging tools and obey 
the rules of clearing and settlement systems (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Indeed, it can be 
said that the development of equity culture has got good economic reasons (Claessens, 
1995; Black, 1997, Smith, 2003). Liquid financial markets encourage saving and attract 
investors that enable firms to raise the necessary capital. A distinct equity culture and high 
market capitalisation lowers firms' financing costs and thus opens new windows of 
opportunity for investment. Firms with injected financial capital contribute to the economic 
health and further development (Beck et aI., 2000). They provide employment, contribute 
to the creation of knowledge and foster innovative thinking. Without adequate capital firms 
cannot develop their business and that has negative implications for the broader economy. 
This fact is true in the case of transition economies which are typically debt finance 
oriented and have an underdeveloped equity culture. 
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2.4.2. Equity Culture and the Transition Economies 
Transition economies are characterised by their bank-based financial systems (Gehrke and 
Knell, 1992). The fact that equity financing has not been extremely successful as a source 
of capital acquirement in transition countries is not surprising. The former centrally 
planned systems embedded constraints and simply did not allow for the development of 
equity financing. It is believed that the development of equity financing as an equal form to 
debt financing has been hindered due to special country interests (Stiglitz, 1999). Indeed, 
equity culture development supporters have had to overcome massive obstacles, such as 
mistrust of stock exchanges, nationalistic aversion to adopting 'Anglo-Saxon' financial 
techniques and resistance to sound corporate practices on which a viable public equity 
market depends (Smith, 2003). 
Specifically, in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the former 
communist regimes opposed the development of stock markets, the primary financial 
intermediaries of equity-based financing, and thus their level of development in 1989 was 
comparable to the British stock markets in the 19th century (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). 
Indeed, only a small part of corporate investments was financed by equity (Kornai, 2006). 
As a result of the narrow scope of financial markets in Central and Eastern Europe, capital 
providers have associated firm financing in these transition countries with higher risk than 
in other more developed economies (Wyplozs, 2002). The disregard for transparency, 
medium to high levels of bankruptcy and lack of adequate business expertise and 
experience have been identified as the main reasons for this (Bakker and Gross, 2004). 
Despite considerable advances over the last decade, existing European financial markets 
are still functioning below their potential (EBRD, 2006). As a result, European 
development and particularly the transition EU economies have been losing out on jobs 
and growth. Economists agree that the main reason for this is the fragmentation of these 
markets which is driven by domestic bias, inefficient regulation and risk-averse culture. 
This results in an inability of many funds to become sufficiently specialised and to achieve 
critical mass within a (short) timescale (i.e. attracting large number of companies and 
investors). Therefore, the majority of firms in the CEECs have preferred traditional ways 
of financing such as debt financing, leasing and renting. 
However, recent views point out that a combination of global and region-specific 
factors gives an indication that there may be a realistic potential for equity culture 
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development in transition economies (Segal, 2009). Firstly, the recent financial CrISIS 
highlighted a number of 'cracks' in the current banking sector and the issues related to the 
corporate sector's over-dependence on it. Secondly, the economic improvement 
demonstrated in the majority of transition economies prior to the financial crisis (e.g. 
removed restrictions on foreign ownership, improved accounting and information 
standards) and in many cases the transition countries' ability to limit the negative 
consequences caused by the financial crisis have been identified as reasons to believe that 
the 'promotion' of equity financing. as a direct competitor to debt could be plausible 
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Cumulatively, these events could be seen as potential 
catalysts for the development of an equity culture in transition economies. 
In the case of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) the 
following has to be noted. Firstly, the reform process in the CEECs is still ongoing. 
Although the CEECs succeeded in complying with the economic requirements imposed 
upon them by the European Union (EU), the financial liberalisation process is far from 
being finished (EBRD, 2009). This provides an opportunity for correct economic policy 
shaping which could be potentially geared towards supporting an equity culture in these 
countries. Secondly, events such as privatisation of formerly state owned businesses, the 
establishment of the Euro currency and the shift in the pension systems from state-owned 
to individual retirement accounts and defined contribution pension plans (just to name a 
few) have prompted the 'equity culture' supporters to raise their hopes. Thirdly, the 
substitution of top-down corporate governance systems based on central planning with 
corporate governance systems that react to and base their decisions upon market signals is 
seen by many some as a signal for the change of direction of these countries' financial 
systems (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Fourthly, the increased interest of foreign investors 
in the CEE region has a significant impact as 'equity culture' emerges where a strong 
investor base is. The increased interest of the foreign investors has been prompted by the 
downturn in the mature equity markets. Investors are therefore looking for new and 
exciting markets with substantial growth and potential. The CEECs might not be the centre 
of their investment activities (with the BRIC countries taking the prime) but the spillover 
effect may have an economic policy changing impact. Lastly, but perhaps most 
importantly, the majority of the corporate sector in the CEECs is dissatisfied with the 
financing services their financial systems offer (EBRD, 2008b). Indeed, a strong increase 
in the demand for sophisticated financial services in the rapidly expanding economies of 
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Central and Eastern Europe has been noted (EBRD, 2006). Many firms in the CEECs feel 
that the limited availability of finance is the major constraint to their growth and 
development as many have their bank loan applications declined or receive only part of 
what they requested (Scholtens, 2000). Furthermore, due to limited competition at the local 
level, banks are able to overcharge for their capital raising services, with the effect of 
locking companies into long-term relationships. The banking sector also has started to 
require an increased amount of information on business propositions before granting loans. 
This has could remove an advantage of bank finance (because it was quick and easy to 
arrange). Klapper et a1. (2002) find that the main sources of dissatisfaction firms express 
are red tape, poor services, excessive bank charges and the inappropriateness of solutions 
offered. 
From the research perspective, international authorities (e.g. The World Bank, The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) have recognised that transition 
economies as new democratic economies have a high growth potential and therefore, have 
called for more scientific work on the transition type of economy (DE CD, 2009). Indeed, 
since the transition process started, financial systems in these countries have started to be 
analysed, transition processes in individual countries have been evaluated and some 
downfalls of the existing systems rooted in the inherited legacy of the previous regime 
have been identified (Underhill, 1995; Bakker and Gross, 2004; Doyle and Walsh, 2005). 
However, a number of authors have identified more areas that need further clarification 
and gaps that require additional research. 
For instance, Purda (2008) points out that there is a need for further research on 
transition countries (e.g. transition economies of the CEECs) as 'caution should be used in 
extending the results from research on financial systems of developed economies with 
well-functioning financial markets to the context of transition and post-transition 
countries'. Bekaert and Harvey (2002) stress the requirement for a better understanding of 
the combination of factors (macro-economic and institutional) influencing financial system 
reforms in transition markets and Klapper and Love (2003) emphasise the need to fe-focus 
the research in transition economies from country-level to firm-level, or a combination of 
these two levels. Pinkowitz et a1. (2002) highlight the need to analyse corporate 
governance mechanisms when assessing financing choices of firms, in particular equity 
capital, in transition economies. Fisher et a1. (1997) and later on Kornai (2006) add at the 
corporate level, the motivations behind firm financing choices should be more closely 
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examined. Bakker and Gross (2004) call for more attention specifically to the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe as ' these markets are particularly interesting 
since they provide us with a number of comparable, yet in many interesting respects, 
different cases'. Also, the need to provide empirical knowledge on factors affecting the 
CEECs ' future financial systems' developments and direction has been accentuated by 
many (e.g. Hermes and Lensink, 2000; Nord, 2000) with some particularly stressing the 
importance of an assessment from the equity financing perspective (EBRD, 1998; Smith, 
2003). However, to our knowledge, in the case of the transition literature, the attention to 
equity culture as a phenomenon coexisting in a financial system with a strong capital 
market sector, the effect of its limited existence in the transition economies and viable 
suggestions for its possible development have been neglected. This is where our study adds 
value. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The literature revIew has enabled us to outline issues related to our research problem, 
identify and justify our research subject and understand the limitations of scientific work 
performed in our research area. A diagram adapted from Booth et al. (1995) shows III a 
nutshell our literature review process. 
Figure 2.2.: A Flow Diagram of Literature Review: Application to Our Study 
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THESIS RESU L T s l 
In our study we aim to investigate a number of issues related to the phenomenon of 
equity culture and its development in transition economies with special focus on ten 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. We pose four research questions. 
Firstly, to investigate the environmental forces which affect the development of an equity 
culture in transition economies and identify specific conditions stemming from these 
environmental forces that have to be satisfied in order for an equity culture to develop we 
create first two research question as follows: 
1. What are the main environmental forces that shape the direction of a financial system 
development towards creating an equity culture in a transition economy? 
2. What conditions stemming from the environmental forces guide the process of moving 
towards the creation of an equity culture in a transition economy? 
We provide answers to these questions by developing a conceptual framework in 
Chapter 3. Our second research question is further empirically examined with a specific 
group of transition economies - the CEECs through benchmarking and clustering in 
Chapter 6. Secondly, the CEECs are further examined as we empirically evaluate the 
nature of factors affecting equity culture development in these countries. This is achieved 
with a regression analysis in Chapter 7. This analysis thus answers our next research 
question which is formulated as follows: 
3. Under what specific external and internal factors is the creation of an equity culture 
feasible in the CEECs? 
Furthermore, to be able to suggest policy recommendations at the government and 
financial institutions level we draw on a comparative analysis of three separate cases. Each 
case examines a country with different level or potential for equity culture development 
identified in the prior empirical analysis sections. We distinguish between three different 
groups of countries: Firstly, 'leaders' - countries that demonstrate the best potential for 
equity culture development; secondly, 'potentials' - countries that with some improvement 
of relevant market conditions reveal a realistic possibility for an equity culture 
development; and lastly, 'laggards' - countries that show low potential for the creation of 
equity culture due to unfavourable conditions. This helps us to give an answer to our final 
research question: 
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4. Which strategies should be followed by business practitioners and financial institutions 
and what policies should be adopted by governments and financial organisations in 
order to support the development of an equity culture in the transition economies of the 
CEECs? 
To sum up, in our work we aim to conceptually and empirically investigate the 
potential for an equity culture development in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe. This aspect of a financial system development and the chosen research 
approach have not been detected in the prior research. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce a new conceptual framework that explains the 
process of equity culture development in transition economies. We propose that equity 
culture may develop in transition economies if firms do not incur excessive transaction 
costs when demanding equity financing as compared to the size of transaction costs 
associated with the more commonly used debt financing. The size of transaction costs is 
determined by the character of conditions affecting the demand for equity finance. Such 
conditions originate from internal and external environments of the firm. Our conceptual 
framework enables us to determine not only the nature of these environments but also the 
specific conditions these environments have to satisfy. The role of the conceptual 
framework is thus to provide answers to the first two of our research questions. Firstly, 
what the main environmental influences affecting an equity culture development are, and 
secondly, which conditions stemming from those environments have to be met so that 
equity culture may be developed. 
To limit ambiguity, we note the following: Firstly, the research focus is on the 
financing of firm activities at a strategic level, where internal capital is no longer adequate 
(primarily due to the size of the capital requirement which firms are unable to generate 
internally) and external capital is necessary. Therefore, we presume that firms seeking 
external finance have two options: debt or equity. We thus attempt to investigate what 
motivates firms to switch to a new source of capital or increase the levels of a less used 
Source of external capital, such type of capital being equity. 
Secondly, to achieve the status of a developed economy is not restricted to the 
adoption of an equity culture. Indeed, there are countries that are developed economies yet 
have not acquired a dominant equity culture. Germany and Japan are the prime examples 
of such economies (Levine, 2002; Amable, 2003; Smith, 2003). Therefore, the conceptual 
framework serves the purpose of a theoretical tool designed to assess the feasibility of an 
equity oriented financing as an alternative to a debt based financing in those economies 
that are striving to achieve the status of developed economies. This argument is graphically 
depicted in Fig. 3.1. It shows that individual countries' positions can be plotted in terms of 
the equity culture presence (horizontal level displaying low and high equity culture) and 
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the level of economic development (vertical level displaying transition and developed 
economies). Country x depicts a less developed transition economy with a weak bank 
system providing unattractive debt and an almost non-existent equity culture. Country y 
represents a more developed transition economy with a stronger banking system and some 
demand for equity financing . Countries z and ware both examples of developed 
economies. The former has a bank based developed financial system and thus low equity 
culture while the latter exhibits the presence of an equity based developed financial system 
and thus high equity culture. 
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This theory-building chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, we justify the need for a 
new theoretical approach as we look at earlier corporate finance theories. Secondly, we 
explain our approach of theory bridging that we apply for the development of the 
conceptual framework, followed by a detailed explanation of the conceptual framework 
itself. Then we formulate several propositions and conclude the chapter with a summary. 
3.2. The Need for a New Theoretical Approach 
According to the Economics and Corporate Finance literatUre, sources of financial capital 
commonly comprise debt, equity, or some combination of these two (Boot and Thakor, 
1997; Allen and Gale, 2000; Vitols, 2001; Boldizzoni, 2008). Discussions on the subject of 
capital supply are offered by a number of scholars (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Williamson, 1985; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Nevertheless, we examine 
three most influential theories: The Pecking Order Theory, the Trade-Off Theory, and The 
Market-Timing Hypothesis. The perspectives from which these theories address the issue 
of capital structure and their applicability to our study are given primary attention. 
Firstly, in the 'Pecking Order Theory', Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms 
prefer internal financing (i.e. financing obtained by means of savings or inheritance) to 
external financing (i.e. financing granted by another person or institution). In the case of a 
need for external capital, firms prefer new debt financing (at reasonably low interest rates) 
to new equity financing. They claim that firms follow the hierarchy of financing sources, 
with internal financing being the first choice over external financing and debt financing 
being preferable to equity financing. They see the size of capital that firms require as the 
constraining factor in determining the appropriate source, not its actual availability in an , 
economy. Secondly, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) on the other hand argue that firms 
decide on the financing source by balancing the costs and benefits. Their 'Trade-Off 
Theory', often seen as a competitor to the 'Pecking Order Theory', assumes that firms 
trade-off the tax benefits of debt with the bankruptcy costs of debt when making the 
financing decisions. Thirdly, Baker and Wurgler (2002) contrast with the two former 
theories by stating that firms always look for the cheaper type of financing regardless of 
their current levels of internal resources, debt or equity. According to this corporate 
finance theory - the 'Market Timing Hypothesis' - firms choose a source of financing that 
is at the time of decision-making more highly valued by financial markets, in a sense that 
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firms would opt for debt financing during sound debt periods and for equity during 
attractive equity periods. 
However, the applicability of these theories to our research is limited. Empirical 
evidence suggests that neither the Pecking Order, Trade-off nor Market Timing Hypothesis 
theories can fully explain the capital structure choices of firms in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Delcoure, 2007). The reason for this claims to be the specificity of 
factors observed in these transition economies such as the differences and financial 
constraints of banking systems, shareholders and bondholders rights protection, 
sophistication of equity and bond markets and corporate governance. However, some 
scholars (Booth et aI., 2001; Novorozhkin, 2003) suggest that these countries follow the 
modified 'pecking order' as their corporate sectors rely heavily on external short-term 
(debt) rather than long-term (equity) capital. This is due to the limited length of operations 
of their stock exchanges, trading mechanisms, market capitalization. Haas and Peeters 
(2006) point out that retained earnings and short-term debt are not sufficient capital options 
. to fuel corporate and economic growth. Transition authors generally agree (Booth et aI., 
2001) that there is still ample room in these transition economies to further deepen their 
financial markets. 
We further maintain that the common drawback is the perspective from which these 
theories examine the financing choices. They adopt a developed financial system 
perspective and therefore automatically assume that firms have a number of financing 
options (bank or equity) available, that the financial intermediaries are present and 
favourable and that the institutional and macro-economic conditions, i.e. the national 
competitiveness levels are quite stable and high.4 These conditions are not present in less 
developed economies in a form equal to more developed economies. In the CEECs, for 
example, the understanding of equity culture is limited (SchoItens, 2000), the availability 
of equity finance is low (Bakker and Gross, 2004), and the few operating capital markets 
are highly illiquid (Thatcher, 2007). For these reasons, the CEECs are 'tagged' as countries 
with almost non-existent equity culture. 
In addition these existing theories do not conceptually explain what the main 
influences that contribute to the development of a particular type of a financial system are 
4 The 2008 'World Competitiveness Report' confirms that, despite the global economic downturn, developed 
countries are able to protect their status of 'developed' countries and maintain relatively high competitiveness 
levels in comparison to developing and emerging economies. 
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and which factors in particular determine the development of an equity culture. In our 
thesis we focus on the strategic (i.e. long-term) sources of finance (debt and equity). To 
investigate the potential for equity culture development in the CEECs we thus develop a 
conceptual framework which draws on the modified corporate structure theory of 'pecking 
order'. We maintain that financing decision-making of firms depends on the size of 
transaction costs such firms incur when deciding on the most adequate source of external 
finance. It is important to mention that we adopt an early economic approach to the 
definition of transaction costs and thus define it as the total cost associated with debt or 
equity rather than the contractual part of raising finance. 
Our theoretical approach which bridges managerial, strategic and institutional 
theories enables us to understand the complex set of factors that affect the financing 
decision-making of firms toward equity financing and thus shape equity culture creation in 
a country. The theory bridging approach and the individual theories are explained in the 
next section. We maintain that this relatively new theoretical concept innovatively initiates 
. discussion about the motives and incentives behind the firms' financial decision-making. 
This subject has been previously given little attention by the Economics and Corporate 
Finance literature. This is where our study adds specific value. 
3.3. Approach 
The main contribution of conceptual framework, as a research strategy for theory building, 
is that it forces us to think in a systematic manner about research problems (Botha, 1989). 
We find that the complex process of immersion, the testing of previous assumptions and 
the modification of those assumptions altogether ultimately lead to theory building. We \ 
apply this intellectual research strategy in an attempt to make sense out of the data that we 
have uncovered (Shields and Tajalli, 2006). We believe, and in this regard we follow on 
Gioia and Pitre's (1990) theory building work, that the nature of a conceptual framework 
should be seen as a search for comprehensiveness stemming from bridging different 
theoretical views. The concept of theory bridging is indeed seen as a powerful theory 
building tool (Botha, 1989; Shields and Tajalli, 2006) and it has been recently popularised 
in the fields of Strategic Management (SM) International Business (lB). In fact, the 3rd 
JIBS Annual Conference on Emerging Research Frontiers in International Business (2006) 
focused solely on the subject of bridging ofIB theories, constructs and methods. Volberda 
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(2006) states that due to the fragmentation of the IB field, the integration and synthesis of 
adjacent theories is necessary. Oesterle and Laudien (2007) add that the need to model co-
evolutionary frameworks is accentuated by the dynamics of the today's firm sector and the 
innumerable contexts we find it in. On the whole, we find that modem scientists (Gioia and 
Pitre, 1990; Volberda, 2006; Oesterle and Laudien, 2007) agree that in order for the IB 
research to matter more and be better applicable to the real business world, researchers 
should not only study the firm survival or success, but also the quality of the economic 
sector, culture and people - the stakeholders that encompass the firm and its existence. 
The firm and its financing mechanisms is a complex matter, influenced by both, 
internal as well as external environments. Complex relationships such as the ones between 
firms and their stakeholders, between firms themselves and between firms and the macro-
environment they are embedded in, can seldom be understood through a single theoretical 
lens and therefore a combination of theories is appropriate (Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Gray 
and Wood, 1991). Furthermore, the widened focus of Corporate Finance theories from 
pure profit-maximisation ideas to added growth concepts (Klapper and Love, 2003), 
requires the adoption of a new theoretical perspective which bridges 
manageriallbehavioural, institutional and strategic thinking. In our case, the theory 
bridging strategy serves the purpose of explaining factors that affect financing choices of 
firms internally (within the firm) and externally (outside the firm), and motivate them to 
switch to equity financing. 
We recognise that the financing decisions of firms ultimately represent the demand 
of financing and that economies can only supply financing for which there is demand 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Beck et aI., 2006; Deidda and Fattouh, 2008). We add that it is not 
just economies purely from the economic, but also institutional and intra-firm point of 
view. This demand depends on the motivations behind capital seeking decisions, the risks 
firms are prepared to bear (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 2002), the quality of their 
institutional environments (Williamson, 1985; Peng et aI., 2008) and macro-economic 
'health' of the nation this firm is in (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996; Wyplosz, 
1999). Demand for a new type of financing (such as equity financing in the case of the 
CEECs), initiated for example by a politically driven change of the economic system, can 
only lead to a sustainable financing culture if the macro-economic, institutional and 
managerial environments support it. Furthermore, if the conditions are not adequately 
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developed and aligned with what the corporate sector demands, progress toward a 
developed financial system is prevented. 
The managerial theory of the Resource Based View, the strategic theory of National 
Competitiveness and the institutional theory of Varieties of Capitalism conceptually 
underpin our analysis. These theories and their role in our conceptual framework are 
explained in detail in the next section. 
3.4. Conceptual Framework 
3.4.1. A New Framework with the Help of Old Concepts 
The conceptual framework is based on the traditional profit-maximising view of the firm 
according to which strategic choices of firms are determined by the size of costs involved. 
We believe that the firm ultimately opts for such type of financing that enables it to keep 
its costs to the lowest possible level. We maintain that next to the real (production) costs, it 
is the size of the transaction costs that firms consider. We apply Williamson's (1975) 
definition of transaction costs as "the costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures". The logic of our argument is that if 
the costs of equity finance are too high, firms will not demand it and thus the size of 
transaction costs will prevent an equity culture development. 
Furthermore, Dahlman's (1979) typology of transaction costs, namely the search, 
contracting and co-ordination costs, enables us to differentiate between individual types of 
transaction costs. For the purpose of our research we apply these in the following way. 
Firstly, the search costs can be characterised as costs incurred through searching for the 
best (and available) capital supplier providing equity. Secondly, the contracting costs can 
be identified as the costs of contractual arrangements under equity-based financing options. 
And lastly, the co-ordination costs can be described as costs of managing the relationship 
between the firm and the equity provider. Williamson's (1979) 'Transaction Cost Theory' 
(TCT) which evolved from the 'Theory of the Firm' (Coase, 1937) is, therefore, our 
theoretical starting point. We believe that the size of transaction costs is affected by factors 
internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) to the firm. 
Internally, the size of transaction costs is affected not only by the traditional factors 
of the mainstream Economics and Finance literature - the size of the firm and the firm's 
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performance, but also by other factors such as the firm's former experience with external 
sources of finance, the type and quality of capabilities accumulated throughout the firm's 
existence, managerial preferences and the firm's overall stance towards learning, 
innovation and change. By complementing the traditional Economics outlook with views 
from an increasingly important managerial/strategic stream of literature we are able to 
explain what other factors internal to the firm affect the financing choices. The 'Resource 
Based View' (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Teece et aI., 1997) theoretically underpins our 
concept. 
In addition, we argue that the external environment in which the firm is embedded 
influences the firm's strategic decision-making. Firstly, the institutional environment by 
which we mean the 'set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that 
establishes the basis for production, exchange and production' (Davis and North, 1971) 
affects financial system development. It has been established in the literature (Vito Is, 200 I; 
Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Peng et aI., 2008) that bank based and equity oriented financial 
. systems differ in their institutional set-ups. The firmly established institutional theory of 
'Varieties of Capitalism' (VC) (North, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001) provides us with 
theoretical underpinnings in this respect. Based on this theory we give special attention to 
the finance and corporate governance side of the institutional environment. We explore 
both the qualitative aspects of the institutional environment and the quantitative presence 
of financing institutions (intermediaries) that were able to develop in such institutional 
conditions. The rising influence of institutional theories in the Strategy and International 
Business literature (Peng, 2004; Jackson and Deeg, 2008) also supports the appropriateness 
of its application. 
Secondly, the macro-economic environment which we see as a 'hygiene' factor for 
any advanced financial system development has to be analysed. The concept of national 
competitiveness (NC) (Porter, 1990) provides theoretical foundation for this aspect of our 
examination. We maintain that the level of national competitiveness affects the financing 
choices firms have. Any type of external capital supply, whether bank or equity, requires 
the presence and proper functioning of a competitive economy that is able to attract new 
capital providers and keep the already established ones. It is the more developed 
economies that make it feasible for alternatives to debt oriented sources of capital to 
develop (Bekaert et aI., 2002). We thus see the development and adoption of equity 
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financing associated with lower transaction costs In those countries that carry the 
characteristics of more developed economies. 
In conclusion to this section we sum up our theoretical thinking, which is also 
graphically displayed in Fig. 3.2. Traditionally, firms have two basic financing options 
when seeking external capital. The common occurrence in the financial system 
developments of transition economies is that debt financing is established first, before 
additional external sources such as equity financing, emerge (hence the equity financing 
arrow on right is positioned lower than the debt financing arrow on the left) (Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002; Filatotchev et aI., 2007). The speed and intensity of moving from one 
source of finance to another varies from firm to firm and from country to country. Some 
firms switch to an alternative source of finance as soon as it is established in an economy 
(firm x), others observe, learn, gain experience and then adopt it later (firm y). And, 
inevitably, there are firms that do not switch at all and remain debt financed (firm z). The 
main decision-making factor in this respect is the size of transaction costs. These decrease 
or increase depending on three main influences: the managerial capabilities within the 
firms, and the institutional and macro-economic conditions outside the firms. The 
Resource Based View, the Varieties of Capitalism theory and the National 
Competitiveness approach enable us to put these influences into theoretical concepts. A 
more detailed explanation of all above mentioned theories, and their combination into a 
single theoretical model follows in the next section. 
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Fig. 3.2.: Conceptual Framework - Graphical Display 2 
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3.4.2. Four Players - One Game: The Role of Individual Theories in the Framework 
It has been established that the theory-bridging approach offers a contribution to scientific 
work because it fosters an awareness of different perspectives and thus can tap various 
aspects of research phenomena producing new and uniquely infonnative theoretical views 
of events under study (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). As introduced in the previous section, we 
aim to explain the development of an equity culture in transition economies through a 
multi-paradigm theoretical approach by combining the Economics theory of Transaction 
Costs, managerial theory of Resource Based View, strategic concept of National 
Competitiveness and the institutional theory of Varieties of Capitalism. 
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3.4.2.1. Transaction Costs Theory (TCT): The 'Old and Tested' 
Due to its wide acceptance in the Economics literature and the type of study we perform, 
we adopt the 'Theory of the Firm' (Coase, 1937) as a natural start of our theoretical 
thinking. Since the beginning of the last century a number of economists (Berle and 
Means, 1933; Coase, 1937; Hall and Hitch, 1939; Williamson, 1975; Putterman, 1996; 
Madhok, 2002) have explored this theory in order to explain the firm's existence, 
behaviour, and the firm's relationship with the market. It is considered to be one of the first 
neo-classical concepts from which other streams of theoretical thinking have subsequently 
developed (Putterman, 1996). It identifies cost as the decisive factor for firms to determine 
whether it is more efficient to perform certain tasks internally, by firms, or externally, on 
the market. In his early works, Coase (1937) discussed the 'costs of using the price 
mechanism' and introduced the concept of transaction costs by which he meant the costs 
incurred in making an economic exchange. This concept has gradually progressed into a 
theory - the 'Transaction Cost Theory' (TCT) (Williamson, 1979). 
The application of TCT for our research is unique, pragmatic and at the same time 
fruitful. TCT has been previously applied to determine whether the firm should use internal 
or external resources. This was the essence of the 'make' versus 'buy' decisions (Madhok, 
2002). We argue that the 'transaction costs tool' is also applicable for the analysis of two 
resources stemming from the external level as differences in transaction costs between 
these two resources will emerge. These variations in costs will direct the firm's decision-
making about external sources of financing. 
In our research we focus on the analysis of external sources of capital (debt and/or 
equity) that firms opt for when internal sources are unavailable or no longer adequate. In 
the case of external financing, firms incur higher transaction costs than they would through 
the means of internal financing. However, firms incur these costs willingly as external 
capital is typically used for the financing of more complex, often long-term, strategic-level 
activities. We thus concentrate on the variations in transaction costs in terms of these two 
sources of capital. The transaction costs typology of search, contracting and co-ordination 
costs enables us to better identify the advantages and/or obstacles of individual financing 
choices. From the search costs point of view, firms seeking equity financing may incur 
high costs if the equity financing platform is not present, i.e. if they are unable to find an 
equity provider, or have to search for one in foreign markets. Furthermore, the 
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development of an equity culture may be prevented due to firms' inability to comply with 
the contracting requirements of equity financing. Lastly, firms choosing equity financing 
as an external source of capital may be subject to high transaction costs in the case of poor 
co-ordination of their relationship with the equity provider. This may occur as a result of 
internal limitations, insufficient institutional quality, or adverse macro-economic 
conditions. 
3.4.2.2. The Resource Based View (RBV): The New Perspective 
With the ever stronger influence of managerial and behavioural theories (Lockett and 
Thompson, 2001) in the sphere of international business, the changing focus of the firms 
onto corporate growth issues (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et aI., 2000) and the 
changing status of the firms to 'learning units' (Teece et aI., 1997), the exclusivity of a 
purely economic view on the matters of corporate finance is no longer viable. It has to be 
set against managerial thinking (Baumol, 1993). Considerations on the ways managers use 
the firm's internal resources and capabilities (Teece et aI., 1997), the extent to which they 
base their decisions on past experiences, and the ability, willingness and readiness of their 
firm to dynamically develop and adapt, enable us to explain the incentives and motives 
behind particular financing choices of firms. 
We thus adopt RBV, a managerial theory from the Strategic Management 
perspective, viewed by many (Madhok, 2002) as a natural complement to the TCT. Indeed, 
RBV concentrates on the identification of those firm specific resources and capabilities 
that enable firms to gain and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; 
Barney, 1986; Barney and Hesterly, 2008) and enhance the value creation of the firm 
(Lockett et aI., 2009). RBV, as part of rapidly growing behavioural aspect of Strategic 
Management literature, gives us information about how firms actually operate and what 
affects their strategic decision-making. 
The approach we adopt is to treat the RBV primarily as a theory that offers insights 
about the decision-making behaviour of managers. The issues of the dynamic capabilities 
development such as the creation of knowledge together with the path dependency 
phenomenon and the managerial intentionality aspect are our primary interest. The 
dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece, 2007) discusses how the firm has to re-adjust to a 
rapidly changing business environment resulting in renewing or altering its existing 
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resources (Teece et aI., 1997; Wang and Ahmed, 2007). We are interested in how these re-
adjustments affect the firms' financing choices and to what extent they could trigger 
switching to an alternative source of external capital. 
Every firm develops a set of unique capabilities through learning (Pedler et aI., 1997; 
Senge, 2006). Firms acquire knowledge through 'learning by doing' when conducting 
business. Lack of knowledge and experience is related to the limitation of options and 
possibly to higher costs. Firms initially follow a strategy that helps them to develop a set of 
unique resources and capabilities. Unless they are motivated to change they follow the path 
that has worked initially, that's been adopted as a norm and that works. Path-dependent 
tendency is thus regarded as an incremental part of the learning process (Wang and 
Ahmed, 2007). It is, however, not the only factor that internally affects the strategic 
decision-making. We believe and in this respect are in line with Hutzschenreuter et al. 's 
(2007) argument that once path dependencies are accounted for, there may still some 
unexplained corporate behaviour remain. Why is it that some firms opt for an alternative 
Source of finance quicker than others? Why some firms won't consider alternative sources 
of finance despite the fact that the path dependent patterns have been 'broken ,?5 The factor 
of managerial intentionality can explain this. 
Managers' intentions inevitably vary from case to case. For some the strategic focus 
IS on the 'stay regional versus go global' aspect, for others it is the 'imitate versus 
innovate' aspect. We believe that the variation can be explained through the attitude 
towards risk, learning, workers' motivation, professional (e.g. finance) skills, level of 
domestic and international experience, just to name a few. In line with Adler's (1997) 
findings, we believe that national culture influences the values, attitudes and behaviour of 
individuals. We, therefore, reason that individual's perception of uncertainty and attitudes 
toward risk are affected by the national culture in which the individual resides. To support 
Our argument we are able to provide the findings by K wok and Tadesse (2006) who have 
statistically proven that uncertainty avoidance is a statistically significant variable in 
differentiating natural inclination to a financial system (bank or equity based). However, it 
goes beyond the scope of this study to study national culture as the primary independent 
variable affecting equity culture development. Rather, we consider it in combination with 
other managerial factors named above. 
S Here we mean firms with similar external environment conditions - institutional and overall macro-/micro-
economic. 
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The notion of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture induces the constructive 
discussion on managerial resources and capabilities even further. Entrepreneurial literature 
(Kirzner, 1973; Baumol, 1990; Shane, 2003) suggests that the presence or absence of an 
entrepreneurial culture determines managerial attitudes towards knowledge creation and 
managerial intentionality. Entrepreneurial thinking amongst managers in a firm empowers 
managerial intentionality (Hutzschenreuter et aI., 2007) which in the case of strategic 
financing translates as subjective selection and execution of financing choices. 
Entrepreneurial authors such as Shane (2003) Pisano et aI. (2007) and Bowen and De 
Clercq (2008) are consistent in their view that the existence of entrepreneurial culture 
coincides with the presence of managerial skills, regulation and corruption. Firstly, 
advanced managerial skills, and finance skills in particular, provide managers with a sense 
of autonomy and skills necessary for entrepreneurial thinking. Secondly, a well-specified 
legal system that encourages laws that mandate disclosure, facilitate private enforcement 
through liability rules (La Porta et aI., 2006), offer better protection for minority 
shareholders (La Porta et aI., 1999), and has an impartial judiciary (Whitley, 1999) are the 
regulatory necessities for financing decision-making with entrepreneurial 'flavour'. 
Thirdly, higher levels of corruption, which can be interpreted as lower levels of trust in 
public officials, can adversely influence entrepreneurial thinking. A corrupt environment 
changes frequently and unpredictably (Baumol, 1990). We maintain that corruption 
represents uncertainty and can potentially discourage managers to adopt the role of 
entrepreneurs. Due to the link between entrepreneurship and managerial intentionality we 
aim to investigate the correlation between entrepreneurship, managerial (i.e.) finance skills, 
regulation, corruption and equity culture creation. At this point we observe how the intra-
firm environment and managerial thinking as such are influenced by the institutional 
conditions present in an economy. A progression toward the examination of an institutional 
environment and its place in our conceptual framework is therefore a natural and logical 
step. 
3.4.2.3. Varieties o/Capitalism: Institutions Matter! 
Institutional theories have recently become more important. They have become pivotal in 
strategic managerial thinking and are no longer considered as "background theories" to 
other major firmly established concepts (Peng et aI., 2008). Scholars agree that formal and 
informal institutions, commonly known as the "rules of the game" (North, 1990), shape the 
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strategy and performance of firms (Vitols, 2001; Peng, 2004; Lau et aI., 2007; Jackson and 
Deeg, 2008). North (1990) points out that the informal institutions mirror the national 
culture and the norms adopted. The necessity to understand cultural differences in order to 
fully appreciate the various institutional origins and evolution has been stressed by many 
IB authors (e.g. North, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Buck and Shahrim, 2005; Kwok and 
Tadesse, 2006; Witt and Redding, 2009). North (2005: ix) reasons that ..... the cultural 
component of the scaffolding that humans erect is ... central to the performance of 
economies and policies over time". Wright et al. (2005), in their works on emerging 
economies, go in line with North's observations and stress the role of culture in any 
strategic decision-making. Witt and Redding (2009) add that when habits and routines, the 
two building elements of culture, become fixed, institutions, the layer of societal order, are 
formed. Chui et al. (2002) in their research come to a conclusion that culture does matter 
for corporate structure related considerations. It not only affects the structure of the 
informal institutional system (rules, laws, regulation) but also managements' perception of 
the costs and risks related to debt or equity finance. The previously discussed theory of 
RBV enables us conceptually to include the factor of national culture when considering 
managerial strategic decision-making. On the macro level we observe different types of 
culture through the type, quality and functionality of individual institutional environments 
and thus consider cultural differences only as a subset of complex institutional contexts. 
Research on institutional variations has thrived in socio-economics as the 
'comparative business systems approach' (e.g. Whitley, 1999) and within comparative 
political economy as the 'varieties of capitalism theory' (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008). Researchers have studied the key dimensions of institutional variation 
across various capitalist systems and the implications of this variation in terms of outcomes 
at the national economy and the firm level. The Varieties of Capitalism theory (VC) (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001) - identifies different forms of capitalism by pointing out the 
institutional differences. The core distinction VC draws is between two types of 
institutional environments, liberal market economies (LMEs) and co-ordinated market 
economies (CMEs). The context of competition and formal contracting are central to 
liberal market economies while in coordinated market economies more collaborative rather 
than competitive relationships prevail and a strategic interaction among firms and other 
actors replaces typical demand and supply conditions behaviour of competitive liberal 
markets (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). These two forms of capitalism constitute ideal types at 
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the poles of a spectrum along which other nations can be displayed. Therefore, the VC 
theory is also useful for understanding institutional environments of those countries that do 
not exactly follow one or the other pattern earlier introduced (Lane and Myant, 2007). 
Principally, VC conceptualises how corporate behaviour is affected by the institutions of 
political economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It identifies the firm as the centre of the 
analysis and thus 'builds bridges' between Business Studies and Comparative Political 
Economy. This firm-centered view fits our concept, as we see the firm as the main 'actor' 
in equity culture development. The relationship of the firm with institutional 'actors' 
determines the size of transaction costs and thus the feasibility of equity culture creation. 
For the purpose of this inquiry, we focus on one sphere of the formal institutional 
environment identified by VC - corporate governance6• Corporate governance is linked to 
financial system development in the mainstream Economics and Finance literature (La 
Porta et aI., 1997; Levine, 1997; Kaufmann et aI., 2000). The extent of corporate 
governance in a country determines which type of external finance is accessible and most 
viable. We focus on those institutional aspects that affect financing decision-making of 
firms. Although the 'rules of the game' principle (North, 1990) characterises the main 
function of corporate governance, its importance can hardly be restricted to the legal 
framework. Other elements of weak corporate governance such as excessive bureaucracy, 
disruptive corruption, poor transparency, and low democratic accountability have the 
POwer of imposing significant costs to firms and therefore are crucial considerations for the 
quality of an institutional environment. Not only do such conditions deter external capital 
providers from entering the market and growing, but also steer firms towards traditional 
ways of financing. Financial intermediaries adopt different ways of dealing with these 
market imperfections. Banks, for example, don't condition the provision of capital on 
publicly available data (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996) and their strong 
Contractual culture safeguards them from ·the weaknesses of the corporate governance 
system as a whole. On the other hand, equity providers, such as institutional or private 
investors gain information about firms from publicly available sources. Therefore, in order 
to access finance, businesses need to understand 'the rules of transparency', which we 
translate as adherence to law and order, adequate bureaucratic quality and successful 
limitation of corrupt practices. We use the ultimate representatives of each institutional 
6 
The other four spheres - industrial relations, vocational training and education, inter-firm relations, 
employees - are not directly applicable for our research topic. Hall and Soskice (2001) provide a detailed 
analysis of these. 
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environment - Germany and Japan for the CMEs and the UK and USA for the LMEs as 
our benchmarks to simulate the institutional structure of the financing sector in each 
country. 
In addition to the qualitative, corporate governance assessment of the institutional 
environment, we also examine the structure of the financial intermediaries sector in order 
to determine the presence or absence of equity oriented financial institutions. In line with 
earlier literature (Offe, 1996) which states that firms automatically make such strategic 
financing choices (debt or equity) for which there is institutional support we thus claim that 
the institutional structure is another significant determinant of equity culture development. 
Vittas (1998) adds that the degree of development of non-bank financial intermediaries is 
not only a specification tool on the type of financing dominating in an economy but also a 
determinant of a country's overall level of financial development. We thus reason that a 
complementary relationship between firms, financial intermediaries and corporate 
governance practices steers corporate demand for external capital toward a specific 
financial direction (debt or equity). Ultimately, the decision-making factor on the type of 
capital selected will be the size of transaction costs a firm incurs during this process. 
3.4.2.4. National Competitiveness (NC): An External Determinant of Financing Choices 
No firm exists in a vacuum and its existence is externally affected by the competitive 
nature of the macro-environment it is embedded in. Political forces of individual nations 
are usually set to promote competitiveness and thus build corporate and national 
competitive confidence. There are many and complex determinants of national 
competitiveness. Modem economists (Porter, 1990; Schwab and Porter, 2008) have 
highlighted the institutional and economic factors as the two main constituents of national 
competiveness that determine the level of productivity of a country and the performance of 
individual firms. Indeed, the role of a country's competitiveness in determining the 
functioning of firms and the strategies they choose to pursue has been stressed by many 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988; Porter, 1990; Peteraf, 1993; Schwab and Porter, 2008). 
Our approach to studying national competitiveness is to focus on the performance 
(competitiveness) of a country's national economic system. This approach is not 
uncommon. It has been noted in the literature (e.g. Hamalainen, 2003) that researchers tend 
to substitute the word 'competitiveness' with 'economic performance' due to an overlap of 
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theoretical arguments in the fields of economic growth and international competitiveness. 
We see national competitiveness as a measure of a nation's economic capability and 
potential in the world economy. Nations that are competitive are able to meet the needs of 
their corporate sectors and thus contribute to the fulfilment of their strategic goals (Raj an 
and Zingales, 2003b). Therefore, it can be said that the competitiveness level of a nation 
reflects this nation's ability to provide prosperity to its firms - the main economic drivers 
of any economy. We are able to determine the level of competitiveness within each nation 
by studying a country's economic strength in terms of ~conomic stability and growth, 
productivity, trade openness, structure and by examining the presence of the most potent 
macro-economic factors such as labour costs, interest rates, exchange rates, GDP growth 
and others as determined by Michael Porter in his works on national competitiveness 
(Porter, 1980; Porter, 1990; Schwab and Porter, 2008). 
We reason that the level of national competitiveness affects financing choices of 
firms and therefore impacts on equity culture development. In countries with strong 
competitive confidence, firms have more financing choices and the incentives to use the 
sources in order to fulfil their (and consequently their countries') growth potential (King 
and Levine, 1993; Beck et aI., 2005). Empirical research has confirmed that banks and any 
other forms of non-bank financial intermediaries are more active and efficient in advanced 
(competitive) economies (Beck et aI., 2001) On the other hand, in countries with lower 
levels of macro-economic performance where inflation is not under control, interest rates 
are disproportionally high and economic growth is stagnating, firms cannot make informed 
strategic decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 2003b). Advanced financial systems, whether 
bank or equity based, are associated with the presence of competitive national economies. 
However, national economies that are less competitive are more commonly able to 
facilitate the functioning of bank oriented financial systems than equity based financial 
systems (Bekaert et aI., 2001). Therefore, we maintain that economies with higher levels of 
national competitiveness are in a better position to develop equity culture than their less 
competitive counterparts. 
The Transaction Costs Theory, the Resource Based View, the theory of Varieties of 
Capitalism and the concept of National Competitiveness are bridged together to provide a 
conceptual answer to the problem of equity culture development in transition economies. 
We have identified the firm and its demand for equity financing as the main driver of 
equity culture development in a country. Firms may opt for equity financing if the 
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transaction costs they incur in the process of searching for an equity provider, creating a 
contractual relationship with an equity provider and co-ordinating a business relationship 
with an equity provider are low due to favourable (equity financing) conditions. These 
supply conditions are of macro-economic, institutional and managerial nature. In order to 
'crystallise' the concepts, we put forward several propositions. These are introduced in the 
next section. 
3.S. Propositions 
Based on the focal concepts fundamental to our discussion we devise propositional 
statements - the parameters for our theory. The fundamental role of propositions is to 
provide explanation or information about an aspect of reality (Chatman, 1996). Their value 
to the theory building process lies in their ability to be tested, thereby strengthening or 
weakening our theory (Botha, 1989; Chatman, 1996). We believe that to carefully design 
propositions a revisit of the research questions is a logical approach. A research question 
should respond to an inquiry being proposed, suggest generalisable links with similar or 
varied phenomena and give fresh insight to matters of our research concern (Chatman, 
1996). Our research questions are the following: 
1. What are the main environmental forces that shape the direction of a financial system 
development towards creating an equity culture in a transition economy? 
2. What conditions stemming from the environmental forces guide the process of moving 
towards the creation of an equity culture in a transition economy? 
3. Under what specific external and internal factors is the creation of an equity culture 
feasible in the CEECs? 
4. Which strategies should befollowed by business practitioners andfinancial institutions 
and what policies should be adopted by governments and financial organisations in 
order to support the development of an equity culture in the transition economies of the 
CEECs? 
The purpose of propositions in our conceptual framework is to act as a guide when 
examining issues related to an equity culture creation in two ways. Firstly, to determine the 
nature and significance of individual internal and external environments on the equity 
culture development in transition economies for the firm as such and then for specific 
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group sizes (Large, SMEs and Micro firms). Secondly, to identify the conditions these 
environments have to display in order to accommodate an equity culture development. 
3.5.1. Environmental Forces Affecting Equity Culture Development 
In the conceptual framework introduced previously we determined three key sources of an 
external and internal influence on the equity culture creation. These are the macro-
economic, institutional and managerial environments. We believe that a competitive 
macro-economic environment acts as a basic support mechanism for any form of an 
advanced financial system development, and therefore is also a necessary prerequisite for 
equity culture creation. Furthermore, the institutional and managerial environments have a 
crucial role, as they steer the direction of financial system development toward a specific 
type: bank or equity oriented. 
We thus put forward Proposition 1: 
PI: Equity culture development in transition economies is shaped by a combination of 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments. 
However, we propose that these environments do not affect individual firm size 
groups 7 in the same way and weight due to the varied internal characteristics of these 
groups. Therefore, an assessment of the Micro firms, SMEs and Large firms follows in 
terms of the incentives behind a) accessing external sources of capital, and b) opting for the 
specific type of equity capital and thus forming an equity culture. 
3.5.1.1. Micro Firms 
Micro firms are not a homogenous group (Hill and McGowan, 1999). The group's 
diversity is reflected in the high variability of individual micro firms. It includes high 
technology knowledge based firms as well as small corner shops. Firms with high growth 
aspirations on one hand with the so called 'life style businesses' on the other, share the 
population of this group. 
The informal management style of Micro firms (Chell and Baines, 2000) is reflected 
in the strategic planning. Perren (1999) reasons that formal strategic planning is normally 
7 For firm typology we apply the size variable as defined by the EU in 2006 and thus identify three finn 
types: Micro finns, SMEs and Large firms (for exact definitions see Chapter 4) 
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not present in the Micro firms and that any strategic decision-making is informal and 
normally not communicated to other stakeholders. Later research found that the Micro-firm 
managers/owners make strategic decisions based on intuition and previous experience 
(Kelliher and Reinl, 2007). Schaper et ai. (2005) also point out that the Micro firm 
owner/manager can't often distinguish between strategic planning/decision-making and 
day-to-day problem solving. Decisions are made without any form of long-term planning. 
As a result, decisions with short-term focus that result in short-term returns are favoured 
over those that require long-term investment. This, consequently, has got an impact on the 
long-term success. 
The majority of Micro firms are not growth focused (Perren, 1999). The literature 
explains the lack of growth in two main ways. Firstly, the growth poverty is attributed to 
the lack of resources (Chell and Baines, 2000). Poor resource base leaves little opportunity 
for development, learning and reflection. This fosters a culture that is not prone to growth 
and not open to change. Secondly, it is explained by the lack of managerial capability 
(Schaper et aI., 2005). Managerial skills and capabilities are particularly important in 
established business as these enable the owner(s)/manager(s) to deal with external shocks. 
Previous research states that the majority of Micro firm owners/managers have managerial 
shortcomings (Kelliher and Reinl, 2007). Their managerial skills are developed by trial and 
error (Schaper et aI., 2005) as they perform the day-to-day business activities. Many 
authors see the business ownership as a 'learning experiment' in itself and believe that it 
protects some from business failure (e.g. Chell and Baines, 2000). 
Furthermore, the sustainability of many Micro firms is questionable as high failure 
rates are representative of this group. As many as forty percent of Micro firms cease to 
exist within the first three years and eighty percent fail to trade in the longer term (Perren, 
1999). The same research also indicates that there is little difference between Micro 
businesses that fail and those that are just surviving. This suggests the vulnerability of the 
Micro firm sector. 
Due to the fragile nature of their business establishment and the general lack of 
collateral, Micro firms experience difficulty in obtaining capital from external capital 
providers (Perren, 1999). They are considered a high risk and therefore are charged a high 
risk premium by lenders. Perren (1999) empirically confirms that the lack of finance is 
positively correlated with the high business failure of the Micro firm. Furthermore, the 
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smallness of the Micro firm is usually reflected in the small value of its transactions. For 
instance, the cost of using formal institutions is relatively high for this type of business. 
Similarly, it is costly for formal institutions to lend capital to small businesses because of 
the fixed administrative costs which are high relative to the earnings from the transactions 
performed by the firm. The most popular sources of external finance for Micro firms are 
loans from family and friends, overdrafts and bank loans (Mead and Liedholm, 1998). 
These are all debt-based. Venture capital is the only and least used source of capital by 
Micro firms that functions around the notion of an equity culture. A small niche of Micro 
firms tum to this form of credit when larger sums of capital are required. The Micro firms 
who apply this type of financing are mostly from the financial services sector or heavy 
industry sector (e.g. mining companies). More recently, the difficulties in raising debt have 
resulted in early and start-up technology and bio-tech firms seeking equity finance, 
particularly where product development may be expensive and several years away. 
Lack of resources and limited growth ambitions are the main barriers of Micro firms 
to considering alternative source of financing (e.g. equity) as they are not cost-effective. 
Unarguably, Micro firms contribute to the overall financial system development in a 
country. With their demand for overdrafts and loans these firms generate need for bank 
based financial institutions (Mead and Liedholm, 1998). In the case of transition 
economies this means that they reinforce the path-dependency of using debt as the primary 
Source of external capital. Although we argue that Micro firms principally playa small role 
in equity culture development, we aim to establish the nature of factors that prompted the 
few exceptions to use equity as an external source of capital. Based on our understanding 
of this group, we expect the managerial and institutional factors to be specifically 
significant in the case of micro-firms demanding equity financing and thus contributing to 
an equity culture development. We expect the macro-economic conditions to be less 
significant as Micro firms are believed to be affected more by the micro-economic 
conditions of their local community. 
3.5.1.2. Large Firms and SMEs 
Large firms and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the primary drivers of economic 
and technological progress (Klapper et aI., 2002). The ability of these firms to exploit the 
economies of scale and scope is considered to be the essential driving force of a country's 
economic development. The strategic decision-making these firms undertake is related not 
51 
just to the ultimate goal of profit maximisation but also to the one of corporate growth 
(Beck et aI., 2005). These corporate motivations signal a more ambitious attitude towards 
transaction costs as the long-term benefits become a 'strong partner' to the short-term costs 
in the strategic decision-making of these firms. Therefore, we reason that these two firm 
groups are more prone to considering alternative sources of finance, such as equity. 
In the initial stages of the transition process, however, the firms that 'experiment' 
with new forms of financing first are the large ones (Beck et aI., 2005). The newly formed 
SME sector uses mainly short-term debt financing as a source of external capital (Klapper 
et aI., 2002). Large firms have the resources to make more advanced strategic decisions. 
Firstly, Large firms adapt the learning process and managerial skills at a faster speed than 
in any other type of firm (Hermes and Lensink, 2000), and secondly they are able to 
develop links with firms in foreign countries' quicker than their smaller counterparts (Choi 
and Jeon, 2007). Furthermore, the institutional change and the establishment of new 
financial intermediaries is in the initial stages of the economic transition period typically 
geared towards supporting larger rather than smaller firms (Beck et aI., 2000). 
Due to the scale of the Large firms' operations, their financing requirements are 
mainly determined by the external influences of macro-economic and institutional 
environments. Although the strategic decision-making is also influenced by the managerial 
capabilities of individual firms, it is not driven by it, as we believe it is the case in Micro 
firms and SMEs. Strategic decision-making in Large firms is typically formed by a group 
of managers responsible for strategy formulation and thus the managerial capabilities of 
individual staff are not playing a role as big as in the Micro firms. On the other hand, 
SMEs are more vulnerable to macro-economic issues in an economy and are affected by 
the institutional inefficiencies of their domestic markets. Furthermore, the managerial 
environment is important. 
We thus put forward Propositions 2, 2a, 2b and 2c: 
P2: The impact of macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments is 
dissimilar for different firm sizes. 
P2a: The managerial environment has stronger impact for Micro firms than SMEs and 
Large firms. 
P2b: The institutional environment has strong impact for Micro firms, SMEs, and Large 
firms. 
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P2c: The macro-economic environment has stronger impact for SMEs and Large firms 
than Micro firms. 
3.5.2. The Conditions Affecting Equity Culture Development hi Transition Economies 
When firms in transition economies make the decision to finance their activities with 
equity capital they incur transaction costs in the form of search, contracting and co-
ordination costs. The size of these costs depends on the fit between the macro-economic, 
institutional and managerial environments with the demand for equity financing. If there 
are complementarities and the fit is good, transaction costs will be low, however if there 
are few complementarities and the fit is weak, transaction costs will be high. It is the nature 
of factors that contribute to low transaction costs that is of our interest. 
Firstly, search costs are the costs associated with market research. Firms need to 
assess the availability of equity providers - private and institutional investors, the number 
and quality of equity related services - equity brokers and investment advice companies, 
and the liquidity of financial intermediaries - stock exchanges. To do so, firms inevitably 
sustain search costs in the form of time, resources and finances. Secondly, contracting 
costs are the costs firms incur when negotiating and entering a contractual agreement with 
an equity provider. Today's existence of complex institutional frameworks and policies 
results in the high cost of contractual agreements as costs are born in order to negotiate and 
write the terms of the arrangements, monitor the performance of the contracting party and 
enforce the contracts. Lastly, co-ordinating costs are the costs attributed to the maintenance 
of the relationship between a firm which uses equity as its source of external capital, 
individual investors and financial intermediaries. 
Firms embedded in economically underperforming countries usually opt for 
traditional forms of external capital such as bank financing (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 
2001). Prasad et aI. (2003) go in line with this finding and note that there is little advantage 
in considering more advanced sources of capital unless the country is economically 
adequately developed. Indeed, improved macro-economic conditions in transition 
economies are a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of more developed forms of 
external financing (Bekaert et aI., 2002). Minkov (2004) notes that firms in countries that 
have achieved higher levels of economic development are able to benefit from alternative 
sources of financing and focus their attention on economic growth. 
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Institutional environments III the transition countries have been formed by the 
character of political and financial liberalisation processes these countries have been 
through. Firms embedded within an environment supportive of a coordinated market 
economy, typical for prevailing bank-oriented institutions, laws and policies and a higher 
concentration (and competition) of banking intermediaries incur higher search, contracting 
and co-ordinating costs when opting for equity financing. The simple fact of limited 
availability of equity-supportive institutions accompanied by under-developed institutional 
policies may result in higher transaction costs that 'firms may not be prepared to bear. 
Also, the corporate governance practices developed as part of individual institutional 
frameworks lead to specific transaction costs. Bank based systems typically exercise strict 
contractual agreements (Bekaert, 1995). According to Kwok and Tadesse (2006), the 
reason for this is that bank-based systems are preferred in countries with high uncertainty 
avoidance, in other words are highly risk-averse. Contracts are therefore seen as tools that 
help to prevent high risk. Firms have contractual obligations also when they opt for equity 
financing but the contractual process is of a different character - a contract is seen more as 
a legally practical and necessary part of the capital securing process as opposed to ultra-
dominant part of the negotiation process. Equity financing is a more popular financing 
option in countries that display lower uncertainty avoidance characteristics, i.e. are less 
risk-averse (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006) and show no or little transparency issues (Kim and 
Kenny, 2007). 
Although affected by the macro-economIc and institutional environments, the 
finanCing decision ultimately lays with the managers, the type of firm they represent and 
the extent to which they follow the path-dependent tendencies. If the managerial style of 
managers in transition economies is path-dependent, good experience dominates and 
relationships based on trust prevail, firms have no or very little incentive to consider 
alternative sources of financing. Indeed, under these circumstances firms will 
automatically apply for another bank loan and thus keep their search, contracting and co-
ordinating costs at low levels. However, if managers have had an international experience 
with equity financing, if they are allowed and motivated to 'experiment' with riskier 
financing options and have good financial skills, path-dependent tendencies may be broken 
and firms may consider equity financing. 
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Based on the assumptions above we put forward Proposition 3: 
P3: Equity culture development is feasible in a transition economy if there are advanced 
macro-economic conditions, if the system carries the characteristics of a liberal 
market economy, and the managerial style is risk-taking. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have put forward a conceptual framework and propositions in terms of 
equity culture development in transition economies. We believe that the conceptualisation 
itself can be regarded as a valuable theoretical contribution in its field. The combination of 
theoretical concepts used and consequently arranged into a single theory building block is 
also innovative. The propositions are designed to investigate the main influences and 
conditions that contribute to an equity culture development in transition economies. This 
less popular source of finance in the transition economies yet popular in a number of 
developed economies is a dynamic and challenging issue to observe. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters we explored relevant Economics, Finance and Transition Finance 
literature in relation to financial system development, financial system models and access 
to finance whilst focusing specifically on the issue of equity culture development. We also 
introduced our conceptual framework - the the~ry-building block of our research .. The 
theoretical and conceptual factors influence the research design of our thesis, which is 
discussed in this methodology chapter. Firstly, we outline the research objectives and 
debate the relevance of individual methodological philosophies. Then we introduce our 
research sample followed by a discussion on data collection and data handling. After that 
we overview the data analysis methods, discuss the legitimacy of our research and note the 
limitations. Finally, we summarise our methodological choices. 
4.2. Research Objectives 
Research objectives enable us to clearly understand the purpose of our study and further 
assist in the direction we investigate research phenomena (Emory and Cooper, 1991). The 
objectives of our research are twofold: Firstly, we aim to identify environmental forces and 
specific conditions stemming from these that contribute to an equity culture development 
in transition economies. Secondly, we intend to identify specific factors which affect 
equity culture development in the CEECs. 
These research objectives arose as a result of our previous work on AIM's8 potential 
future expansion into the area of Central and Eastern Europe (Stone, 2006). This research 
project revealed AIM's limited expansion interest into the Central and Eastern European 
region. Whilst it was beyond the scope of that project to identify the list of factors causing 
this reality, a phenomenon of limited equity culture presence in this geographic area was 
clearly recognised. A consequent review of relevant academic literature revealed gaps in 
the context of equity culture development in transition countries. 
8 AIM - Alternative Investment Market, the London stock exchange for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) (www.londonstockexchange.comlaim 
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Thus we fonn our research objectives as follows: 
1. To identify the main environmental forces that shape the direction of a financial system 
development towards creating an equity culture in a transition economy. 
2. To examine the nature of conditions stemming from the environmental forces which 
guide the process of moving towards the development of an equity culture in a 
transition economy. 
3. To determine under what specific external and internal factors the creation of an 
equity culture is viable in the CEECs. 
4. To propose which strategies should be followed by business practitioners and financial 
institutions, and which policies should be adopted by governments and financial 
organisations in order to support the development of an equity culture in the transition 
economies of the CEECs. 
4.3. Philosophical Perspectives 
Philosophical perspectives relate to assumptions about the social world and how it can be 
investigated (Saunders et aI., 2000). Burrell and Morgan (1979) maintain that two main 
perspectives exist: the nature of society and the nature of science. Firstly, social research is 
based on assumptions that underpin social science and these assumptions shape the 
methodological choices researchers make. Secondly, science involves the subjective or 
objective research approach. These philosophical assumptions are often depicted as 
standing in opposite relation, which pennits comparison between the different research 
traditions. The research assumptions of epistemology, ontology and methodology are 
expanded upon next. 
4.3.1. Our Epistemological Perspective 
Epistemology concerns the question of what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline (Bryman and Bell, 2003), how it can be obtained and communicated to others 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). There are two extreme views on this in the epistemological 
debate. Firstly, positivism, a view which theorises that knowledge can be acquired while 
the researcher is independent of the phenomenon under study (Saunders et aI., 2000). 
Positivism further entails the principle of deductivism, which comes with a belief that the 
purpose of theory is to generate propositions or hypotheses that can be tested and that will 
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thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Remenyi and 
his co-authors (1988) further add that science must be conducted in a way that is value-
free, in other words that is objective. 
Secondly, a contradicting notion to positivism advocating the necessity of personal 
experience by a researching individual is interpretivism (Saunders et aI., 2000; Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). This epistemological view believes that reality is socially constructed and 
therefore it can be only understood in context which cannot be fully comprehended without 
the researcher's direct involvement in the phenomenon of the study (Remenyi et aI., 1988). 
While inductivism - a theoretical principle according to which scientific research proceeds 
from observations to theories (Saunders et aI., 2000) has been also associated with 
positivism, it is primarily a principle of interpretivism in the working-through of its 
implementation in the practice of research (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
The nature of our research does not necessitate closeness to the research 
phenomenon - the firm as a corporate organisational unit or financial intermediary. We 
follow the view that organisations exist as concrete entities about which data can be 
collected (Pugh, 1983). Data collection is geared towards the accumulation of facts and 
consequently leads to the development of a conceptual framework. Every framework 
contains analytical constructs that are applied to examine the collected data (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). As a result, conclusions can be drawn about the structure and functioning of 
individual organisations (Pugh, 1983) resulting in the generation of generalisable 
knowledge (Saunders et aI., 2000). Our research is based on the above principles and thus 
is in agreement with positivist assumptions. We therefore believe that from the 
epistemological perspective positivism is congruent with the nature of our study, and has as 
such influenced the chosen methodology. 
4.3.2. Our Ontological Perspective 
While the epistemological perspective refers to assumptions about knowledge, ontology 
relates to the reality of the phenomenon being investigated (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Research literature (BurreII and Morgan, 1979; Remenyi et aI., 1988) depicts it with two 
opposite viewpoints, nominalism and realism. The former denies all objectivity, whether 
actual or potential (Hacking, 1999) and states that abstractions known as universals are 
without essential reality and that only individual objects have real existence (Armstrong, 
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1978). Conversely the latter maintains that a single reality exists independently of an 
individual's appreciation of it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and that objectivity is not only 
present but must be recognised by the scientist (Armstrong, 1978). We maintain that 'the 
firm' - an organisational unit through which the phenomenon of equity culture creation is 
investigated - possess its own reality. We are thus are in line with Berle and Means (1933) 
and Coase (1937), the 'fathers' of organisational theories, who almost a century ago 
determined that the firm possesses its specific existence and nature. 
Furthermore, we find that Bryman and Bell (2003) have observed that realism shares 
some common features with the epistemological perspective of positivism. Firstly, it is the 
belief that social sciences should apply the same types of approach to the collection of data 
and to explanation. Secondly, it is the view that there is external reality to which scientists 
direct their attention. Realists (Bhaskar, 1989) state that scientists will be only able to 
understand the social world if they identify the structures at work that generate events that 
are under scientific observation. Such structures are observable through the practical and 
theoretical work of social scientists. 
Considering these ontological concepts, we deem the theory of realism to fit our 
research study better than the ontological theory of nominalism. The objectivist view, the 
general manifesto of this theory - the recognition of the reality of the phenomenon under 
observation, and the structuralist perspective are the main justifications for this. 
4.3.3. The Methodological Perspective 
We now discuss the methodology - the means available to research the phenomenon being 
studied (Remenyi et aI., 1988), the techniques for acquiring new knowledge or amending 
previously discovered knowledge (Bell, 1987), the systematic approach taken towards the 
collection of data so that information can be obtained (J ankowicz, 1991; Saunders et aI., 
2000; Bryman and Bell, 2003), the logical and rational order of steps by which scientists 
come to conclusions about the world around them (Blaxter et aI., 2001). The 
methodological approach is guided by the researcher's choices in relation to epistemology 
and ontology and thus denotes an objective or SUbjective approach to research (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). The objective approach correlates with quantitative research methodology 
while the subjective approach is associated with qualitative research methodology. 
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Our previous examination of epistemological and ontological approaches suggests 
that positivism and realism are the correct philosophical choices to guide our approach to 
methodology. Based on this finding we confirm that a quantitative research method 
founded on the objectivist principle is the main research method. This suggests that 
quantitative approach is performed from the 'outsider' perspective as the researcher is 
removed from the data (Remenyi et aI., 1988). Multiple characteristics of our study 
contribute to the justification of this approach. Firstly, an examination of the nature of our 
research problem, which is the identification of conditions and factors that contribute to an. 
equity culture creation in transition economies, requires the creation of variables. It is the 
quantitative approach that applies statistical methods and mathematical modelling, and is 
variable centred (Punch, 1998). Secondly, our research design requires empirical testing of 
a previously developed conceptual framework. This is traditionally achieved with the help 
of a quantitative method (Depka, 2006). Furthermore, the quantitative approach fits with 
our research design as it is efficient at understanding and explaining large-scale structural 
features of social life (i.e. the direction of a financial system in transition economies) 
(Punch, 1998), is better generalisable (Saunders et aI., 2000), and is used for analysis at 
macro-levels (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Whilst our research involves a selection of 
countries which are studied over a variety of years in order to understand and predict the 
future of a dynamic element - the equity culture development we indeed deem the 
adoption of a quantitative research method appropriate. 
The demand for a quantitative based approach in our research area has also been 
stressed by a number of authors. For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) 
have stressed the need for creating new conceptual models based on which available data 
on emerging equity markets in developing economies (such as the transition economies of 
the CEECs) can be empirically tested. Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) pointed out the 
requirement for a variable-based approach to studying factors affecting financing choices 
of firms, the complexity of the financial, business and economic environments and the 
resource-heavy conditions related to external financing, specifically due to their diversified 
nature. Bekaert and Harvey (2002) have noted the necessity to apply deductive approaches 
when investigating capital markets in the developing economies (such as the transition 
economies of the CEECs). More recently, Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) highlighted the 
importance objectively assess all firm size groups (micro, small and medium, and large), 
the financial constraints they experience and the financing choices they make. 
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From these examples it is evident that quantitative approach is a preferred research 
method in our research area and is thus congruent with our earlier suggestion of using the 
quantitative method as the core method for our study. 
However, we believe that choosing just one research method may not be sufficient as 
'by adopting only one research method a researcher may be discovering only one view of a 
particular research situation' (Cooper, 2010). Everitt and Dunn (2001) also warn that 
giving attention only to what can be measured or quantified and thus ignore the wider 
social and political contexts may result in suggesting misleading recommendations. These 
arguments are strong in support of a mixed-methodology approach (Bryman, 1988; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2002), suggesting that utilising a variety of 
approaches may lead to more robust results. We see the research as a process that has 
different phases which do not function effectively under the same research methods. 
Therefore, a combination of research methods might be necessary so that individual phases 
function to their best potential and thus collectively contribute to a more comprehensive 
research outcome. 
We adopt Tashakkori and Teddlie's (1998) definition of a mixed methodology 
research design which incorporates various qualitative and quantitative strategies within a 
single study that might have either a quantitative or qualitative theoretical drive. Therefore, 
although our study is of a quantitative character, we 'import' a qualitative strategy 
supplemental to our core method which serves the purpose of enlightening or providing 
clues that are followed up within the core method. Caracelli and Greene (1993) call this 
type of mixed methodology a 'sensitizing strategy' as the supplement method is not used 
as a stand-alone project but rather is applied to provide clues to the earlier generated results 
a researcher arrives at using the core method. Due to the fact that this supplementary 
method provides only a glance at a different perspective and the findings are not confirmed 
independently of the main study, we cannot call this research design a triangulation. 
Triangulation, the multi-method research design, involves the presence of two or more 
subprojects which explain methodological integrity and thus are complete in themselves. 
Remenyi (1998) notes that mixed methodology methods are not unusual in academic 
research and that usually one research method 'dominates' over another. Bryman and Bell 
(2003) also comment that is quite unusual to find examples of investigations in which 
qualitative and quantitative research have a roughly equal role as in most cases one 
approach tends to prevail as the major source of data collection and analysis. 
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Although differences between the qualitative and quantitative approaches exist 
epistemologically and ontologically (Bryman and Bell, 2003) as they represent a different 
approach to social science (Remenyi et aI. , 1988; Easterby-Smith et aI. , 1991), the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to research share some similar characteristics and 
indeed can complement each other in a number of ways (Saunders et aI. , 2000). Table 4.1. 
demonstrates some of the fundamental characteristics and qualities these methods possess. 
Table 4.1.: Key Characteristics of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods 
Characteristics 
Approach 
The role of theory in 






Method of analysis 
Qualitative 
Subjectivist 














Derived from numbers 
Numerical and standardized data 
Diagrams and statistics 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (J 979), Bly man and Bell (2003) , Saunders el 01. (2000) 
Quantitative research is indirect and abstract and treats experiences as similar, adding or 
multiplying them together, or quantifying them (Bell, 1987). On the other hand, qualitative 
approach implies a direct concern with experience as it is 'lived ' or 'felt' or 'undergone ' 
(Bhaskar, 1989). These specific characteristics of the two different research methods are 
the core reasons why we believe in our research add significant value. By combining them 
into a single mixed methodology we enjoy these benefits simultaneously. The specifics of 
the methods we apply for data analysis are offered later in this chapter, in section 4.6. 
4.4. Sample Description 
4.4.1. Geographical Area: The CEECs 
Our research sample - the segment of the population that is selected for investigation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003) - includes ten Central and Eastem European countries, the 
CEECs. Transition literature (Lavigne, ] 999; Stiglitz, ] 999; Wyplosz, ] 999; Kolodko, 
2000; Lavigne, 2000) calls these countries 'the group one countries '. They are the fornler 
centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe, also denoted as the (former) 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe which were the last ones to obtain 
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European Union (EU) membership: Firstly, in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), and secondly, in 2007 (Bulgaria and 
Romania). 
A sample of ten countries is manageable in terms of data handling, yet provides 
opportunity for clustering. These countries share similar pasts as former centrally planned 
systems, date the start of their political, economic and financial liberalisation processes 
almost equally, and have comparable transition experiences. Klapper et aI. (2002) notes 
that in the early years of the transition period the CEECs shared several characteristics 
such as a concentration of firms in the manufacturing sector, low legal and governance 
standards, and poor accounting standards. However, these countries have undertaken 
different post-transition economic and institutional paths, developed diverse trade links and 
created distinctive corporate sectors. These characteristics form a sample that shares a 
satisfactory amount of common links yet differentiates sufficiently to motivate the 
researcher to look for and identify those distinguishable attributes. 
Additionally, we simultaneously gather data for four selected benchmarks: the UK 
and the USA - the representatives of the Anglo-Saxon equity oriented systems, and 
Gennany and Japan - the representatives of the German-Japanese banking oriented 
financial systems (Allen and Gale, 2000). We use these benchmarks in the first step of our 
data examination - the clustering analysis, which is presented in Chapter 6. 
4.3.2. Research Period: 1996-2008 
Equity culture development is a process which evolves gradually owing to the speed of 
adequate macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions in a country. Such 
development is best observed on a sample of continuous data. In our research we 
investigate continuous data from 1996 to 2008. The explanation and justification of this 
research period is provided next. 
Although the political transition started in the 1990s, the institutional transformation 
and macro-economic stabilisation started being recognised in 1996 (Coricelli, 1998b; Lau 
et aI., 2007). This happens in big political transitions as the systems are inefficient in 
absorbing the influx of changes and therefore remain at pre-transition levels for some 
period (Newman, 2000; Roth and Kostova, 2003). Indeed, in the very first years of the 
transition the post-communist economic reforms were still in their infancy, the region was 
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in a recession and the obstinacy of the inflation rate was causing many headaches (Murrell, 
1996; Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997). The focus on macro-stabilisation policies rather than 
institutional building delayed the progress towards more advanced institutional reforms in 
many areas including financial. Prior to 1996 any attempt for an equity culture creation 
would not have been successful. Only after the first five years have the economic clouds 
over CEECs started lifting (EBRD, 1998). Sinn (1997) also comments that economic 
recovery did not start till six to seven years after the fall of communism. The 
implementation of monetary policies designed by the International Monetary Fund together 
with independent country-specific economic and political reforms led to the occurrence of 
growth across the region. Inflation that reached peak levels of 600 percent in the early 
1990's was by 1996 averaging 18 percent (EBRD, 1999). By the end of 1995 most of the 
CEECs were experiencing a modest economic growth which meant an end to the initial 
transformation-driven recession (EBRD, 1999). 
The last year of our research period, year 2008, is a period point by which all CEECs 
have become EU members and have mostly accomplished all the major transition reforms 
as directed by the EU (Schwab and Porter, 2008). In this year, the Czech Republic - as the 
first CEEC - was taken off the list of transition countries and was awarded a status of a 
developed European economy. Furthermore, from the data collection point of view, we 
have identified data availability constraints before 1996 and after 2008. 
4.5. Data Collection 
4.5.1. Data Collection Technique and Sources 
In our research we adopt data collection techniques in line with the quantitative approach. 
Saunders (2000) points out that quantitative data can be collected in a standardised way, 
thus the data set used in this study comes from several secondary sources in order to cover 
all the areas relevant to our investigation. Firstly, in order to determine the conditions in 
the macro-economic environment we access data from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), the world's leading resource for economic and business research, forecasting and 
analysis (EIU, 20IOa), the Institute for Management Development (1M D) in the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, the world's most renowned and comprehensive annual report 
on the competitiveness of nations and their corporate sectors (lMD, 2010), and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) database on transition 
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indicators, a unique source olin/ormation on Central and Eastern Europe (EBRD, 2008a). 
Secondly, to reflect the institutional environments of individual countries we use data from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a valuable source of data on institutional 
quality and in more detail the EBRD transition indicators database. Thirdly, to account for 
the managerial capabilities of firms we use data from the IMD database. Furthermore, in 
order to investigate the firm sector in terms of ownership and the financial intermediaries 
sector we use the Orbis database, a global product of Bureau van Dijk, with information on 
75 million companies worldwide (BureauVanDijk, 2008). 
For the purpose of this project, 'data cleaning' procedures are followed so that data 
can be approached in an effective yet robust way. Firstly, as proposed in the conceptual 
framework, the firm sector analysis aims to investigate how different firm size groups react 
to equity financing and what factors are the main drivers of an equity culture development 
in the case of the Large firms, SMEs and also Micro firms. However, our source of data for 
the firm sector - the Orbis database - only provides data for the total number of firms. 
Therefore, some data handling in the form of class sizes creation is necessary before the 
variable construction process can be explained. Secondly, managerial data for some of our 
sample countries, which we collect from the IMD database, does not cover the whole of 
the 1996-2008 period and in some instances years 1996-1999 displayed zero values. 
Therefore, we used the 'trends technique' to obtain the missing values. These two data 
handling instances are explained and justified in detail in the next section. 
4.5.2. Data Handling 
4.5.2.1. Handling of the Firm Data 
According to the Orbis database the total number of firms in our research sample - the 
CEECs is 2,417,670. In order to group these firms according to their size we use the 
European Union's firm definition of 2003. This definition uses two size thresholds: the 
number of employees (CON 1) and other two key financials - the total assets (CON 2) and 
the turnover (CON 3). These are shown in Table 4.2. 
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CON 1 Employees 
>251 
11-251 
CON 2 Total Assets 
(EUR) 
>43 mil. 
2 mil. - 43 mil. 
Micro < 10 <2 mil. 
Source: European Commission (2005); www.europa.eu (accessed 2007) 
CON 3 Turnover 
(EUR) 
>50 mil. 
2 mil. - 50 mil. 
<2 mil. ---, 
The total sum of 2,417,670 includes large firms (Large) - 1,940 fimls, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) - 34,477 finns, and micro firms (Micro) - 583,022 firms. We notice, 
that the sum-up of Large, SMEs and Micro fimls does not add up to the total number of 
firms in the CEECs. There are two reasons for this: 
1. Some of the firms have unknown one or more of the CON 1, CON 2 and/or CON 3 
values. 
2. By adapting the 'CON 1 + CON 2 + CON 3 method' we exclude from the sample a 
significant number of firms which fit just one or two of the above conditions as 
opposed to all three. For example, it would be incorrect to assume that large firms are 
only those of more than 251 employees with financial values of more than 43 mil. in 
total assets and 50 mil. in turnover. Firms with just 10 employees but with financial 
values of more than 43 mil. in total assets and 50 mil. in turnover are also known as 
Large. The same applies for finns with 11 -250 employees and financial values of more 
than 43 mil. in total assets and 50 mil. in turnover. 
The simplified method of combining three variables for each group (i.e. Large, SMEs, 
Micro) would lead to the emergence of missing values in the sample. This would seriously 
damage the robustness of our sample and negatively affect the validity of our results. 
Therefore, we design a new method of firm grouping. 
The initially adopted sampling method leads to two significant sampling problem. Firstly, 
missing values in some of our sampling units indicate the problem of an incomplete 
sample. Secondly, the one-way combination of three selected conditions results in 
undesirable exclusion of a significant number of sampling units (firnl ). Therefore, we 
approach the sampling in the following way: 
1. We select only those firms that have known values for all three variables: the number 
of employees, total assets and turnover. This enables us to reduce the total number of 
firms to a more manageable sample of770,118 (Table 4.3 .). 
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2. We then combine CON 1, CON 2 and CON 3 in such a way that enables us to cover all 
possibilities. We create 9 subgroups (Table 4.3.): 
Figure 4.1.: The Decision-making Tree for Group Creating Criteria 
G3 CON I: Max JO G6 CON I: 11 ·250 G9 CON I: Min 251 
CON 2: none CON 2: none CO, 2:none 
CON 3: none CON 3: none 
599 115 411 
(45) 
CO I: ax 10 
CON 2: Min 43 nil. CO 2: Min 4311il. 
CO 3: Min 50 mil. CO 3: Min 50 mil. 
43 or SO mil. 
G2 CON I: Max JO G5 CON I: 11 ·250 
CON 2: Max43 mil. 
Size - Hn ancials 
CON 3: M1Il2mtl.: Max50nil. 
2 mil. 
GI CON I:Max IO 
CO 2:Max2rnil. 
10 Silt · unpl oy. " 250 
NOIC:GI·Ql =Group I ·Qoup9 
Source: Author 's Own 
Large total: 10022 
(45+566+ 9411 ) 
5MB lotal; 164780 
(3754 + 161 026) 
Micro total : 595 316 
We now discuss the above table from Group 1 (bottom left comer) to Group 9 (upper right 
comer. 
Group i: CON 1 - mployees: Maximum (hence Max) 10 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 2 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover (Operating Revenue): Max 2 mil. 
The combination of these three conditions provides a number of finn which can be 
identified as 'true' Micro firms. The group meets the size requirements in ternlS of the 
number of employees and financials. The total number of this group is 595,316. 
Group 2: CON I - Employees: Max 10 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 43 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover: Max 50 mil. 
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This group matches the size requirements for Micro firms in terms of the number of 
employees but the financials are the ones of SMEs. The total number of this group is 
599,070. 
However, by subtracting the total number of group 1 from the total number of group 2 we 
cover a group of firms which has no more than 1 0 employ~es but has the minimum values 
of total assets and operating revenue 2 mil. and the maximum values of total assets and 
operating revenue 43 mil. or 50 mil. This 'sub-group' of firms is SMEs. The total number 
is 3,754. 
Group 3: CON 1 - Employees: Max 10 
CON 2 - not considered 
CON 3 - not considered 
All firms in this group have a maximum number of 10 employees irrespective of their 
financials. The total number is 599,115. However, as the total number includes firms with 
financials of group 1 and group 2, the total amount is irrelevant. But a sub-group of firms, 
which has a maximum number of 10 employees and financials more than 43 mil. or 50 
mil., is of our interest. This sub-group, due to the high values of its financials, represents 
part of the Large firms. The total number of this sub-group is 45. 
Group 4: CON I - Employees: 11-250 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 2 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover: Max 2 mil. 
This group consists of tirms that have between 11 and 250 employees but maximum 2 mil. 
in total assets or 2 mil. in operating revenue. The total number of these firms is 124,877. 
Our next group - group 5, however, includes these firms. Therefore, we don't include this 
group in our classification. 
Group 5: CON 1 - Employees: 11-250 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 43 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover: Max 50 mil. 
This group represents the group of 'true' SMEs. The number of employees, the value of 
total assets and the size of the operating revenue fit the criteria of SMEs. Therefore, the 
total amount of this group, 161,026 firms, is included in the sample. 
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Group 6: CON 1 - Employees: 11-250 
CON 2 - Total Assets: not considered 
CON 3 - Turnover: not considered 
The firms in this group include all firms that have between 11 and 250 employees 
irrespective of the firms' financials. The total number of this group is 161,592. However, a 
small sub-group of 566 firms is of our interest. The difference between group 6 and group 
5 gives a small but important sample of large firms that have between 11 and 250 
employees and a minimum value of 43 mil. in total assets and 50 mil. in operating revenue. 
Group 7: CON 1 - Employees: Min 251 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 2 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover: Max 2 mil. 
Firms in this group have more than 251 employees but the maximum value of their total 
assets is no more than 2 mil. and the maximum value of the operating revenue is less than 
2 mil. The total number of firms in this group is 973. This group, however, is not included 
on its own but as a part of bigger group - group 9. This is explained in the coming lines. 
Group 8: CON 1 - Employees: Min 251 
CON 2 - Total Assets: Max 43 mil. 
CON 3 - Turnover: 50 mil. 
Firms in this group have more than 251 employees but no more than 43 mil. in operating 
assets and 50 mil. in the turnover. The total number of firms in this group is 7,472. As it 
was the case with group 7, this group is not considered in the final sample of Large firms 
as the final group, group 9, incorporates these firms. 
Group 9: CON 1 - Employees: Min 251 
CON 2 - Total Assets: not considered 
CON 3 - Turnover: not considered 
Finns in the final group are those with more than 251 employees. The values of total assets 
and turnover are not considered. This is the largest group out of the three groups with 
employees more than 251. The total number is 9,411. This is somewhat not surprising, as 
We would expect that for a firm with more than 251 employees to remain profitable it has 
to have an annual turnover of 50 mil. and/or the value of the firm's total assets must be 
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more than 43 mil. All the firms from this sample are included in the final sample. These 
are Large firms. 
Our firm group classification concludes that the firm sector sample consists 770,118 firms. 
These firms have known values in terms of their employees, total assets and turnover. 
1. Micro firms 
Group 1, which includes firms that have no more than 10 employees and less than 2 mil. in 
total assets or turnover, is the only group that represents the Micro firms. The total number 
of this group is 595,316. 
2. SMEs 
There are two groups of SMEs. Firstly, there is a subgroup between groups 1 and 2. Firms 
in this sub-group have no more than 10 employees but have a minimum of 2 mil. in their 
total assets and turnover, and a maximum of 43 mil. in total assets or 50 mil. in turnover. 
The total number of this type of firms is 3, 754. Secondly, there is group 5, which 
represents the 'true' SMEs. There are 161,026 of these. Therefore, a total sum of 164,780 
is the sum of all SMEs in our sample. 
3. Large 
There are three groups of large firms. Firstly, it a subgroup between groups 2 and 3. A 
small number of firms (45) with less than 10 employees but with the value of total assets of 
more than 43 mil. and the value of operating revenue of more than 50 mil. Secondly, it is 
another subgroup, this time between groups 5 and 6. This group of 566 firms meets the 
requirements of SMEs in terms of the firm's size (11-50 employees) but at the same time 
those of large firms (Min 43 mil. ion total assets and Min 50 mil. in Turnover). Lastly, it is 
the big group of large firms (9,411). The total number of large firms comes up to 10,022 
firms. 
As table 4.2 shows the total number of Micro firms (595,316) SMEs (164,780) and Large 
firms (10,022) adds up to the total number of firms in the CEECs (770,118). 
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Figure 4.2.: Firm Size Specification: Total Number of Firms 
Note: GI-G9 = Group I -Group 9 
Source: Author's Own 
10 
4.5.2.2. Handling of the Missing Data 
Size - Employment 250 
Total: 770 118 
The problem of mi ing data occurs in cross-national research in Economics, Sociology 
and Political cience becau e governments and/or other institution responsible choose not 
to, or in orne in tance fail to, report tatistica l data for one or more years (Zarate et aI., 
2006). We find this to be the case in the in tanee of macro-economic, institutional but 
primarily managerial ata. Therefore, we adopt a technique of trend (Dewberry, 2004), 
also called the data extrapolation technique (Arm trong, 200 I), which enab les us to create 
value for the whole ample of continuou data. The extrapo lation m thod is reliable, 
objective and ea ily automated. It enable u to construct new data points out ide the et of 
known data point. 
The table how that countri with the most mis ing managerial data (pre ented in 
the order from mo t to lea t mi ing time ob ervations) are Bulgaria, Latvia Lithuania, 
then Romania, fi 1I0wed by tonia and Slovakia, and lastly Slovenia. Even our 
benchmarks demon trate mi ing va lue for year 1996-2000 in some instances. Thi is an 
evidence of the 'young age ' of the econdary managerial data ources. However, creating 
trends i a method commonly u ed by researcher and tatistician when dealing with 
m' . 
IS Ing continuou data (Dewberry 2004) and therefore does not negatively affect the 
robustne of our methodological approach to the missing values problem. 
71 
Table 4.3.: The Exhibit of Miss ing Data 
~ .~ 
>. >. .::: ~ ~ == .. c ~ ·c ~ ::2 Data .J:.a ~ ~ ~ ~ '0 == == ~ == E ~ == ·E = c ~ ~ Q,) ~ y = 0 == ~ oJ: ~ ... ;;. ;;. Indicators/ Q,) Co ... .. Q. == ~ = N Q,) en Q,) = ~ ... 0 0 .£ 0 rJ) uc::: Co:) ::t ~ :::5 c::: 00 Country o::l [;oJ ~ .J Q., rJ) :::l :::l 
(J Balance of 96- 96- 96-
~ Trade 01 01 98 o Vl 
.... .... Inward FDl 96-- 0 o ~ 
(J ro 99 C1) (J 
6.:.0 .... c Gower. 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
u -ro Budget 00 00 00 99 99 
~ Sur/Def 
Vl Banking 96- 96- 96- 96-
C1) 
Sector 98 98 98 98 - ·c 
.~ .~ Assets c"O 
ro ~ 
Stock 96- 96- 96- 96-c .... . _ c 
t..1.,~ Market 98 98 98 98 c - CaEital. 
Worker 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
Moti vation 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
Finance 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
Skills 04 98 00 98 98 98 04 04 98 02 00 98 98 98 
Foreign 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
High-ski lJ ed 04 OJ 01 OJ 01 OJ 04 04 OJ 02 01 OJ OJ OJ 
people 
International 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
Experience 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
Competent 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
Senior 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
Manager 
Vl Adaptability 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-.... 
of 04 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 0 00 04 04 00 
C5 
u Companies :a .s redibility 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
<Ii of Managers 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 .;:: 
Entrepre- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-C1) 
bO 
neurship 04 -00 04 04 02 00 98 ro c 
ro Attitudes 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
~ 
towards 04 00 00 00 00 00 04 04 00 02 00 00 00 00 
Globali ati on 
National 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96- 96-
Culture 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
Flex ibility 96- 96 96- 96 96 96 96- 96- 96 96- 96- 96- 96 96 
and 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
Adaptability 
Need for 96- 96 96- 96 96 96 96- 96- 96 96- 96- 96- 96 96 
Economic 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
and Social 
Reforms 
orporale 96- 96 96- 96 96 96 96- 96- 96 96- 96- 96- 96 96 
Value 04 00 04 04 02 00 98 
SOl/rce: BIU (20 lOa); IMD(20 I 0) 
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4.6. Methodology of Data Analysis 
The compiled data is examined through the combination of three individual techniques: 
benchmarking/clustering, statistical regression and a qualitative comparative analysis. 
These are briefly introduced in the next sections and then thoroughly presented in Chapters 
6,7 and 8. 
4.6.1. Variable based approaches 
The variable-based notion is unique to the quantitative research (Saunders et aI., 2000; 
Depka, 2006). The creation of variables is a fundamental part of any type of quantitative 
research. We have created several variables reflecting our conceptual framework. A 
detailed analysis of the creation, justification and measurement of variables is offered in 
Chapter 5. 
4.6.1.1. Data Description: Benchmarking and Clustering 
The design of our conceptual framework requires the collection of numerous data of 
economic, institutional and managerial nature for a twelve year period and for fourteen 
different countries. Such amount of data necessitates a structured way of presenting it. 
Therefore, we adopt a relatively new clustering method - the Co-Plot method (Raveh, 
2000a), which is seen as an interesting alternative to Principal Component Analysis. It 
enables us to observe individual CEECs and benchmark them against our chosen 
benchmarks. Cluster analysis is used as a first step when the researcher is interested in the 
characteristics of the individual items in the data, rather than aiming to test causalities 
(Everitt and Hothorn, 2009). Our aim is to summarise the obtained data as simply, 
practically and effectively as possible, identify clusters of countries that perform similarly 
economically and institutionally compared to benchmarks representing the banking or the 
equity oriented financial systems. The clustering method, and the Co-Plot method In 
particular, enable us to do this. We provide a detailed analysis in chapter 6. 
4.6.1.2. Regression Analysis: Investigation of Causality Effects 
Once clusters are observed and their characteristics noted, the search for causalities is a 
natural second step in an empirical investigation (Everitt and Dunn, 2001). This enables 
the researcher to suggest direct effects between variables and test individual hypotheses. It 
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also offers more room for generalisation of the examined phenomena (Jankowicz, 1991). 
Stemming from our conceptual framework we perform simple regressions for the demand 
dependent variables. This is explained in detail in Chapter 7. 
4.6.2. A Narrative Qualitative Approach 
4.6.2.1. Comparative Analysis: A Soft Interpretation of Findings 
The third and final part of our empirical investigation is the execution of a qualitative 
comparative analysis on three countries under observation. This provides room for a 'soft 
interpretation' of our findings. The advocators of this approach (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) 
state that comparative analysis are the correct approach to studying social phenomena as 
the analysis is performed through a thorough analysis of an individual phenomenon. This 
method rests on the assumption that the phenomenon being studied is typical of a certain 
type so that generalisations may be made that will be applicable to other phenomena of the 
same type (Gerring, 2004). We believe that a simple, well constructed comparative 
analysis will enable us to strengthen the validity of our results gained through the previous 
two stages of our variable-based empirical analysis. 
4.7. Research Legitimacy 
Reliability, validity, causality, generalisation and replicability are collectively referred to 
as the determinants of research legitimacy (Bryman and Bell, 2003). They are also denoted 
as traditional criteria for judging quantitative research (Blaxter et aI., 2001). These are 
discussed directly relating to our research in the next subsections. 
4.7.1. Reliability 
Reliability relates to the issues of consistency of measures observable through the factors 
of stability, internal reliability and inter-observer consistency (Saunders et aI., 2000). The 
assessment of whether a measure is stable over time, whether indicators used are consistent 
and whether there is consistency in recording observations should be questioned by any 
researcher. Blaxter et al. (2001) point out that this is also the case when a researcher is 
using secondary data sources. To ensure the reliability of our research we make 
comparisons between data and claims from a number of reputable sources. We find that 
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our chosen sources provide information consistent with information from other reputable 
sources. Furthermore, we are re-assured of the legitimate choice of our sources as we find 
that the data we use is based on a repeatable system of collection processes. 
4.7.2. Validity 
Validity is concerned with the integrity of conclusions generated from a scientific piece of 
work (Bryman and Bell, 2003). It relates to the issue of whether selected indicators that are 
devised to measure a concept really measure that concept, whether a conclusion that 
features a causal relationship between two or more variables is robust (causality), and 
whether results of a study can be generalised beyond the specific research context 
(generalisation) (Saunders et aI., 2000). Remenyi et aI. (1998) argue that research validity 
can be increased by using a combination of data sources as this compensates for any 
potential weaknesses in the researcher's use of one data collection method. Blaxter et aI. 
(2001) also recommend the use of multiple data sources when discussing ways of 
safeguarding research validity. The various data sources we use for this study have been 
discussed in section 4.4.1. 
4.7.2.1. External Validity: Generalisation 
Generalisation, also by some authors denoted as generalisability, denotes the extent to 
which the findings of a research can be applied outside the environment within which it 
was undertaken (Jankowicz, 1991). It is the ultimate aim of every quantitative researcher to 
produce a study the results of which can be generalised. However, as Saunders et aI. 
(2000) point out, the concern of delivering generalisability is common amongst 
quantitative researchers using cross-sectional and longitudinal research designs. Bryman 
and Bell (2003) observe that in the case of cross-sectional research design scientists 
usually give greater attention to internal validity issues. 
4.7.2.2. 1nternal Validity: Causality 
Causality refers to the fact that it is not satisfactory for quantitative researchers to simply 
describe how things are but rather explain why things are the way they are (Blaxter et aI., 
2001). Thus researchers are often interested in a phenomenon like motivation which not 
only refers to something that can be described but rather something that can be explained 
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(Bryman and Bell, 2003). In other words this means examining the causes. In the research 
objectives of our study we have identified the search for motivations that 'make or break' 
equity culture development in individual CEECs central to our research effort. 
4.7.3. Replicability 
The quantitative views of reliability and validity are directly connected with the 
assumption of replicability (Jankowicz, 1991). Saunders et a1. (2000) state that replicability 
is regarded as an important quality of quantitative research as it is crucial that the methods 
taken in generating a set of findings are made explicit so that it is possible to replicate a 
piece of scientific work. In our project we describe exact processes by which the data is 
generated and the analysis produced. We believe that without complete information about 
where data come from and how it is made measurable we cannot truly understand the set of 
our empirical results. Therefore, we produce a 'replication data set' which includes all 
information necessary should anyone want to replicate our empirical results. 
4.8. Research Limitations 
Researchers should be aware of their study's research limitations (Blaxter et aI., 2001). 
Any research design (whether qualitative or quantitative or the combination of both) has its 
limitations and it is crucial that scientists recognise these limitations and seek possible 
routes of mitigating them (Easterby-Smith et aI., 1991). The limitations of the mixed 
methodology research approach and the three methodological approaches to data analysis 
that we adopt in this thesis: benchmarking/clustering, regression and comparative analysis, 
are explained next. 
Critics of the quantitative approach state that it facilitates only a collection of a much 
narrower and sometimes even superficial dataset (Bell, 1987), that the development of 
standard questions necessary for the research may lead to structural bias and incorrect 
representation (Ragin, 1987), that results are limited due to the numerical way of 
description rather than more informative narrative (Punch, 1998), and that the reliance on 
instruments and procedures applied in the quantitative research hinders the connection 
between research and everyday life (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Furthermore, Depka (2006) 
warns that the quantitative approach requires large samples and is appropriate for macro-
level rather than micro-level research (Saunders et aI., 2000). 
76 
As stated earlier in this chapter the large sample of data that we gather for this 
research together with the added time element of a continuous research period are just two 
of the basic indicators of the appropriateness of the quantitative approach applications. To 
prevent overreliance on the statistical Inumerical way of data description we start with a 
data description analysis. Although it is variable-based, the technique applied - the Co-Plot 
method - enables us to describe the data in a more narrative way. The benchmarking 
attribute of this method also helps us to bring the data to a more meaningful level and thus 
provides the essential link between pure research and life examples. On the other hand, this 
method alone does not support the generalisation and causality requirements that we have 
earlier identified as typical for a quantitative type of analysis. Therefore, as a next step, we 
perform a regression analysis which produces a general pattern of variable relationships. 
Finally, to be able to interpret the results from the regression analysis we perform a 
comparative analysis, which not only serves as a soft interpretation tool but also captures 
the social element of the interpretation of observed results. The application of this method 
means that we adopt a mixed methodology approach which enables us to mitigate most of 
the limitations of a quantitative approach when it is performed on its own. 
4.9. Conclusion 
The methodology chapter sought to examine theoretical and conceptual factors affecting 
the research design of our dissertation. Firstly, we debated the methodological philosophies 
followed by a discussion of approaches to sampling and data collection. Then we explained 
the data handling. Finally, we outlined the methodology of data analysis, we discussed 
issues related to the legitimacy of our research and considered the limitations and benefits 
of each analytical tool. 
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Chapter 5: Data Characteristics - An Empirical Examination 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous methodology chapter we proposed that an application of a mixed 
methodology method is most congruent with our type of research. We thus employ a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to provide answers to our research 
questions. However, we establish that the quantitative approach dominates and is indeed 
our main methodological approach whereas the qualitative approach supplements the main 
method and thus sensitizes results gained from the quantitative analysis. In a quantitative 
study the sample is converted into variables so that phenomena can be studied with the 
help of statistical tools (Blaxter et aI., 2001). 
With a purpose to create a sample that is complete and reflects the complexity of the 
conceptual framework we collate macro-economic, institutional, managerial and corporate 
data. In this chapter, our aim is to define our choice of variables, justify their applicability 
and explain how they are measured. Furthermore, we empirically examine their fit between 
each other. This enables us to understand how our sample 'behaves' before we proceed to a 
more detailed discussion of our panel data followed by a statistical analysis. 
5.2. Variable Definitions and Measurements 
5.2.1. Sample Description 
The details of our sample - the choice of countries and selected time period were all 
explained in Chapter 4. However, in this section we briefly explain the transformation of 
our data representing this sample into variables so that they can be statistically measured. 
Firstly, Variable 1 represents each of the used fourteen countries: ten CEECs and four 
benchmarks (Germany, Japan, UK and USA). The order of countries is arranged 
alphabetically. Secondly, Variable 2 denotes the years under observation: thirteen years in 
the 1996-2008 period. We provide an overview of these variables in Table 5.1. 
In our study we observe multiple entities (countries) at multiple time periods (years). 
This implies that we study cross-sectional time-series (continuous) data. Econometrics 
literature (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002) denotes such data type the panel data. In our case, panel 
data allows us to control for variables that are not easily measured like cultural factors and 
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variables that change over time but not across individual countries (i.e. national policies). 
Therefore, it can be said, panel data accounts for individual heterogeneity of our sample. 
Moreover, panel data enables us to include variables at different level of analysis (i.e. 
fimls, countries) and thus develop multilevel modelling. 
Table 5.1.: Sample Characteristics: Country & Year 
Vari able N o. Vari a bl e Variabl e Code Vari able Type S ca le/Ran ge Source 







7=La tv ia 
8=Lith uania 
9=Poland 





2 Year yea r Inte rv aVRalio 1996-2008 General 
Source: Author 's Own + European Commission (2005) 
5.2.2. National Competitiveness - The Macro-Economic Indicators 
When assessing the national competitiveness levels of individual countries in our ample 
we involve three groups of macro-economic variables. Fir tly, variables 3-11 denote 
general macro-economic indicators commonly used to determine an economy's stability, 
performance and growth potential: an indicator of an economy's economic power (GDP 
per head), a measurement of a process by which a nation's wealth increases over time 
(Real GDP growth per head), a measure of an economy's long-term technological change 
(Total factor productivity growth), a measurement of a nation's currency's purchasing 
power relative to other currencies (Rea l effective exchange rate ICPl based/), a measure 
representing a direct link between productivity and the cost of labour used in generating 
output (Unit labour costs), a rate that is charged for the use of a lender's money (Lending 
interest rate), a measure of foreign investments flowing into the local economy (Inward 
foreign direct investment/GDP), a measure of an economy's 'health' - the balance between 
an economy's import and export (Balance of trade/GDP), and a measure of a nation's 
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economIC growth (Government budget surplus-deficit/GDP). Sound macro-economIC 
performance is an essential pre-requisite for the development of an advanced financial 
system (Boot and Thakor, 1997; Hermes and Lensink, 2000a). We maintain it is also 
necessary for the development of an equity culture. 
Secondly, we include variables 12-14: the proportion of agriculture 
(Agriculture/GDP), services (Services/GDP) and industry (Industry/GOP) sectors. These 
variables provide an important indication on the structure of individual economies. 
Developed economies have a developed industry and services sectors with the agriculture 
sector playing a minor role as a contributor to a nation's economic wealth. While countries 
with bank-based systems tend to have bigger industry sectors (Baumol, 1990; Abiad and 
Mody, 2005), those with equity-based systems typically demonstrate a strong presence of 
their services sectors (Bekaert et aI., 2001). 
Thirdly, variables 15-18 offer a deeper insight into the status of macro-economic 
conditions specifically in the transition economies. The EBRD transition indicators are a 
valuable source of information on the competitive performance of the CEECs. To enrich 
the 'picture' of the national competitiveness levels of individual CEECs we look in 
particular at four transition indicators: Overall infrastructure reform, Price liberalisation, 
Trade and Forex system, and Competition policy. 
Whereas the first two groups of variables under observation are continuous ratio 
variables expressed as proportional indicators, the last group of transition indicators is a 
categorical ordinal variable. The transition indicators score reflects EBRD's evaluation on 
the country-specific transitional progress. Individual scores indicate the following: A score 
lower than 1.5 - a country has undergone only a few reforms, a score between 1.5<2.5 - a 
country has improved its position moderately, a score between 2.5<3.5 - a country has 
demonstrated some significant actions, a score between 3.5<4.5 - a country has 
experienced a substantial improvement, a score higher than 4.5 - a country has reached the 
levels of advanced economies. We provide an overview of the above discussed variables in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2.: Macro-economic Indicators Reflecting the Level of ational Competitiveness 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
3 GOP per head Iggdpyer_ Continuous - ETU 
($ at PPP) USD Ratio database 
4 Real GDP gro wth reaLgdp Continuous - ETU 
per head (% pa) Ratio database 
S Total factor total fa Con tinuous - ETU 
product ivity gro wth Ratio database 
(%) 
6 Real effective real eff Continuou - ETU -
exchange rate Ratio database 
(CPI-based) X 
7 Unit labo ur cos ts unit lab Continuou - ETU 
(% change pa) Ratio database 
8 Lending interest rate lending_ Continuous - ETU 
f%) Ratio database 
9 In wa rd foreign in ward f Continuous - ETU -
direct Ratio database 
investment/GOP (%) 
10 Balance of trade ba lance Continuous - EfU -
(% of GOP) Ratio database 
II Govemment budget govemml ICon tinuous - ETU 
s urplu /deficit Ratio database 
(% of GOP) 
12 Agricul ture/GOP agricu lt Continuous - EfU 
(%) Ratio database 
13 I Services/GOP (%) Iselvices Continuou - EfU 
Ratio database 
14 Indu stry/GDP (%) industry Continuous - ETU 
Ratio database 
IS Overall overalL Categorica I <1.S=few refol111S EBRD 
infra tructure Ordinal I.S .S= moderate irnprovement tran ition 
refonn 2.S<3.S= significant action indicators 
3.S .5= sub tantial improven'X!nt report 
>4.S= levels of advanced 
economies 
16 Price libera li ation price_Ii !Categorica l < I.S- few refol111S EBRD 
Ordina l I.S .S= moderate improven'X!nt transition 
2.S<3.S= significant action indicators 
3.S .S= ubstantial improvement report 
>4.S= levels of ad anced 
economies 
17 Trade & Forex trade Categorical < I.S=few refol111S EBRD -
sys tem Ordinal I.S<2.S= moderate improvement tran ition 
2.S<3.5= ignificant actions indica tors 
3.5 .S= substan tial il11proven'X!nt report 
>4.5= level of advanced 
economies 
18 Competition Policy competit Categorical <I.S=few refol111S EBRD 
Ordinal I.S .S= moderate improvement transition 
2.S<3.S= significant actions indicators 
3.S .5= sub tantial improvement report 
>4.5= level of advanced 
economies 
Source: EBRD (2008), EfU (2010) 
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5.2.3. Institutional Quality 
Institutional environment facilitates the development of a specific financial system. While 
equity-based systems require institutional systems which guarantee the protection of 
individual shareholders, efficient bureaucracy and low corruption leading towards high 
transparency, the bank-based models necessitate the presence of institutional reforms and 
policies geared towards the co-ordination within the banking sector and its regulation. To 
assess the institutional quality in our sample countries we examine two sets of data. Firstly, 
we employ the political risk components of ICRG institutional data, which enables us to 
assess the institutional quality of both the CEECs and the benchmarks. Secondly, to 
consider the institutional progress specifically in the CEECs, we include a smaller set of 
EBRD transition indicators in our analysis. Both groups of variables are of categorical 
ordinal type. 
Variables 19-21 (Government stability, Socioeconomic conditions and Investment 
profile) can have a minimum number of points assigned 0 and maximum 12 whereas 
variables 22-25 can have a minimum number of points assigned 0 but maximum 6. In 
every case the lower the risk point total, the higher the risk, and the higher the risk point 
total, the lower the risk. Variable 19 - Government stability - is a measure of a 
government's unity, legislative strength and popular support. Variable 20 - Socioeconomic 
conditions - evaluates socio-economic pressures at work (in particular unemployment, 
consumer confidence, poverty) that could constrain government action or lead to social 
dissatisfaction. Variable 21 - Investment profile - assesses factors affecting the risk to 
investment that are not covered by other political social or financial risk components (in 
particular contract viability, profits repatriation, payment delays). Variable 22 - Corruption 
- measures a political threat to foreign investment as it can distort economic and financial 
environments, reduce the efficiency of a government and businesses and introduce 
instability into the organisational processes. Variable 23 - Law and order - comprises two 
subcomponents ('law' and 'order'). While the former assesses the strength and impartiality 
of a country's legal system, the latter is concerned with the application of law and effective 
sanctioning. Variable 24 - Democratic accountability - reflects on the type of governance 
employed in each country. ICRG identifies five different types of governance (alternating 
democracy, dominated democracy, de facto one-party state, the jury one-party state, 
autarchy) and assigns the highest number of risk points to alternating democracies (low 
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risk) and the lowest number of risk points to autarchies (high risk). Variable 25 -
Bureaucracy quality - is another indicator of a country's institutional strength. Countries 
demonstrating high points on this variable run bureaucracy systems independent from 
political pressures with established effective bureaucratic mechanisms. 
For the assessment of the institutional quality in the transition economies we apply 
transition indicators as follows: Variables 26-30 - Large scale privatisation (an indicator 
on the process of transferring state ownership of large firnls into private hands), Small 
scale privatisation (an indicator on the process of transfelTing state ownership of small 
firnls into private hands), Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation (an indicator on 
the progress of banking laws and regulation), Securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions (an indicator on the progress of securities laws and regulation), governance an 
enterprise restructuring (an indicator on the progress of corporate governance). Individual 
cores indicate the following: A score lower than 1.5 - a country has undergone only a 
few reform (achieved limited progress), a score between 1.5<2.5 - a country has 
improved its position moderately (achieved moderate progre s), a core between 2.5<3.5 -
a country has demon trated some significant action (achieved significant progress), a 
core between 3.5<4.5 - a country ha experienced a substantial improvement (achieved 
sub tantial progr ) a core higher than 4.5 - a country ha r ached the level of 
advanced economie (achieved a progre comparable to advanced economies). We 
provide an overview of the above di cu ed institutional variables in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3.a.: Indicator Reflecting 1n titutional Quality 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type ScaJe/Range ISource 
19 Govcmm::nt govcmmc I Catcgorica I o (low quality) - 12 (high quality) rCRG 
Stabi lity IOrdinal database 
20 I Sociocconomic socioeco I Catcgorica l o (low quality) - 12 (high qua lity) lCRG 
I Cond itions Ordinal database 
21 In vestm::nt in ve tml Categorica l O( lowqua li ty)- 12(h igh quality) ICRG 
Profile Ordinal database 
22 Comlption corrup ti Ca tegorica l o (low qua li ty) - 6 (high quality) ICRG 
Ordina l database 
23 Law and Order law and Categorical o (low qua lity) - 6 (high quality) rCRG -
IOrdina l database 
24 Dcmoeratic democrat Catcgorical o (low quality) - 6 (high quality) ICRG 
Accountability Ordinal database 
25 Burcaucracy burcaucr Categorical o (low qua lity) - 6 (high quality) ICRG 
Quality Ordinal database 
tire: J R (2001 
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Table S.3.b.: Indicators Reflecting Institutional Quality 
Var iable No . Var iable Var iable Code Var iable Type S cale/Range Source 
26 Large sca le large_sc Categorica l < 1.5=fe w refonns EBRD 
privatisation Ordina l 1.5<2.5= moderate improvement tran s ition 
2.5<3.5= ignificant actions indicators 
3.5<4.5= substantia l improve ment report 
>4.5= leve ls of advanced 
econonlJes 
27 SmaU sca le smaU sc CategOlical <1.5=few refonm EBRD 
priva tisa tion Ordina l 1.5<2.5= moderate improverrent transition 
2.5<3.5= ignificant actions indicators 
3.5<4.5= s ubstantia l improven-ent report 
>4.5= levels of advanced 
economies 
28 Banking reform banking I Categorica l < I .5=few refOnTlS EBRD 
& interest rate Ordinal 1.5<2.5= moderate inlproverrent transition 
libera lisa tion 2.5<3.5= s ignificant actions indicators 
3.5<4.5= substantia l inlproverrent report 
>4.5= levels of advanced 
economies 
29 Securities securiti Categorica l < I .5=few refomlS EBRD 
markets & non- Ordina l 1.5<2.5= moderate improven-ent tran ition 
bank fm anc ia l 2.5<3.5= ignificant act ions indicators 
in titutions 3.5<4.5= ub tan tia l unprovell-ellt report 
>4.5= level of advanced 
economies 
30 r~vemance and entrepri Categorica l < 1.5=few refomlS IEBRD 
Enterprise Ordina l 1.5<2.5= moderate inlpro errent trans ition 
res tru ctu ring 2.5<3.5= s ign ifican t actio ns u1dicators 
3.5<4.5= subs tantia l inlproverrent report 
>4.5= leve l of ad anced 
economies 
Source, EBRD (2008) 
S.2.4. Financial In titutions: Bank-based vs. Equity-oriented Financiallntermediarie 
To evaluate the financial intermed iary side of the institutional environment we consider 
two group of indicator. Fir tly, the number of bank- and equity oriented financial 
intcrmediarie that have developed in each country under it pecific macro-economic 
condition and in titutional quality and econdly, the quality of the banking ector and the 
liquidity of th equ ity-oriented capital markets ector. 
Bureau van Dijk's Orbi databa e i an invaluable ource of company data, including 
data on financial in titution . It offer a tandard lndu trial la ification developed by the 
U en u Bureau (U I ) which enable u to view indu try egment pecific to our 
re earch. Fir tly, t examine the quantitative pre ence of banking in titution we select fi e 
indicator. With the aim of data normali ing we convert each indicator into a proportional 
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percentage using the total number of financial intennediaries as a denominator. Variable 
31 - national commercial banks, Variable 32 - state commercial banks, Variable 33 -
commercial banks (other), Variable 34 - branches and agencies of foreign banks, Variable 
35 - foreign trade and international banking institutions. Secondly, to identify the number 
of other than bank loan credit providing institutions we add two other indicators: Variable 
36 - short-tenn business credit institutions, Variable 37 - miscellaneous business credit 
institutions. Finally, to assess the presence of equity-related financial intennediaries we 
look at the following indicators: Variable 38 - securities dealers and broker and flotation 
companies, Variable 39 - security and commodity e changes, Variable 40 - finns offering 
investment advice, Variable 41 - other services allied with the exchange of securities or 
commodities. 
Using another source of data, the IMD database, we further assess the quality of the 
banking sector and the equity-relates capital markets ector. Firstly, we examine the 
banking sector' s 'depth ' a we study Variable 42 - banking sector assets - in all our 
sample countrie . Secondly, we look at the liquidity of the main tock exchange in our 
sample countries. Variable 43 - tock market capitali ation enables us to observe thi . In 
addition , we examine liquidity of the average listed firm . We thus create Variable 44 
expre ed as a ratio of tock market capitaii ation over the number of listed dome tic 
companies. We provide an overview of the above di cussed variable in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4.a: Indicators Reflecting the Pre ence of Financial Intennediaries 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type IScale/Range ISource 
31 Na tio nal commerc ial ra t io nationa Ibanks Continu ou - Orbi Databa c 
banks /TNFI* Ratio + Auth or' 
Ca lcu lations 
32 IStatc commcrc i:l l ra tios tatecomba nks IContinuou - Orbi Databa e 
banks /TNFI Ratio + Author' 
[c:alculations 
33 Commcrc ial ba nks ra tiocombanks IContinuou - 0rbi Databa e 
(o th cr)/TNFI Ra tio + Author' 
Ca lculations 
34 Bra nche and ratiobra nch forcign ban ks Continuous - 0 rb i Databa e 
agencie of foreign Ratio + Auth or's 
banks /TNFI Calcu lations 
35 Foreign trade and ra tiofit rade IContinuou - Orb is Databa e 
intern ational Ratio + Author' 
banking ICalculations 
in stitutions/TNFI 
36 IShort term bu in ;s ra tio horttennin tit IContinuou - Orbi Databa e 
credit Ratio + Author' 
ins t itut ions/TNFI [Calculations 
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Table 5.4.b : Indicators Reflecting the Presence of Financial Intermediaries 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
37 Miscellaneous ratiomisc Continuous - Orbis Database 
bus iness cred it Ratio + Author's 
in stitution s/TNFI Calculations 
38 Security brokers ratiosecUJity Continuous - Orbis Database 
and dealers and Ratio + Author's 
flotation Calculations 
companies/TNFI 
39 Security and ratiosecurity2 Continuous - Orbis Database 
commodity Ratio + Author's 
exchanges /TNFT Ca lculations 
40 In yes tmen t ratioinvetsment Continuous - Orbis Database 
advice/TNFT Ratio + Author's 
Ca lculations 
41 Oth er services allied ratioo therserv Continuous - Orbis Database 
with the exchange Ratio + Author's 
of securities or Calculations 
commod ities /TNFI 
42 Bankin g Sector banking_ Continuous - TMD database 
Assets Ratio 
1(% ofGDP) 
43 Stock market stock ml Co ntinuous - TMD database 
capitali ation Ratio 
!(% ofGDP) 
44 Stock market averagemktcap Continuous - TMD database + 
capita lisation/ Lis ted Ratio Author's 
Domes tic Calcu lations 
Compa nies 
* TNFJ - Tota l Number of Financia l TntemlCd ialies 
Source: Author's Calculations + Orbis (2008), IMD (2010) 
5.2.5. The Firm Sector: Categories of Firm Size and Ownership 
One of the advantages of using panel data is that it enables us to employ a 
multidimensional perspective. We are not on ly ab le to observe country level data but also 
include an examination at the firm level. In our study we utilise both levels of analysis as 
we maintain that firms are the main driver of an equity culture development at a national 
level. As we previously explained in Chapter 3, our conceptual framework, we intend to 
investigate if factors affecting an equity cu lture development vary for different firm sizes. 
We use the firm size definition recognised by the European Commission in 2005 and 
categorize the firm sector into large firms (Large), small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
micro firms (Micro) and in addition the total number of firms - a combination of all three 
size groups - (Tota l). In our summary tab le (Table: 5.5.) a categorical nominal variable 
representing the firm size category has number 45 . 
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Furthermore, to be ab le to identify what proportion of the firm sector 'demands' 
equity financ ing in each of our sample countries we create variables 46-50 in the following 
way: Firstly, we examine the proportion of public firms over the total number of fimls 
(Variable 46). Secondly, we offer the proportion of private firms over the total number of 
firms (Variable 47). Then, we investigate what the number of private firms that have more 
than five shareholders over the total number of firms is (Variable 48). We argue that for 
the purpose of our research objective - an investigation of a potential for equity culture 
development in transition countries - assessing public finns exclusively would not produce 
reliable resu lts . This is because it is not only public firnls (through public equity) but also 
private firms with a higher number of shareholders (through private equity) that contribute 
to the creation of an equity culture. In addition, we generate two intensity ratios: Variable 
49 - Public firms over private firms and Variable 50 - Private firms with five or more 
shareholders over private firms. We provide an overview of these variables in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5.: Ownership Patterns of the Firm Sector 
Variable No. Variable Var iable Code Variable Type IScale/Range ISource 
45 Firm ize firm sil Categolical l=Large European 
Nominal 2=Micro Commission 
3=SME (2007) 
4=To tal 
46 Public ratiopublic IContinuous See Chapter 4, Orbis Database 
Firms /TNF* Ratio section + Author' 
4.4.2.1. . Ca Iculations 
47 Plivate ra tioprivate Continuou See Chapter 4, Orbi Da taba e 
I Finns /TNF Ratio seetion + Author's 
4.4.2. 1. Calculations 
48 Private Finns ratioprivate5 ICon tinu ous I See Chapter 4, Orbis Databa e 
with 5 or more Ra tio section + Author's 
s hareh Id ers l 4.4.2. 1. Calculation 
TNF 
49 Public pub lictopriva te Continuous See Chapter 4, Orbis Database 
Firms/ Private Ratio section + Author's 
[Finns 4.4.2. I. Calculations 
50 Private Fim1S private5toprivate Continuous Sce Chaptcr 4, Orbis Da tabase 
wi th 5 o r morc Ratio I section + Author' 
s hareholdcr I 4.4.2.1. Calculation 
Private Fim1S 
TNF - Tota l Number of Firms 
Source: Author 's Calculations + Orbi (200 :,1 
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5.2.6. Intra-firm Conditions: Managerial Capabilities 
To assess the internal environment of a firm and its readiness to foster demand for equity 
financing we include thirteen managerial variables obtained from the IMD's World 
Competitiveness Yearbook. The primary source of data on management practices is an 
executive survey designed by IMD. Data is provided through an index of ° to 1 0, where the 
bottom level denotes negative perception and the upper level indicates the most favourable 
perception. The type of variables can be therefore identified as categorical ordinal. 
Drawing on our conceptual framework we' select managerial variables which 
correspond to the nature of our intra-firm argument that less risk-averse managerial 
behaviour is positively associated with the development of an equity culture. We select 
thirteen variables which we deem relevant for the examination of the intra-firm 
environment: Firstly, Variable 51 - worker motivation - is an indicator related to business 
efficiency implying the presence of a culture of continuous improvement. Secondly, 
Variable 52 - finance skills - relates to an ability of managers to guide the firm through to 
more advanced financing choices. Then, Variable 53 - foreign high-skilled people -
evaluates the attractiveness of firms to foreign high-skilled candidates, Variable 54 -
international experience - assesses the presence of international experience of senior 
management and Variable 55 - competent senior mangers - looks at the involvement of 
senior management when strategic decision-making takes place. Next, Variable 56 -
adaptability of companies - reflects the adaptability of managers when faced with new 
challenges and Variable 57 - credibility of managers - mirrors the credibility of managers 
within a society. We also include Variable 58 - entrepreneurship - which assesses if 
managers demonstrate entrepreneurial attitudes and qualities and Variable 59 - attitudes 
towards globalisation - which evaluates global awareness of managers. Finally, Variable 
60 - national culture - reflects levels of openness towards foreign ideas, Variable 61 -
flexibility and adaptability - reflects the flexibility of managers when they are faced with 
new strategic challenges, Variable 62 - need for economic and social reforms - is an 
indicator of a firm's ability to understand the necessity for economic and/or social change, 
and Variable 63 - corporate values - evaluates to what extent the corporate values of a 
firm take into account the values of individual employees. We provide an overview of the 
above discussed variables in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6.: Intra-firm Conditions: Managerial Capabi lities 
Variable No. Variable Variable Code Variable Type Scale/Range Source 
51 Worker Motivation worker ill Categorical index 0 to 10 lMD database 
Ordinal 
52 Finance Skills finance Categorical indexO to 10 lMD database -
Ordinal 
53 Foreign high- foreign 1 Categorical index 0 to 10 lMD database 
skilled people Ordinal 
54 International interna t Categorica l indexO to 10 lMD database 
Experience Ordinal 
55 Competent Senior competen Categorical indexOto 10 lMD database 
Managers Ordinal 
56 Adaptability of adaptab i Categorical index 0 to 10 lMD database 
companies Ordinal 
57 Credibility of cred ibil Categorica l index 0 to 10 IMD database 
Managers Ordinal 
58 Entrepreneurship entrepre Categorical indexOto 10 lMD database 
Ordinal 
59 A ttitudes toward attitude Categorica l index 0 to 10 IMD database 
globalisation Ordinal 
60 Nationa l Cu lture nationa 1 Categorica I indexOto 10 IMD database 
Ordinal 
61 Flexibility and flexibil Categorica l index 0 to 10 IMD database 
Adaptability Ordinal 
62 Need for Economic need for Categorica I indexOto 10 JMD database 
and Socia l Reforms Ordinal 
63 Corporate va lu es corporat Categorica l indexO to 10 IMD database 
Ordinal 
Source: l MD (2010) 
5.3. Data Assessment: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
To eva luate our data set and determine if there are statistica ll y significant differences in the 
experimenta l conditions we perform a statisti ca l test of the analys is of variance (ANaYA). 
For an ANaYA, datasets are organised by factor and leve ls (Cryer and Mi ll r, 1994). 
Factors are the different independent variab les in a study and they are te ted at given 
levels. In our study we run a 'one-way' ANaYA as only one factor changes (country) at a 
given level (vari ab les 3-63). Thi parametric procedure helps u to determine the stati tica l 
signifi cance of the difference between the means of ten groups (10 EECs) and 
consequently four groups (Germany, Japan, UK, USA) of va lues. The rejection or 
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acceptance of the statistical significance of the differences in ten (and four) means is based 
on a standard that no more than 5% of the difference is due to chance or sampling error and 
that the same difference would occur 95% of the time should the test be repeated. Although 
some researchers use a more rigorous standard of 1 % which means that the same 
difference would occur 99% should the test be repeated, we adopt the 5% acceptance level. 
Due to the fact that the analysis of variance is among the most popular of statistical 
procedures, it can be used with a number of different methodologies and is especially 
critical to a study using two or more groups. We use this method to empirically evaluate 
our data. 
We perform the ANOVA for each variable in our five sets of variable groups 
mirroring the previous section 5.1. This approach enables us to present the results in a 
reader-friendly organised way and at the same time follow a structure we introduced in 
Chapter 3, our conceptual framework. It is important to mention that we use the ANOVA 
solely to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between individual 
groups in our sample and thus suggest the fit among individual countries. Due to the large 
number of observed variables we provide data interpretation in Chapter 6, in which we not 
only compare individual values for our sample countries in more detail but also benchmark 
and create clusters using the Co-Plot method. Furthermore, the Co-Plot method enables us 
to include the time element into our examination. 
5.3.1. One-way ANOV A of Macro-economic Indicators 
Firstly, one-way analysis of variance is used to determine whether individual macro-
economic indicators differed among ten CEECs and our four chosen benchmarks. The 
analysis shows (Table 5.7) significant differences among the CEECs in terms of all general 
macro-economic indicators at 1 % level except from variable 7 (Unit labour costs) which is 
statistically not significant. The F statistics of this variable is smaller than 1 which suggests 
that there is less difference between groups (CEECs) than there is within individual groups. 
The fact that this variable is significant at only 10% level and demonstrates lower than I F 
statistics leads to a conclusion that there is small variance of data representing this 
particular variable. In the case of the groups of benchmarks variable 2 (Real GDP growth 
per head) is also significant at only 10% level. 
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Furthermore, we observe from the ANOY A table that Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Slovakia have on average the highest GDP growth, and they also score high on the Real 
GDP growth per head indicator. Other macro-economic indicators also confirm that these 
economies have very competitive macro-economic conditions. On the other hand, Bulgaria 
and Romania have on average worse performing economies as they display low GDP 
growth, low total factor productivity growth, yet for their type of economies relatively high 
labour costs and high lending interest rate. Other CEECs di splay somewhat average values. 
A more detailed discussion of the data with the added time element follows in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.7.: ANOYA Table : Macro-economic Indicators (l 
Macr<H!conomic GDP per head Real GDP Total faclOr Real effective Unit labour Lending Inward foreign Balance of Government 
Imticalors (I) (1000$ at 1'1'1') growth per head product ivity exchange rate cos ts interest direcl trade budget 
US D (% pa) growlh (CPI-based) X (% change pal ra te investm:::nt (% ofGDP) surplus/defic il 
(%) (%) (% ofGDP) (% ofGDP) 
Variable (v) No. v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v lO \ \1 
No . Count l)' Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bulgaria 8.92 4.14 0.74 133.19 10.86 47.63 8.38 -19.76 1.30 
2 Czech Rep 9.75 6.30 2.06 124.88 7.21 7.98 6.25 -2.69 -3.68 
3 Es IOlliu 9.4 1 7.27 4.45 117.06 14.97 8.53 8.77 -22. 16 0.34 
5 Hun gal)' 9.53 3.86 2.3 1 119.63 7.62 13.69 5.75 -4.44 -5.99 
7 Latv ia 9.18 7.37 4.36 11 3.57 9.45 11.50 5.15 -14.67 -1.44 
8 Lithuania 9.27 3.95 3.48 122.58 10.03 9.78 4.10 -15.69 -1047 
9 Poland 9.35 4.7 1 204 1 11 6.55 7.98 14.68 3.91 -7.76 -4.30 
10 ROIl"'-ln ia 8.95 3.80 lAO 131.74 10.35 38.21 4.65 -10.98 -3.14 
II Slo vakia 9049 4.99 1.98 127043 7.3 1 12.06 5.79 -5.28 -3.29 
12 Slovenia 9.86 4.40 1.1 5 100.19 6.89 12048 2.29 -3.99 -1.26 
Total 9.37 5.08 2.63 120.68 9.27 17.65 5.79 -10.74 -2.29 
F statislics 13.65 2.68 3.50 3.25 0.46 2.65 5.89 63.68 19.36 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0071 0.0007 0.0014 0.8974 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 Genm ny 10.24 1045 0.68 100.59 1.44 5043 2.03 5.24 -2.00 
6 Japan 10.23 1.00 0.08 105.28 -3.12 1.52 0.17 1.87 -6.28 
13 UK 10.25 2.30 0.35 96.16 4.07 4.96 4.48 -4.72 -1.64 
14 USA 10.53 1.95 1.25 102.54 1.51 6.90 1.61 -4.85 -1.90 
Total 10.31 1.67 0.59 101.14 0.98 4.70 2.07 -0.61 -2.96 
F statis tics 12.47 2.68 2.99 3.03 2.29 107.79 11.53 149.81 11.48 
Prob > F O.OQ()I) 0.0574 0.0399 0.0382 0.0900 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: EIU (2010b) and Author 's ANOVA performed in STATA 
Secondly, we perform the ANOVA on indicators representing the composition of 
individual economies in terms of their proportions of the serv ices, agriculture and industry 
sectors. In the case of the CEECs we also examine the variance of transition data obtained 
from the EBRD database (Table 5.8). The ana lys is of variance indicates that there are 
significant differences among the ten CEECs and our four benchmarks. We observe 
significance at 1 % level with the F statistics being larger than I in all cases. 
While the developed economi es of Germany, Japan , UK and USA show on ly a small 
percentage of economic contribution ach ieved by their agriculture industry this is not the 
case in many of the CEECs, particularly Bulgaria and Romania . Estonia is the CEE 
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representative with the most productive services sector, and Czech Republic displays on 
average the most productive industry sector. In terms of the EBRD transition indicators, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia underperfoml their CEE counterparts. 
Table 5.8.: ANOYA Table: Macro-economic Indicators (II) 
Macro-economic Agriculture/ Serv ices/GOP Industry/GDP Overa ll Price Trade & Competition 
Indicators (n) GOP (%) (%) (%) infras tlUcture libera lisation Forex Policy 
refo rm system 
Variab le (v) No. v l2 v l3 v l4 v l5 v l6 v l7 \ 18 
No. Cou nt ry Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bulgaria 11.94 57.00 31.06 2.69 4.10 4.25 2.43 
2 Czech Rep 3.48 58. 10 38.42 4.02 4.33 2.85 3.56 
3 Es tonia 4.28 66.85 28.88 3.13 4.33 4.23 2.92 
5 lIungary 6.66 61.53 31. I 3.54 4.33 4.33 3.13 
7 Latvia 4.38 63.49 31.1 3 2.82 4.33 4.25 2.56 
8 Lit hua nia 6.39 62.35 31.26 2.62 4.18 4.20 2.84 
9 Poland 4.90 62.89 32.21 3.18 4.28 4.33 2.97 
10 Roma nia 13.73 49. 18 37.09 2.82 4.28 4.20 2.31 
II lovakia 4.44 59. 17 36.39 2.46 4. 18 4.30 3.13 
12 Slovenia 3. 11 61.76 35.13 2.77 3.95 4.33 2.51 
To tal 6.33 61.03 32.64 3.0 1 4.23 4.13 2.84 
F tatis tics 26. 15 37.84 20.5 1 17.02 6.71 98.2 1 14.67 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 Gennany 1.1 2 68.91 29.97 N/A /A 
6 Japa n 1.68 70. 8 27.44 /A fA 
13 UK 1.40 71.4 27. 12 /A /A 
14 U A 1.11 76.38 22.5 1 N/A N/A N/A 
To tal 1.3 71.91 26.76 fA NfA fA 
F tati tic 25.28 43.27 49.16 fA /A N/A 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NfA NfA N/A 
Source: lMD (2010), EBRD (2008a) and Author ' ANOVA peliormed in STATA 
5.3.2. One-way ANOVA of Institutional Quality Indicators 
We apply the ANOYA to a es the variance of in tituti onal data for the C and our 
four benchmarks. We find that in the case of the C E all groups have the probabili ty 
leve l at I % level which sugge t that data di ffers substantially among individual coun trie . 
The arne significance level i present in mo t observa tion for the benchmarks group 
with three exceptions: variable 19 (government stability), variable 2 1 (inve tment profile) 
and variable 25 (bureaucracy quality). In the ca e of variable 19 al 0 the F sta ti tics i 
below I which uggest that there i Ie di fference between group than there is within 
individual groups. 
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The ANOY A table displays very similar levels for the developed countries, with the 
UK and USA performing slightly better on the indicators of law and order, corruption and 
bureaucracy quality. The CEECs' group institutional quality indicators are on average 
lower than those of our four benchmarks with Bulgaria and Romania di splaying the lowest 
values in most cases. Interestingly, Estonia scores on average lower on the variable of 
Investment Profile than most other CEECs, however its value is close to that of the UK. 
Table 5.9.: ANOYA Table: Indicators of Institutional Quality (1) 
Ins tit·utiona.1 Go ve l11 men t Socioeconomic in ves tn1ent Corruption Law and Order Democratic Bureaucracy 
Quality Indicators Stability Co nditions Profile Accoun tability Quality 
(I) 
Va riable (v) No. v l9 v20 v2 1 v22 v23 v24 v25 
INo. Count ry Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bu lgaria 8.36 3.8 1 10.29 2.7 1 3.85 5.24 2.00 
2 Czech Rep 7.37 7.1 8 10.18 3.2 1 5.1 5 5.29 3.00 
3 • tonia 8.92 6.87 9.93 3.54 4.00 5.08 2.61 
5 Hunga ry 8.33 6.19 10.49 3.78 4.64 5.88 3.59 
7 Latvia 8.76 5.85 10.01 2.28 4.92 5.00 2.38 
8 Lithuania 7.91 6.5 1 10.01 2.5 1 4.00 5.30 2.38 
9 Poland 7.89 5.38 10.46 3.08 4.4 1 5.88 3.05 
10 ROmlnia 8.34 4.40 8.33 2.67 4.24 5.78 1.00 
II Slovakia 8.07 6.86 9.97 3.00 4.38 5.56 3.06 
12 Slove nia 9.63 6.5 1 10.47 3.28 4.67 5.05 3.00 
T tal 8.36 5.96 10.01 3.01 4.43 5.41 2.61 
r ·tati ·tics 3.49 15.27 2.65 5.28 10.20 10.00 200.43 
Prob > F 0.0007 0.0000 OJXJ77 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 German y 8.94 9.98 I I. 14 4.21 5.36 5.30 
3.97 
6 Japan 8.89 .88 10.82 3.33 5.3 1 
5. 10 3.97 
13 K 9. 12 7.5 1 9.67 4.59 5.83 
5.84 4.23 
14 A 9.39 .17 10.53 4.67 5.48 
5. 2 4.00 
otal 9.09 8.63 10.54 4.20 
5.50 5.52 3.99 
F sta tio tics 0.32 12.60 1.64 17.02 3.57 
15.74 1.6 
Prob .> F 0.8099 0.0000 0.1918 0.0000 0.0207 
0.0000 0.202 
Source: 1 RC (2001) and Author ' A OVA pel/armed in STATA 
The V A of the tran ition in titutional indicator indicate that there are 
significant difference among the a all indicator are significant at I % I el 
(Tab le 5. 10.). Also th F tati tic i higher than I in all ca e which sugge t that there is 
more di fference between group than there i within group . 
While zech Republic ~ tonia Hungary and lovakia's a erage va lue for the 
111 tituti nal data are the highe t indicating a ub tantial improvement of the in titutional 
indicator Bulgaria, Romania and lovenia are the wor t performing countrie 111 the 
group. In particular, zech Republic, E tonia and Hungary perform the be t on the 
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indicator of large scale privatisation, and Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia show the 
highest values on the indicator of small scale privatisation. In terms of the banking reform 
we observe that Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia demonstrate a proactive reform 
approach. On the other hand, the indicator of the presence of securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions shows on average higher values in the case of Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. 
Table 5.10.: ANOY A Table: Indicators of Institutional Quality (II) 
Ins titutional Large scale Small scale Banking refonn Securities markels & Governance 
Quality Indicators privarisalion privatisation & interest rate non-bank fmancial and Enterprise 
(D) liberalisation institutions res tructuring 
Va liab le (v) No. v26 v27 v28 v29 v30 
No. Country Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bulgaria 3.51 3.57 3.16 2.28 2.46 
2 Czech Rep 4.00 3.23 3.92 2.85 4.30 
3 Estonia 4.00 4.33 3.69 3.18 3.31 
5 Hungary 4.00 4.30 3.18 3.64 3.38 
7 Latvia 3.33 4.23 3.4 1 2.67 2.85 
8 Lith uania 3.49 4.25 3.26 2.59 2.87 
9 Poland 3.30 4.33 3.38 3.54 3.3 1 
10 Romania 3.23 3.57 2.85 2.23 2. 18 
II Slovakia 3.92 4.33 3.23 3.05 3.23 
12 lovenia 2.97 4.33 3.25 2.70 2.85 
Tota l 3.58 4.05 3.33 2.87 3.07 
F s lali lie 19.34 88.04 9.28 28.41 75.40 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: EBRD (2008a) and Author ' ANOVA peljormed in STATA 
5.3.3. One-way ANOVA of Indicators Representing Financial Intermediaries 
The data assessment of financial intermed iari es in the CEECs' group revea l that there are 
zero va lue for the majori ty of countri es in the case of vari ab le 36 (short-term business 
cred it institution) and a ll countries in the case of variabl es 32 (State commercial banks), 
33 ( ommercial banks (other)) and 34 (Branche and agencie of foreign bank) in the 
CEECs' group. In the case of the latter, due to zero va lues in the ca e of all countries, no 
ignificance level is provided. Therefore, these four variables cannot be included in the 
forthcoming stati stica l analysis. In the ca e of the remaining variab les the stati tical 
significance of the difference in the means indicates that there i a statistica lly sign ificant 
difference betwe n the means in a ll ten CEECs and all four benchmarks. A ll indicators are 
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significant at 1 % level. Higher F statistics in the case of the benchmarks implies significant 
variations within a smaller number of observations. 
Table 5.11.: ANOY A Table: Quantitative Presence of Financial Intermediari es (l and II) 
Financi al Nationa l State Commercia l Branche and Foreign trade and Short term business Miscellaneous 
Intermedi aries (I) commercial commercial banks agencies of in ternational credit business credit 
banksfTNFI* banks/TNFI (o ther)IT FI foreign banking ins titutionsfT FI institutionsfTNFI 
banks/T FI ins titutionsfTNFI 
Variab le (v) No. v3 1 v32 v33 v34 v35 v36 v37 
No. Country Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bulgaria 5.20"10 0.00% 0.00"10 0.00"10 16.56% 0.11 % 9.70"10 
2 Czech Rep 27.60"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 25.71 % 0.00"10 36.19% 
3 Es ton ia 12.30"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 8.62% 0.00"10 35.43% 
5 Hungary 1.56% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 29.68% 0.00"/, 
6. I ~, 
7 Latvia 6.90"/, 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 6.49% 0.00"10 38.22% 
8 Lithuania 9.14% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 20.37% 0.00"10 17.73% 
9 Poland 5.75% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"/, I .36% 1.12% 61.92% 
10 Romania 2.27% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 15.05% O.(l()'), 10.63', 
I I Slovakia 19.84% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 15.45% 0.00"10 18.09% 
12 Slovenia 5.15% 0.00"10 0.00"10 0.00"10 24.66% 0.00"10 14.57% 
Tota l 9.67', 0.00". 0.00"10 0.00" , 18.09", 0.12', 24.86', 
F s tatis tic 47.78 N/A IA I A 128.68 106.98 330. 5 
Prob > F 0.0000 N/A N/A N/A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 Gerntlny 6.45% 5.30"10 5.30"10 0.09"10 24.50"10 0.53% 
4.11', 
6 Japa n 2.64% 0.00"10 0.02% 1.7 % 0.00"10 0.00"/' 66.25''0 
13 UK 5.88% 5.35% 5.36% 0.39% 4.73% 3.20"10 60.09"10 
14 SA 27.77% 20.91% 4.14% 0.04% 0.15% 2.04% 
3.91', 
Total 10.68'. 7.89% 3.71'" 0.57' • 7.35' , 1.44', 
33.59' , 
F stati.<.tics 563.32 686.87 109.54 138.92 3429.22 529.56 
1215.27 
Prob > ~ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
Fi nancial Security broken. and ISccuntyand Inve.tment Other sen ices allied Banking ISlOck market 
ISlOck ,rorket 
Intermc(ti nrics (I I) dealer. and Oototion comll'Odity advicefTNFI with the exchange of ISector capitalisation 
caplla h"t ,on!LJ, ted 
cOIrpanies . FI e""hange I I H securitic or Assets (',of GOP) 
Dolll!stic OIl'q)al1leS 
cotrarodllieslT FI (',of OP) 
Variable (v) No. v38 v39 v40 v41 
v42 ,43 ,44 
No. Country Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Mean Mean 
I Bulgaria 11.42% 0.5 1'. 16.56', 
16.56' , 5968.79', 1360.46% 1.16', 
2 Czx:ch Rep 12.27% 1.23''0 15.05% 
15.05% 8157.74'~ 2503.56', 63.04' , 
3 Estonia 28.91% 0.60"10 9.60"10 
4.22'. 5592.17''0 2755.81' , 45.47'. 
5 Ilungary 4.02% 0.14% 28.90% 
4.02% 72 16.38% 722.00"10 19.47" , 
7 Latvia 7.91~, 1.14% 6.49'10 
28.91% 3614.8 " 1564.46'. 8.49' , 
8 Lithuania 9.84% 1.50"10 20.70"10 
9.84~, 77312'. 1519.69'10 8.76' • 
9 i'oklOd 3.64~, 2.01% 19.47% 
3.64' • 5381.58', 2113.53', 14 . 1I~, 
10 Romania 9.34% 0.80"10 25.65% 
9.34% 2838.06% 1025.33% 1.03~, 
II lovakia 13.87% 1.7% 15.45% 
15.45''0 6860.67''0 2559. 7% 21.43'. 
12 Slovenia 5.51% 0.76% 24.68% 
24.68% 7367.24', 2194.02% 10.m. 
lotal 10.~O"o 1.06', IR.25% 
13 . 17~o 5677.0~, IK31. 8', 18.98', 
I- 'tatlslic~ 11302 19.91 107.46 
102.47 '2.95 5.03 0.18 
Prob I 00000 00000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 00000 O.IS 
4 Genrony 1.84% 7.81% 24.54% 
20.31% 16860.21% 4788.75~, 162.8~, 
6 Japan 11.21% 1.04% 11 .86% 
5.80"10 21162.21', 7653.50"10 115.9 1', 
13 K 23.10% 10.26% 14.90"10 
25.47"/, 14742.42% 14322.63% 171.49', 
14 A 25.84% 14.48'10 20.48'10 
32.OO'lo 7121.42', 13434.90", 238.9~. 
1'01111 15.15'. &.19'. 17.94", 
20.89', 14971.56', 10049.94'. 172.31' . 
r ,tati.,tlC\ 4332.01 10.49 199.56 2697.69 39.00 4960 13.14 
Prob I- 00000 00000 00000 
0.0000 00000 0.0000 00000 
• TNFI . Total NurrberofFinancial lntenncdiaries 
Source: Orbis (200 / and Author 's ANOVA peliormed in STATA 
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From the ANOY A table we observe that Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia have 
on average the highest proportion of national commercial banks and that Czech Republic 
together with Hungary and Slovenia show the highest presence of foreign trade and 
international banking institutions. While Poland performs on average the strongest on the 
indicator of short-term and miscellaneous business credit institutions, Estonia and Slovakia 
show high values on the indicator of security brokers and dealers . Interestingly, Bulgaria 
and Romania demonstrate a high number of companies offering investment advice. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the quality of the banking sector and equity-based 
sector, we observe that Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have the most 'deep ' 
banking sectors while Estonia, Slovakia and Czech Republic have the highest stock market 
capitalisation in their geographic area. 
5,3.4, One-way ANOVA of Firm Sector Ownership Indicators 
To assess the variance of firm level data in terms of firm ownership for three different size 
group (Large firm , SMEs, Micro firms) and the total number of firnls we apply the 
ANOVA (Table 5.12). We find that in the case of the CEEC and the four benchmarks all 
groups have the probability level at 1 % level which sugge ts that data differs substantially 
among individual countri . Similarly to the previous case of the analysis of variance for 
indicators repre enting the financial intermediaries group we ob erve high F statistics in 
th ca e of the benchmark. Thi again indicates that there is mall number of ob ervations 
with big variati n . 
Table 5. 12.: AN VA Table: Firm Ownership Pattern of Different Finn Size Group 
Firm O\O\T1 trs hlp 
PublK: ',ml<t'TNP P"Vllte FIJ'Jl'I'O/TNF I)m'alc FIITIl'; \I.,th 5 or n'Ore ~han:holdcrs,'TNr 
V,,,. ble (v ) No ,·16 v47 \4K 
IlnTlStA: TUlul IJll}lc ~Mb Mk:N TOl41 lJIrge SMG. M k:ro 
TOlal LA'l!" SMl., Mk:1\) 
No Country Mean Mcan Mcan IMe.n Mean Mcan Mean 
Mean MCli n Mean ,,"'Ieun Mean 
I IlulMur .. , 497'. 1619'. 4 ZOO, 0 41°, 9503°Cl X34 I', 9S.8O", 9K 19', 6.25°0 10.75°0 6.75~0 3.49"1J 
2 ("zech Rep 0 17'. 4 96°~ 007". 0.01 '11 W.K3' ... 95.04°, 
99.93°, 99.9'1". 022'. 020", 0.3 1'0 0. 15', 
3 1"'1001 •• 007' . nO'. 002'. 0.0Il'. 99,93°, 91.30'. 99.911". 10000". 3.280~ 0 00lJ.. 5.43°0 2.65°, 
S llun",,!), o I({', 2 H9', OW, 00l'!. 99 X4 0 /l 97. II ~u 9CJ9 " , 99 9l!' •• 6 6X";, ),9()', 9.35'0 444', 
7 lal Vli:1 0.33', S.S<J'. 027'. OO~', 9967'. 94 41'0 
99 73°, 9995', 3.46', 7.36', S.<J90, O.R7'. 
M LnhUII""'l 04 1', H 1l2', 0,21'/, 0.02'. 9959'. 
911 1<% 99.7'1". 9<) ,9W'CI 5. 1" ... I1 .S]'~ 662'. 2. 1" 0 
Y l)oLlOd OM', 372', 0.2'1'. O~', 99 34'., 96 2!1', 
99 ltJ1, 9994°, 196', 097'. 2. 11 '0 1.91"!. 
10 RoI1\.tn1.t 6'16', 1.56'·. 0 11 '0 9912', 1'13.04°, 9844'11 
99 H9'. 1.37'. K.2SCl o ) K2'. 0.81°11 
O.4!1'. 
II Siov k .. 12.30'. 2.56', 0.5 1°, 97.7H" , M7.70'. 
97.44'0 99.49"11 0.22'" 039'. 027'. 0 12'. 
222'. 
12 19 1R'. I jQ'. 0 10'. C# II ', KO.R2', 
9H.50', 99 90'. 4 1,20, 10.68". 672'. 07rt'. 
Sk)\lcn ... I kCl'. 
1(lX". O,2~, 9KK6', 90.0)', 9H R7'. 1/9,73'0 3.27"0 ~41'o 
4Mofl 173°, 
TUI.JI 1 14'" C}97°. 
17~ 71> 12H41 14M 70 167 M<I :10.92 
12K41 206M 1265.10 J7I.K2 196.21 
1 ,1.11r41-.. 14K 17 16711'1 
nOlX.1 OIXXXl O()(lXl o OI.XI O(X)OO OOlXXl O.lxXXl O()(XXJ O(X)OO OOClXl Ptuh I 1I11U' OIXXM, 
2.00', I H7'. 97RJ'. 9J.3l~, 97.94
3 , 9H 1311 , 7.W'. 10 23°, 6 09', 4.64°0 
( ,.;m~m)l 2 17'. 66H', 
04~o. 000'. 10142'. 9164°, 100. 11 '. 10000'. 
0.00'. O.O~. 000'. 0.000. 
J.pan 141', H 36', 
99.S I', 5 H9'. & 230, 70J·. lO7', 
13 K 67 1', 27.59'. 4054'" 6jQ'. 9t\ 29'. 72 41'. 
9846', 
919H". 7.X3'0 10.02'. 7.2 1', 3.8 )', 
14 USA 10 14', JO 16'. ~ 06', M02', K9H6', 69.K4'o 
94 Q,.tll. 
25'1'. %J~'. MII<O'. 97 Xb', 97.41°, 
5N, 7. Iii". J.33', 2.9"'0 
filI'I II,... 1M 20". H . 
64094 27f12.X6 h79.HH 14ll) hO 355115 
r'!.IIt-Ik. l2S91J!< 2~~3 cp 7M<16~ 1>lO94 11 31 95H3.91 
5494 
00(110 OO(J(X) O()(XXl 0()(X1() U.(X)OO 
O(X)OO O()(x1O o (X)OO O(X)OO 
Pmh I ()I~ •• J OIXll) OIX)OO 
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"lrm O\\TI(' rs hip 
Public Finns/ Private Finns Private Firm; with 5 or rrore shareholders/ Private Finns 
Variable (v) No. v49 v50 
Finn Size Total llIrge SMEs M icro Total Laree SMEs Micro 
INo. Co unt ry Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
I Bulga ria 5.24% 19.99"10 4.39% 1.84% 6.58% 12.90% 7.06% 3.55% 
2 Czec h Rep 0. 17% 5.23% 0.07% 0.0 1% 0.22% 0.21 % 0.3 1% 0.15% 
3 Es tonia 0.07% 9.54% 0.02% 0.00% 3.28% O.W In 5.43% 2.65% 
5 Hu ngary 0. 16% 2.98% 0.09% 0.02% 6.69% 4.08% 9.35% 4 .44° ~ 
7 uu via 0.33% 5.93% 0.27% 0.05% 3.47% 7.80% 5. 10% 0.8~. 
8 Lithuunia 0.42% 9.68% 0.21 % 0.02% 5. 14% 12.65% 6.64% 2. 11 % 
9 Po land 0.66% 3.87% 0.30% 0.06% 1.97% I .W Io 2. 13% 1.97°11 
10 ROI1",-,nia 0.48% 20.6 1% 1.59% 0.11 % 1.37% 9.97% 3.88% 0.81% 
II Slovakia 2.28% 14. 12% 2.63% 0.5 1% 0.23% 0.45% 0.28% 0. 12° 0 
12 Slovenia 1.92% 23.74% 1.52% 0. 10% 4 .20Yo 1 3 .22~0 6.83°''0 0.7m. 
Tota l 1.1 ~0 11.57% 1.11 % 0.27% 3.32° 0 6.23°0 4.70". I 740• 
F SWlistics 137.29 135.23 167.44 124.3 1 203.86 10 16.74 358.18 195.70 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
4 Cenn:lny 2.2 1% 7. 16% 2.10"10 1.90% 7.79"/0 1 0 .9~'O 6.22~0 4.73°0 
6 Japan 1.44% 9.50"10 0.45% O.WIo O.W Io 0.03% O.W Io O.W Io 
13 UK 7.19"10 38.10"10 1.56% 0.49"10 6.02% 8.98% 7. 14% 3.0800 
14 USA 11.28% 43.20"10 5.33% 8. 73~0 8.020,,0 0.32~0 9 1.85% 3.86~0 
Total 5.50"·0 24.50"10 2.36~o 2.78", . 5.5 10• 5.0700 52.40" 0 2.870 0 
F swtistics 2835.29 2752.8 1 76 1.49 555.88 2642.08 654.28 1337.07 33R3.5 1 
Prob F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00000 
'TNF - Tota l Nu rnbcrorFinns 
Source: Orbi (2008)and Author 's ANOVA pel/armed in STATA 
We further ob erve that public proportions of the total number of finns vary from 
those of Large firnls , po ibly skewed by the effect of Micro fiml and SME and their 
ownership patterns. We also find that in the case of public firms the mean of Gemlany 
(our representative of the bank-ba ed model) are quite similar to tho e of the UK (our 
repre entative of the equity-based model). We believe that this is not necessarily due to 
Germany adopting an equity culture imilar to the UK but to the Ie challenging li sting 
requirement of German equ ity-related financial internlediaries. Indeed evidence from the 
private ector confinn that in the ca e of the German firm 'going public' is a 
considerably Ie s demanding proce in terms of time, bureaucracy and contractual 
obligations. Furthermore, we find that in the ca e of the USA, the proportion of public 
firms and firm with more than five hareholders are not ub tantially different from the 
oth r benchmark , despite the fact that the USA i a recogni ed ' prototyp , of the equity 
cu lture model. We believe that thi reality i due to the fact that U firm are not required 
to di clo e the obligatory amount of corporate information typica lly enforced by the 
European regulatory ystems. 
In the ca e of the C ECs the countrie with the largest Means of public firms ar 
Bulgaria and Slovenia, followed by Slovakia, the Czech Republic Poland and Estonia. We 
argue that although in some ca es this demand ha re ulted from the equity-supporti e 
macro-economic in titutional and managerial conditions, the arne is not true for other 
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countries. For example, in Bulgaria and to certain extent 111 Romania, the higher than 
expected proportion of public firms (based on the state of the quality of the overall equity-
supportive environment) can be explained with the transition policies these countries' 
transition governments have adopted. This is analysed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 8. 
5.3.5. One-way ANOV A of Managerial Indicators 
Lastly, we apply the ANOV A to assess the managerial conditions of the corporate sector in 
the CEECs and our four benchmarks. We find that in the case of the CEECs and the four 
benchmarks aU groups have the probability level at I % level which suggests that data 
differs substantially among individual countries. The significance level below 1 which 
suggests that there is less difference between groups than there is within individual groups. 
Table 5.13 .: ANOVA Table: Managerial Conditions 
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From the ANOV A table we observe that on average Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia 
score the best on the indicators of worker motivation, the presence of foreign high-skilled 
people and adaptability of companies with Estonia and Slovakia being the best two 
performers out of the three. These levels are comparable with those of the four benchmarks 
and predominantly of those of the UK and the USA. Czech Republic also scores high on 
the indicators of finance skills of manager and corporate values of companies which IS 
comparable to the values of Germany and Japan. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have introduced our data in the form of measurable variables. We also 
examined the fit of individual variables within their individual groups. This enabled us to 
understand how our data 'behaves' and whether it is suitable for our type of analysis. In the 
next chapter (Chapter 6) we benchmark and cluster our data using the Co-Plot method. 
This is then followed by a regression analysis which determines the relationship between 
our set of variables (Chapter 7). 
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\ 
Chapter 6: Clustering and Benchmarking: CEECs versus Benchmarks 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter benchmarks and clusters the CEECs with regard to their financial system 
development. We focus on the examination of conditions that contribute to the 
development of an equity culture as well as conducting an assessment of the corporate 
sector and its demand for equity financing. We apply a relatively new clustering method-
the Co-Plot method (Gilady et aI., 1996; Talby et aI., 1999; Raveh, 2000a), which enables 
us to observe on a two-dimensional scale the positioning of individual CEECs in relation to 
each other and four benchmarks - Germany, Japan, UK and USA. By relating to the 
conceptual framework, the Co-Plot method facilitates the differentiation between those 
CEECs that show the signs of an equity culture development and those which do not. 
Furthermore, this method enables us to observe the process of development of various 
external and internal factors affecting equity culture in the CEECs as we examine several 
years in the 1996 - 2008 period. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, we introduce the Co-Plot method in 
terms of its place as a statistical analysis method and its methodology. Secondly, we 
continue by justifying the choice of specific years from the 1996-2008 period in our 
investigation. Next we perform the Co-Plot analysis by applying it to five different groups 
of data: We start by assessing the competitive position of our sample countries followed by 
an evaluation of their institutional environments. Then we further examine the institutional 
environments in terms of the type of financial intermediaries present in each sample 
country. We conclude the analysis by reviewing the corporate sector in terms of ownership \ 
patterns and dominant managerial capabilities this sector displays. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a summary of our findings. 
6.2. The Co-Plot Method - 'The New Kid on the Block' 
Classical multivariate statistical analysis methods, such as the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA), Correspondence Analysis (CA) or Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), 
analyse variables and observations separately (Talby et aI., 1999). However, a relatively 
new clustering method designed for multi-criteria analysis- the Co-Plot method has the 
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advantage of analysing variables and observations simultaneously and in a simple manner 
(Segev et aI., 1990; Raveh, 2000b; Raveh, 2000a). The method produces three results. 
Firstly, it shows similarity among data (i.e. decision-making units - DMUs) by the 
composite of all criteria (i.e. variables) involved; secondly, it gives the structure of 
correlations among the variables; and thirdly, it provides mutual relationships between the 
data and the variables (Raveh, 2000a). The software used for the Co-Plot analysis is the 
'Visual Co-Plot'. 
A number of scholars (Tal by et aI., 1999; Paucar-Caceres and Thorpe, 2005; Adler 
and Raveh, 2008) have stressed the advantages of using the Co-Plot method over other 
statistical analysis approaches. Classical multivariate analysis methods, such as Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) or cluster analysis usually examine variables over a single unit 
of observations (an observation in our case is a country), or a variable (in our case country 
characteristics) over a multiple number of units of observations. However Co-Plot 
examines multiple variables and units of observations simultaneously. Co-Plot makes it 
possible to locate each unit of observation in a two-dimensional space with its location 
determined by all criteria (variables) simultaneously. Furthermore, the Co-Plot method 
technique is useful for visual inspection of data matrices as it offers a map, which is based 
on two graphs that are superimposed sequentially. In addition this visual representation 
enables cluster creation. These advantages of the Co-Plot method and its increasingly more 
popular application amongst researchers are the reasons behind our choice of the Co-Plot 
method as our chosen method. 
Indeed, the Co-Plot method has been applied widely: in an exploratory study of 
national versus corporate cultural fit in mergers and acquisitions (Weber et aI., 1996), in an 
analysis of the 1980-1990 computers (Gilady et aI., 1996), in a car selection problem 
analysis (Raveh, 2000a), in a comparative study of the Greek banking system (Raveh, 
2000b), and as an exploratory study for suggesting a methodology for presenting data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) graphically (Adler and Raveh, 2008). The application of the 
Co-Plot method for the analysis of the structure of the MBA programmes in the UK and 
the USA (Segev et aI., 1990; Paucar-Caceres and Thorpe, 2005) has been recently 
criticised by Mar-Molinero and Mingers (2007). Their findings point out that the Co-Plot 
method is inappropriate for zer%ne type (i.e. dichotomous) variables. Our study does not 
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contain such type of variable and therefore, we deem the Co-Plot method viable for our 
considerations. 
The Co-Plot is a graphical display technique useful for visual inspection of data 
matrices such as Xnxk. The data - the decision-making units (DMUs) are displayed as n 
points and the variables are shown as k arrows relative to the same axis and origin. Co-Plot 
records the observations in a manner that similar DMUs are positioned closely on the map. 
DMUs belonging to the same group (cluster) possess similar characteristics and behave 
similarly. The Co-Plot technique enables the simu~taneous study of DMUs and variables 
by sequentially superimposing two graphs - one for points (i.e. DMUs) and the other one 
for arrows (i.e. variables) (Adler and Raveh, 2008). The further an observation is located 
along a particular arrow, the more efficient the DMU is with respect to that ratio. In 
addition, Co-Plot also identifies extreme outliers. Raveh (2000a) points out that these can 
be a sign of data measurement errors, lack of homogeneity amongst observations or they 
can be used to identify unnecessary variables. 
6.3. The Co-Plot Methodology 
Co-Plot has four stages: two preliminary treatments of the data matrix Xnxk - the 
standardisation of data and the measurement of distance between cases; and two 
subsequent stages - the production of a two-dimensional representation of the data and the 
drawing of the variables into the space of the observations. A brief methodological 
explanation follows9• 
a) The Standardisation of Data 
In order for the variables to be treated equally, Xnxk is normalised into Znxk. The elements 
of Znxk are deviations from column means (x.j) divided by their standard deviations (~): 
b) The Measurement of Distance between Cases 
In this stage a measure of dissimilarity Di) ~ 0 between each pair of observations (rows of 
Znxk) is chosen. A symmetrical n x n matrix ( Di/) is produced from all the different pairs 
9For a detailed Co-Plot methodology see Raveh (2000a), Raveh (2000b) and Adler and Raveh (2008). 
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of observations. The city-block distance (i.e. the sum of absolute deviations) is used as a 
measure of dissimilarity: 
k 
Di/ = I I Zij-Zlj I 
j = 1 
c) The Creation 0/ a Two-Dimensional Representation 0/ the Data using the MDS Method 
The matrix Du is recorded using the Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) method. The 
algorithm produced by this method plots the matrix Di/ into Euclidean space in such a way 
that similar observations (i.e. observations with a small dissimilarity between them) are 
close to each other on the Co-Plot, and the dissimilar observations are distant from each 
other on the Co-Plot map. 
The Co-Plot method uses Guttman's (1968) Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) out of 
the group of MDS methods. SSA uses the coefficient of alienation () as a measure of 
goodness-of-fit lO• The coefficient of alienation determines the quality of the two-
dimensional Co-Plot map, in other words, it measures how well the model represents 
'reality'. The smaller the coefficient, the better the output; and all values under 0.15 are 
deemed good (Raveh, 1986; Adler and Raveh, 2008). 
d) The Presentation o/Variables into the Space o/Observations 
In the last stage of the Co-Plot method, variables k are displayed on the Euclidean space 
obtained in stage 3. Talby et al. (1999) state that this is the most interesting part of Co-Plot. 
Here, each variable k is represented by an arrow j. The arrows emerge from the centre of 
gravity of the n points. The maximal correlation between the actual values of the variables 
and their projections on 'the arrow determine the direction of the arrow. The length of the \ 
arrows is undefined. Arrows associated with highly correlated variables will point to the 
same or similar direction. Furthermore, individual observations with a high value in a 
particular variable will be positioned around the space where the arrow points to, while 
observations with low value in that particular variable will be at the other side of the Co-
Plot map. 
Furthermore, in this stage, k individual goodness-of-fit measures are obtained for 
each of the k variables separately. These are the magnitudes of the k maximal correlations. 
10 A detailed statistical explanation of () is provided in Raveh (1986). 
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The gained correlations suggest whether to keep or eliminate certain variables, as variables 
with low correlations do not fit into the graphical display, and therefore, have to be 
removed. Raveh (2000a) states that the higher the variable's correlation, the better the 
variable's arrow represents the direction and the order for the projections of the n points 
along the rotated axis. This also points to the high explanatory power of such variables if 
they are used together to form a cluster. 
6.4. Applying the Co-Plot Method: The Justification of Year Selection 
In order to present the evolution of clusters in a robust yet reader-friendly way for a 
continuous period of twelve years we pick only four years, i.e. 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008. 
The justification for the selection of these specific years is the following: Firstly, year 1996 
is the first year of our research period. Transition literature (Stiglitz, 1997; Brown, 1999; 
Lavigne, 1999) suggests that despite the fact that the political transition took place in the 
early 1990s, institutional transformation and system democratisation was in 1996 
considered to be still in its early days. Secondly, year 2000, a mark of a transitional decade 
when CEECs were actively preparing to join the European Union (EU) by increasing the 
transparency of their economic policymaking and financial institutions and strengthen their 
financial systems overall (Nord, 2000). In the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki European 
Council all CEECs were confirmed to join the EU in the future, and therefore they were 
making efforts to progress towards reforms. Djankov and Murrell (2002) also point out that 
2000 was a year of increased trade activity as foreign direct investment (FDI) levels went 
up across the Central and Eastern European (hereafter CEE) region.' Thirdly, year 2004 
was the year of EU's enlargement eastwards. Eight CEECs joined the EU and two more 
were actively preparing to enter in the three coming years. Lastly, year 2008 is the last year \ 
of our research period. By 2008 all CEECs have become EU members and have 
accomplished all the major transition reforms as directed by the EU (Schwab and Porter, 
2008). In this year, the Czech Republic - as the first CEEC - was taken off the list of 
transition countries and was awarded a status of a developed European economy. This is 
also the last year for which we have consistent data available. 
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6.5. Scope of Analysis 
Firstly, we look at the national competitiveness levels of individual CEECs and the 
benchmarks by focusing on the macroeconomic indicators of development as our 
conceptual framework proposes that equity culture development requires the presence of a 
competitive economy characterised by a sound economic performance and an appropriate 
economy structure. Secondly, we examine the institutional environments of the CEECs and 
their benchmarks. The use of benchmarks plays a significant role in this analysis, as the 
institutional theory of Varieties of Capitalism enables us to distinguish between two 
institutional environments - the Anglo-Saxon model represented by the UK and the USA 
and the German- Japanese model represented by Germany and Japan. The rationale behind 
these first two steps in the empirical analysis is to determine whether our sample countries 
differ economically and institutionally. 
Then, we explore the evolution along the equity culture path more specifically by 
examining the financial intermediaries sector and the composition of the firm sector in the 
CEECs and the benchmarks. The examination of the financial intermediaries sector 
provides information on whether equity related financial intermediaries are present to 
support equity culture development. On the other hand, the examination of the firm sector 
reveals whether its composition in terms of the firm size and firm ownership affects 
financing demands and thus equity culture development as such. 
Lastly, we apply the Co-Plot methodology to the intra-firm analysis by examining 
the CEECs and the benchmarks in terms of their managerial resources and capabilities. The 
analysis investigates the extent to which individual firms have the ability, willingness and 
readiness to dynamically'develop and adapt. It thus enables us to investigate the incentives \ 
and motives behind equity culture development. Furthermore, we expect this section to 
provide some context to the abnormalities observed in the previous stages of analysis (i.e. 
proportionally higher number of public firms in countries with uncompetitive economies 
and lacking institutional support). 
6.5.1. The Competitive Environment 
An assessment of the external environment in which firms and financial intermediaries 
operate determines the national competitiveness levels of their countries (Porter, 1990; 
Porter, 2008). In our conceptual framework we propose that an equity culture development 
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requires the presence of a competitive economy, characterised by sound macro-economic 
conditions and a favourable institutional environment. For the purpose of our research we 
focus in the national competitiveness assessment on the evaluation of the macro-economic 
environment in each country and the institutional environment is analysed from an 
institutionaVpolitical economy perspective defined in the theory of the Varieties of 
Capitalism as explained in our conceptual framework in Chapter 3. Therefore, in this 
section we firstly look at general macro-economic conditions to determine the national 
competitiveness levels based on economic performance. Secondly, we look at the structure 
of individual economies as another indicator of the level of a macro-economic 
development. The proportion and economic power of the agriculture, industry and services 
sectors gives an important indication of the direction individual economies are developing 
and thus the presence of a realistic potential for equity culture development. Lastly, we 
examine macroeconomic conditions in our sample of CEECs using transition indicators. 
This provides additional information for the assessment of the competitiveness levels of 
the CEECs. 
6.5.1.1. The General Macro-Economic Conditions 
A healthy economy is a necessary pre-requisite to any form of an advanced financial 
system development (Boot and Thakor, 1997; Hermes and Lensink, 2000a). However, the 
importance of a competitive national economy is even more crucial for an equity-based 
financial system (Bekaert et aI., 2002). The argument that equity financing is seen as a 
more advanced form of external financing, usually formed after bank financing has been 
sufficiently developed (Li, 2007). This argument supports our view that a competitive 
economy is necessary for equity culture creation in a country. Equity providers look for \ 
investments and choose to operate in economies in which they have confidence their 
investments will materialise (Beck et aI., 2006). Drawing back to our conceptual 
framework we maintain that firms opting for equity financing are more likely to incur high 
transaction costs in an economy that is less competitive, i.e. macro-economically 
underperforming. 
aJ Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
To be able to assess the competitiveness of the individual countries' economIes we 
examine general macro-economic indicators traditionally employed by economists (e.g. 
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Porter, 1990): el - GDP per head (an indicator of an economy's economic power), e2-
Real GDP growth per head (a measurement of a process by which a nation's wealth 
increases over time), e3 - Total factor productivity growth (a measure of an economy's 
long-term technological change), e4 - Real effective exchange rate (CPI based (a 
measurement of a nation's currency's purchasing power relative to other currencies), e5 -
Unit labour costs (a measure representing a direct link between productivity and the cost 
of labour used in generating output), e6 - Lending interest rate (a rate that is charged for 
the use of a lender's money), e7 - Inward foreign direct investmentlGDP (a measure of 
foreign investments flowing into the local economy), e8 - Balance of tradelGDP . (a 
measure of an economy's 'health' - the balance between an economy's import and export), 
e9 - Government budget surplus-deficitlGDP (a measure of a nation's economic growth). 
For year 1996 (Fig.!) we evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with 
measurements on e = 9 variables. The raw data, a Xu x9 matrix is submitted to Co-plot and 
with all 14 variables the coefficient of alienation is 0.13 indicating 0.87 reliability, which is 
satisfactory. The average of correlations is 0.91 indicating that all variables are 
contributing to the clustering of countries. 
Variables el (GDP per head) and eB (Balance of Trade) are highly correlated, on 
average 0.98. They are in the opposite direction of e7 (Inward FDIIGDP) which indicates 
the presence of conflicting attributes. Variables e2 (Real GDP growth per head), e3 (Total 
factor productivity growth) and e5 (Unit labour costs) are highly correlated - on average 
0.96. Further, e6 is positioned in-between e7 and elleB and e4 is lying in-between elleB 
and e2, e3, and e5. All variables provide information on the observations. Observation 
Bulgaria is separated from the other units because it has the lowest e2, e3 and e5 values 
and below average values el and eB. With respect to the observations, therefore, Bulgaria 
could be considered an outlier and appears as such in Fig. 1. Cluster 1 (Germany, Japan, 
UK, USA) is high on arrows (i.e. variables) el and e.B. Cluster 2 (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia) is average in most variables and therefore appears relatively close to 
the center of gravity. Cluster 3 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) is high on variables e2, e3, e5, 
and e7. While Poland is a 'specialist' on e3, Hungary has the strongest value on e6 and 
Romania is positioned in-between e6 and e7. Further interpretation of the Co-Plot follows 
in section b) Interpreting the Co-Plots, p. 110. 
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Fig.l: n=14, e=9, 1996 
e3 
Source: Author's Own (Visual Co-Plot) 
For year 2000 (Fig.2) we evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with 
measurements on e = 9 variables. The raw data, a X/4 x9 matrix is submitted to Co-plot and 
with al114 variables the coefficient of alienation is 0.13 indicating 0.87 reliability which is 
deemed satisfactory. The average of correlations is 0.91 indicating that all variables are 
contributing to the clustering of countries. 






Source: Author's Own 
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For year 2004 (Fig.3) we evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with 
measurements on e = 9 variables. The raw data, a X/ 4 x9 matrix is again submitted to Co-
plot and with all 14 variables the coefficient of alienation is 0.1 0 indicating 0.87 reliability 
which is deemed good. The average of correlations is 0.93 indicating that all variables are 
contributing to the clustering of countries. 
Fig.3: n=14, e=9, 2004 










Source: Author 's Own 
For year 2008 (FigA) we evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with 
measurements on e = 9 variables. The raw data, a X/ 4 <9 matrix is submitted to Co-plot and 
with all 14 variables the coefficient of alienation is 0.13 indicating 0.87 reliability which is 
deemed satisfactory. The average of correlations is 0.91 indicating that all variables are 
contributing to the clustering of countries. 
109 
Fig.4: n=l4, e=9, 2008 
--• 
Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
Oenneny 
oS • 
From the genera l macro-economic perspective we see the existence of several clusters. 
Firstly, a cluster containing our four benchmarks is clearly present in almost all four time 
observations, characterised by high values on GDP per head and the balance of trade over 
GDP confirming the status of benchmarks as economic powers. 
Secondly, four CEECs - the Czech Republic, Hungary, SlovaIGa and Slovenia 
exhibit in 1996 above average to high values for the balance of trade over GDP as well as 
above average levels for real effective exchange rate when compared to other CEECs. 
Poland, although not belonging to this cluster, exhibits similar values to these countries, 
especially in years 1996 and 2004. Despite the fact in the following year these countries 
do not stay in the same cluster, they remain in the same part of the graphical display. The 
break-up of the cluster is caused by the GDP per head increase in Czech Republic and 
Slovakia in years 2000 and 2004, an improved balance of trade over GOP in Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in 2004 and a decrease of Poland to average levels for the 
same indicators in 2008. Based on this general macro-economic information we state that 
in these countries an advanced foml of a financial system, such as an equity-based system 
may be viab le and the development of an equity culture may be feasib le (subject to further 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial analysis). 
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Thirdly, three co-members of another cluster - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -
exhibit high total factor productivity growth and high unit labour costs (with the exception 
of Latvia which scored slightly lower levels than its two co-members). High total factor 
productivity as a measure of an economy's long-term technological change indicates that 
these countries have advanced in terms of their technological dynamism. High unit labour 
costs imply the presence of a skilled workforce and the presence of a service sector. Latvia 
and Lithuania display a high total factor productivity growth in the following years. 
Although in 2008 Latvia's total factor productivity growth falls to below average levels, its 
GDP per head increases to levels comparable to Estonia. Estonia belongs to this cluster in 
1996. In the following years it displays an increased real GDP growth per head which 
causes it to move further away from its former co-members until 2008 when it re-forms a 
cluster position with Latvia. At this time Lithuania performs at average levels on the same 
variables. High total factor productivity and high labour costs supported with above 
average GDP growth indicate the macro-economic readiness of these individual economies 
to develop an equity culture, subject to institutional and managerial support. 
Lastly, Bulgaria and Romania do not form a cluster with any other CEE country in 
terms of their macroeconomic performance. Although high lending interest rates could 
serve as an incentive for firms to look for less expensive external capital than debt, low 
real GDP growth per head and low balance of trade over GDP cause 'an outlier' 
positioning of these two CEECs and indicate inefficient macroeconomic activity. This 
suggests that these two CEECs not only economically underperform their Eastern 
European counterparts, but also that their economies are unlikely to support the 
development of a more advanced financial system such as the equity based financial 
model. Therefore, from the macro-economic point of view the transaction costs of seeking 
equity financing would be high for firms in these two countries. 
6.5.1.2. The Composition of the Sample Countries' Economies 
Any type of a financial system, whether bank- or equity-oriented, reqUIres a strong 
economy with performing industry and services sectors (Bekaert et aI., 2001). Extant 
literature suggests (Baumol, 1990; Abiad and Mody, 2005) that developed economies with 
a dominant industry sector tend to be more bank dominated, as traditionally family owned 
small and medium size industrial firms tend to rely on trusted, historically rooted banking 
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relationships. Equity financing, on the other hand, thrives in developed economies with a 
comparatively stronger service sector (Bekaert et aI., 2001). 
In the· early years of the transition period many transition economies experienced an 
opposite trend. In these countries the only firms experimenting with equity financing were 
primarily from the industry sector, as the previous political regime did not support the 
service sector development (Klapper et aI., 2002). This resulted in the existing service 
sector being represented mainly by young small firms for which equity financing meant 
higher costs than for the larger industry firms. However, transition economies realised that 
to make their economies more competitive they had to break the large industrial firms into 
more efficient and easier manageable units - the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
and they had to support the growth of the service sector (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
Industrial SMEs applied their collateral to obtain loans from banking institutions. Firms 
from the service sector typically lacking fixed assets that could serve as collateral to banks 
did not have the same borrowing opportunities. Therefore, in countries in which the service 
sector has experienced growth, external capital must have been secured from other external 
sources, some of which being equity. Therefore, to strengthen our analysis of the 
competitiveness levels of individual CEECs we look at the composition of their economies 
by examining the IMD indicators for an economy's structure: elO - Agricu/tureIGDP, ell 
- ServiceslGDP, ell - IndustrylGDP. 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
The Co-Plot method for the years 1996 (Fig.5), 2000 (Fig.6), 2004 (Fig.7) and 200S (Fig.S) 
exhibits the following results: We evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with 
measurements on e = 3(elO, ell, el2) variables for each individual year. The raw data, a 
X14x3 matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all 14 variables the coefficient of alienation is 
0.02 for year 1996, 0.01 for year 2000 and 2004, and 0.03 for 200S indicating a high 
reliability of more than 97 percent. The average of correlations is 0.S7 indicating that all 
variables are contributing to the clustering of countries. 
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Fig.7: n = 14, e = 3(e10, ell, e12), 2004 Fig. 8: n= 14, e = 3(e10, ell, e12), 2008 
--• 
... -o 
Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
In term of the composition of individual countries our four benchmarks display he highest 
service sector proportion, with Germany leaning the most towards the direction of the 
arrow identifying industry sector (than any other of the three remaining benchmarks) and 
the USA being the strongest representative of the service sector. Then, the presence of the 
first CEECs' cluster is apparent in all four time observations (as in the previous analysis): 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia consistently show the highest proportion 
of the industry sector in comparison to other CEECs with the exception of 2008 when 
Slovenia shows a smaller proportion of the industry sector and a slightly increased 
proportion of its service sector. Hungary joins this group in 2000, as previously it was an 
agriculture-led economy. Secondly, Poland and Lithuania share similar economy 
composition characteristics. Although Poland starts in 1996 with the size of an industry 
sector comparable to Czech Republic or Slovakia, the later data shows that the level of the 
industry sector decreases rapidly and a higher proportion of the agriculture sector is 
noticeable. Interestingly, the service sector levels are close to average and slightly above 
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the levels of Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and even Slovenia. Thirdly, Estonia and 
Latvia exhibit the largest service sector, below the average size of their industry sector and 
above the average size of their agriculture sector. Lastly, Bulgaria and Romania show the 
highest proportions of their agriculture sectors, and the lowest proportions of industry and 
service sectors. 
Based on these observations we conclude that Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia 
and Slovenia have dominant industry sectors at the cost of less developed services sectors. 
Czech Republic is the strongest representative of the industry sector. We maintain that this 
fact is due to historically rooted relationships with developed industry-led European 
countries such as Germany and Italy. Indeed, as observed from national economic 
statistical data (Government Statistical Offices, 2008) these countries have been the 
recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) predominantly from Germany and Italy. 
There is empirical evidence (Choi and Jeon, 2007) that financial providers follow their 
corporate clients from their home country into foreign countries where substantial FDI has 
been invested. In our conceptual framework we account for this observable fact through 
the path dependency phenomenon and operationalise it through the variable of inward FDI. 
Path dependent behaviour encourages firms to follow the strategic choices, such as 
corporate financing, of principal firms (Stark, 1992). In this case, the firms in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are expected to pursue the same ways of 
securing external capital - the debt, just like the principal firms in Germany and Italy. This 
is not to say that equity culture development in these countries is not viable, only that a 
'hurdle' of path-dependent behaviour has to be overcome. 
Estonia and Latvia ,exhibit a high proportion of the service sector supporting their 
high competitive ranking in terms of the macro-economic development (EBRD, 2008b). 
While a trend of a growing service sector is also apparent in Lithuania and Poland, the 
proportion of these countries' industry sectors is below average and a presence of a 
dominant agriculture sector is noted. In the case of Estonia and Latvia equity culture 
development is viable due to favourable macro-economic conditions and the presence of a 
growing service sector. In the case of the latter, however, despite the growing service 
sector the macro-economic environment is not as sound. The viability of equity culture 
development will be subject to the favourability of institutional and managerial 
environments. 
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6.5.1.3. Digging Deeper - the EBRD Transition Data 
To make our assessment of the competitiveness levels in the 1996-2008 period more robust 
we additionally look at the EBRD transition data. Our selected EBRD variables are of 
institutional character and we include them in our assessment of the national 
competitiveness of individual CEECs as they allow us to include another important aspect 
related to this environmental concept. Despite the fact that we refer to the phenomenon of 
national competitiveness primarily from the macro-economic perspective we account for 
the important institutional elements that contribute to the overall 'competitiveness picture ' . 
This examination enables us thus to have a closer look at the CEECs and their national 
competitiveness levels. We choose four EBRD indicators : Overall infrastructure reform 
(e13), Price liberalisation (e14), Trade and Forex system (e15) and Competition policy 
(e16). 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
Co-Plot exhibits the following results for the 1996- 2008 research period (Fig. 9, 10, 11 
and 12): We evaluate the total set ofn = 10 CEECs with measurements on e = 4 (eJ3, e14, 
e15, e16) variables for each individual year. The raw data, a X ,o x4 matrix is submitted to 
Co-plot. With all 10 CEECs the coefficient of alienation is 0.07 for year 1996, 0.05 for 
year 2000, 0.09 for year 2004, and 0.09 for 2008 indicating a high reliability of more than 
90 percent. The average of correlations is 0.89 which signals an even contribution of all 
four variables. 
Fig 9: n = 10, k = 4(e13, e14, e15, e16), 1996 Fig. 10: 11 = 10, k = 4(e13, e14, e15, e16), 2000 
-o 
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Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
The EBRD data shows that from the beginning of the research period the best performers 
on the transition indicators are the Czech Republic (overall infrastructure refoffil and 
competition policy)", Estonia (overall infrastructure refoffil and competition policy and by 
2008 price Iiberalisation), Hungary (price liberalisation), and Poland and Slovakia (price 
liberalisation and Trade & Forex system). Although Latvia shows average levels for all 
four variables in 1996, it is rated high by the EBRD on the Trade & Forex system attribute 
in 2000, years 2004 and 2008 show that this country is over-stepped by its CEE 
counterparts in terms of the transition progress. Lithuania, on the other hand, shows an 
opposite development. Although starting low in 1996, in 2000 the country progresses into 
better price liberalisation policies and a much more effective functioning of the Trade & 
Forex system. In Slovenia, the price liberalisation system is below its CEE counterparts 
and also other transition indicators show lower levels than in other CEECs. Bulgaria and 
Romania even outperform Slovenia in terms of the transition progress as these two 
countries exhibit higher values for the Trade&Forex system as well price liberalisation 
attributes. Although Slovenia has an outlier position with regard to the transition indicators 
we maintain that the explanatory power of this indicator in terms of the viability of an 
equity culture development is of limited concern due to differing results in the previous 
Co-Plot analyses. 
The EBRD data suggests that Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Slovakia have made the best transition effort comparable to other CEECs. Although 
II As of2008 the Czech Republic was taken off of the li st ofCEE trans ition countries and was given a status 
of a developed European economy (EBRO, 2008) . 
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Latvia has a comparatively larger service sector than most other CEECs, the country's 
macro-economic performance has not been steady and therefore could put the potential for 
an equity culture supportive macro-economic environment into jeopardy. Slovenia 
performs well on general macro-economic indicators and its industry sector has been 
strong. However, its relatively smaller service sector and a weak performance on the 
transition indicators could indicate obstacles towards achieving macro-economic 
conditions compatible with equity culture development. For Bulgaria and Romania it 
seems unattainable to achieve or sustain an equity culture in the medium term. Neither of 
these countries performs as well as other CEECs on their macro-economic indicators, their 
industry and services sectors are lacking behind the others and even the transition 
indicators suggest that the transition process is far from over. 
6.5.2. The Institutional Environment 
The institutional environment affects the financing decision-making of firms and the 
direction of a financial system development overall (Peng, 2004). Scientific research 
(Bakker and Gross, 2004; Kim and Kenny, 2007) further confirms that the institutional 
environments of the banking oriented financial systems differ from the institutional 
environments of the equity-oriented systems. An equity-based financing system requires an 
institutional system characterised by low corruption, high accountability, policies 
protecting investor rights and an efficient bureaucracy-free system (Bekaert et aI., 2001; 
Smith, 2003). Although transparency is also important in the banking system it does not 
have the same imperative role as we see in the equity-based models. This is mainly 
because the private nature of most by bank financed firms and the traditional bank-client 
relationships based on trust are less transparency-centered (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck 
and Levine, 2004). These institutional differences point to the existence of the German-
Japanese banking oriented- and the Anglo-Saxon equity oriented institutional systems. 
6.5.2.1. The Quality of the CEECs' Institutional Environments 
We examine data on institutional quality in the CEECs and the four benchmarks. From the 
ICRG database we select seven institutional variables that we see relevant in evaluating 
financial system development and an equity culture creation. We expect these variables to 
demonstrate institutional differences between those that support the existence of equity-
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based system and those that facilitate the functioning of bank-based financial systems: We 
choose the indicators of Government stability - an indicator on the ability to carry out 
programmes and ability to stay in office (if), Socioeconomic conditions - an indicator on 
public satisfaction/dissatisfaction on public policies (i2) , Investment profile - an indicator 
on the attitude toward investment: expropriation/contract viabihty, taxation, repatriation, 
labour costs (i3), Corruption - an indicator on the legal abidance to law (i4), Law and 
order - an indicator on the strength and imparity of legal system (is), Democratic 
accountability - an indicator on government's legal responsiveness to people (i6) , 
Bureaucracy quality - an indicator on institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy (i 7) 
to distinguish between different types of institutional environments with the liberal market 
institutional environment and co-ordinated market institutional environments being the two 
differentiating institutional prototypes. 
aJ Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
We evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on i = 7 variables for each 
individual year of the 1996-2008 period (Fig. 13, 14, 15 and 16 respectively). The raw 
data, a X/4 x7 matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all 14 countries the coefficient of 
alienation is 0.14 for years 1996, 2000 and 2008, and 0.15 for year 2004 indicating a 
reliability of 85 percent and above. The average of correlations is 0.79 which signals a 
positive contribution of all seven variables. 
Fig. 13: n = 14, i = 7, 1996 Fig. 14: /1 = 14, j = 7, 2000 
-• • 
---. • • -• --• -- ~. 
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Fig. 15: n = 14, i = 7, year 2004 Fig. 16: n= 14, i = 7, year 2008 
• 
Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
We find that Co-Plots exhibit several clusters for the ]996-2008 period. Although our four 
benchmarks are positioned in every year of observation on the same side of the graphical 
display, in no time observation they form a single cluster. This is what we expected as it is 
a proof of a presence of differing institutional systems in the benchmark countries. The UK 
and the USA are grouped together and this cluster exhibits high values for law and order, 
corruption and bureaucracy quality - three prerequisites of institutional transparency. 
Germany and Japan display slightly lower values on the same attributes and form a cluster 
on their own. Furthermore, the second cluster of Germany and Japan also perfom1s better 
on variables displaying better socio-economic conditions and a higher investment profile. 
This is consistent with the identification of institutional characteristics in the Varieties of 
Capitalism theory which, as identified in Chapter 3 - our conceptual framework, we are 
building on. 
Within the CEEC 's group there are variations not only in terms of the overall quality 
of their institutional environments but also relating to which group of benchmarks (UK and 
USA or Germany and Japan) individual CEECs follow. 
Firstly, the Czech Republic is in 1996 the best performer on institutional variables in 
comparison to other CEECs. The values on democratic accountability and bureaucracy 
quality are especially high. The investment profile indicator also remains one of the 
strongest among the CEECs for the rest of the research period. Similarly, Hungary displays 
in 1996 the presence of a reputable legal system, by 2000 the corruption levels improve 
and by 2004 democratic accountability achieves higher values. By 2008, due to its 
improvement in corruption and the increased levels of democratic accountability, Hungary 
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secures a position of one of the better institutionally performing CEECs. From the 
institutional quality perspective the ascending trend in these two CEECs suggest the 
presence of an institutional environment feasible for the development of an advanced 
financial system. However, while the Czech Republic seems to follow the path of Germany 
in terms of its institutional characteristics, Hungary's positioning closer to the UK suggests 
a different trend of an institutional development. 
Secondly, despite the fact that in 1996 Slovakia and Poland are far from being co-
members of one cluster (Poland displays average v,alues for the majority of institutional 
variables while Slovakia was an underperformer) by 2000 these two countries join the 
same cluster characterised by high to above average values for democratic accountability. 
By 2008, however, the position of this cluster moves closer to the centre of gravity 
suggesting the presence of more average values across all chosen institutional variables. 
Although the indicators of democratic accountability and corruption suggest an 
improvement of the institutional environment and position these two CEECs to the 
direction of the UK's institutional system, the low quality of bureaucracy and average 
levels for the law and order indicator do not support its positioning as close to this 
benchmark as we saw in the case of Hungary. 
Thirdly, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are interchangeably joining and 
leaving mutual clusters. Co-Plot adjusted to examine the CEECs without the direct 
comparison to the benchmarks reveals a closer position of two countries in particular: 
Estonia and Slovenia. According to the graphical display the corruption levels are lower 
compared to Latvia and Lithuania and the bureaucracy quality has scored better when 
compared again to the same two countries. This suggests an improvement of institutional 
quality in Estonia and Slovenia and institutional stagnation in Latvia and Lithuania. 
Therefore, from the institutional perspective point of view, Estonia and Slovenia appear to 
have an institutional advantage over Latvia and Lithuania. The same graphical display 
suggests Estonia following path similar to Slovakia, Poland and Hungary (benchmarks UK 
and USA) and Slovenia following the path of Czech Republic (benchmarks Germany and 
Japan). 
Fourthly, Bulgaria and Romania are the weakest performers on institutional 
indicators. This suggests a limited improvement of the institutional environment in these 
countries. Firms seeking equity financing in these two countries face high transaction costs 
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due to the low institutional quality. Therefore, advanced sources of financing, such as 
equity seem to be an unfeasible option to most Bulgarian and Romanian firm. 
6.5.2.2. Digging Deeper - Transition Data on the Quality of Institutions 
In this section more institutional data is examined to supplement the institutional 
environment analysis performed above. The EBRD transition data on the progress of the 
institutional advancement of the CEECs provides information on: Large scale privatisation 
(i8), Small scale privatisation (i9), Banking reform & interest rate libera/isation (ilO), 
Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (ill), Governance and enterprise 
restructuring (i12). Privatisatiol1, FDI, financial libera lisation and corporate governance 
factors vastly shape the characteristics of an institutional ell1vironment in transition 
economies (Choi and leon, 2007) and therefore playa vital role in our assessment of the 
quality of the institutional environment in the CEECs. These EBRD institutional indicators 
enrich our discussion on the different varieties of institutional systems that are the reason 
for and continue deve loping alongside bank-based and equity based financial systems. 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
In this case we evaluate the total set of n = 10 CEECs with measurements on i = 5 
transition variables for each individual year (Fig. l7, 18, 19, 20). The raw data, a XIO x5 
matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all 10 countries the coefficient of alienation is 0.11 for 
years 1996 and 2008, 0.07 for year 2000 and 0.13 for year 2004 indicating a reliability of 
87 percent and above. The average of correlations is 0.85 which indicates a positive 
contribution of all four variables. 
Fig. 17: n = 10, i = 5 (i8- il2), 1996 
- - -• • 




Fig 19: n = 10, i = 5 (18- i12), 2004 Fig. 20: /1 = 10, k = 5(i8 - il2), 2008 
~ --• -- - / . • ./ .. 
t) .... • -- • 
Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
The Co-Plot display confirms that Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland are the 
strongest performers on transitional-institutional indicators. Czech Republic and Poland do 
not belong to the same cluster as Hungary and Estonia. While the fonner exhibits a higher 
proportion of large scale privatisation in all time observations than any other of these four 
CEECs and also scores high on the governance and enterprise restructuring indicator, the 
latter performs extremely well on the small sca le indicator in 1996 but other indicators start 
perfornling better after 2000. In the case of Hungary and Estonia small sca le privatisation 
is prevalent and a steady performance of all the other indicators is present since 1996. 
Czech Republic's large scale privatisation efforts result in perfonnance typical of 
advanced industrial economies where more than 75 per cent of enterprise assets are in 
private hands with effectively functioning corporate governance (EBRD Transition Report, 
2008). If these 'private hands ' have a foreign nature, the Czech government statistical data 
(Czech Republic Statistical Office, 2008) states that they corne from Germany, Italy, 
Austria, the USA and France (the particular order applies). Hungary and Estonia, and 
Poland, on the other hand, perfonn better on the small scale privatisation. In these 
countries the privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights is comp lete 
by 1996 and there is no state ownership of state enterprises by 2000. By the end of the 
same year, more than 50 percent of state-owned enterprises are in private hands and there 
is also an improvement in corporate governance. Furthermore, by year 2004 prudential 
supervis ion and regulation are in place with significant lending to private businesses and 
significant presence of private banks. By 2008 also substantial financial deepening is 
noted (EBRD Transition Report, 2008). 
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Based on the above information we can deduce that Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Estonia and Poland progressed better in their transition process in terms of their 
institutional environments than other CEECs from our research sample. A growing 
institutional support for the banking sector together with a prevalent source of FDI from 
host countries known for their bank oriented financial systems (e.g. Germany, Austria, 
Italy) can be identified as partial reasons for a bank oriented systems in these CEECs. 
However, in the case of Hungary and Estonia a strong presence of non-bank financial 
institutions could be a sign of a growing demand for other than bank financing and thus the 
sound banking sector could be seen just as a preparation for the entry of a more advanced 
form of corporate financing - equity financing. Therefore, at this stage, we maintain that 
the developed stage of the institutional sectors in Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia 
serves as a predisposition for sound financial systems development, whether bank or equity 
oriented. We propose that a later analysis of the financial intermediaries and firm sectors 
will enable us to determine with more rigour what type of conditions are present in these 
countries - the ones that do or do not foster equity culture development. 
Although the other four CEECs - Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia do not 
form one single cluster in any observations, they interchangeably become cluster co-
members in different years and remain in a close position on the graphical display. These 
countries share the characteristics of an advanced small scale privatisation with privatised 
firms possessing individual ownership rights (EBRD, 2008b). By 2000 all four countries 
make substantial progress in the establishment of bank solvency and in the framework for 
prudential supervision and regulation. In this year the differences in institutional transition 
become more visible between these four countries. While Slovenia stagnates in the 
transition and displays the same levels achieved in 2000 until 2008, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia make a better progress. While these three countries improve on the banking 
reform and interest rate liberalisation indicator by achieving a full interest rate 
liberalisation and significant bank lending to private enterprises, two of them also perform 
better in another way. In Lithuania and Slovakia, in addition to a growing regulatory 
framework for bank financing, the non-bank financial institutions, such as investment 
funds and private insurance companies start emerging and an associated regulatory 
framework is formed. 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia exhibit a good effort in small scale 
privatisation. However, large scale privatisation 'fights' major unresolved issues regarding 
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corporate governance. The transition process of institutional conditions necessary for the 
development of a sound financial system is in place but with some limitations. With the 
exception of Lithuania and Slovakia, it seems that these CEECs have to first overcome 
corporate governance issues such as weak to moderate bankruptcy legislation, moderate to 
high bureaucracy quality and the lack of tight credit and subsidy policies. Once this is 
accomplished, firms seeking equity financing have a better chance of experiencing lower, 
and therefore, more acceptable transaction costs. 
The last two CEECs, Bulgaria and Romania, ~confirm' their position of laggards in 
terms of the transition toward an institutional environment supportive of a sound banking 
system and possibly equity oriented financial system. By 2008, when the best CEE 
performing countries achieve institutional conditions comparable to other developed 
industrialised economies, Bulgaria and Romania have a comprehensive programme for 
implementation of privatisation in place but not all their enterprises are privati sed, struggle 
to strengthen competition and corporate governance, and lack a regulatory system 
necessary for the functioning of non-bank financial institutions. Unless these conditions 
improve, equity culture development is not feasible as high transaction costs are an 
obstacle for firms diverting from the usual sources of financing to a riskier alternative -
equity financing. 
6.5.3. Financial Intermediaries 
As we have established the macro-economic and institutional development of each 
individual CEEC in the previous sections and thus have determined which countries have 
the potential to sustain equity culture if that path of corporate financing was desired, we 
now proceed onto the examination of the financial intermediaries sector. This analysis 
enables us to determine in which CEECs the 'supply-financial intermediary' side holds and 
thus provides a critical requirement for the growth and sustainability of equity financing. 
We maintain that the composition of the capital intermediaries sector is a significant 
contributor to equity culture development in a country and that the sustainability of equity 
culture depends on the presence of equity oriented financial intermediaries functioning 




Therefore, in this section we apply the Co-Plot method to determine the status of the 
banking financial institutions versus the equity-supportive financial institutions in ten 
CEECs and benchmark them against four developed economies. The analysis focuses on 
quantitative assessment and qualitative evaluation of banking and equity-related 
institutions (i.e. the quality (depth) of the banking sector versus the quality (liquidity) of 
the equity sector). We find that several indicators show minimum variance amongst the 
CEECs for the 1996-2008 period. For the purpose of securing a high reliability of the Co-
Plot graphical display we opt not to include such indicators l2 in the Co-Plot analysis. 
6.5.3.1. The Presence of Banking versus Equity Oriented Institutions 
To assess the presence of loan providing and equity offering financial intermediaries and 
their supporting institutions we examine their quantitative proportions individually 
expressed as ratios of total number of financial intermediaries (i.e. financial institutions). 
Firstly, we examine the variables of National commercial banks (NCB) (gJ), Foreign trade 
and international banking institution (g2) to assess the presence of banking financial 
institutions. In addition we look at the presence of financial intermediaries other thank 
banks which provide loans by using variable g3 - Miscellaneous business credit 
institutions. Finally, we assess the presence of equity-related financial intermediaries with 
the help of foHowing variables: Security brokers and dealers and flotation companies (g4), 
Security and commodity exchanges (g5), Investment advice (g6), Other services allied with 
the exchange of securities or commodities (g7). 
aJ Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
We evaluate a total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on g = 7 variables for the 
1996-2008 period (Fig. 21, 22, 23, and 24 respectively). The raw data, a X14 x7 matrix is 
submitted to Co-plot. With all 7 variables the coefficient of alienation is 0.13 indicating 
0.87 reliability for years 1996, 2000 and 2004; and 0.14 for 2008. The goodness-of-fit of 
attribute (i.e. variable) g5 (Security and commodity exchanges is very low for all years 
(only 0.32) and because it does not fit simultaneously with an other six attributes measured 
12 State commercial banks, Commercial banks (other), Branches and agencies offoreign banks, Short term 
business credit institutions 
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on the 14 countries, we eliminate g5 from the analysis 13. We, therefore, resubmit a data 
matrix X/ 4 x6. The second run of Co-Plot gives a satisfactory coefficient of alienation 0.05 
indicating 0.99,5 reliability with an average of correlation coefficient of 0.95 for years 
1996, 2000 and 2004. It also gives a coefficient of alienation 0.07 indicating 0.99,3 
reliability with an average of correlation coefficient of 0.94 for year 2008. This result 
indicates that all chosen variables are contributing to the clustering of sample countries. 
Fig 21: n = 14, g =6, 1996 Fig. 22: n = 14, g = 6, 2000 
.. 
.. 
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Source: Author's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
Based on the findings from Co-Plot we are able to distinguish between three groups of 
countries: firstly, countries that exhibit similar composition of their financial 
intermediaries sectors as UK and USA, the two representative benchmark countries for 
equity oriented financial systems; secondly, countries that are positioned close to Germany 
- the benchmark representative for a bank oriented financial system; and thirdly, countries 
13 The number of security and commodity exchanges is, however, considered in the descriptive analysis of 
the financial intennediaries sector in the form of an absolute number rather than a ratio of a total nwnber of 
financial intermediaries . 
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that show the presence of financial intermediaries similar to Japan, our fourth benchmark 
country. The type of financial intermediaries in Japan is similar to the one Germany in 
terms of the banking sector. However Japan displays a larger proportion of other financing 
institutions providing loans, which we do not observe in Germany. Therefore, in this 
instance, we differentiate between countries that follow Germany or Japan as two separate 
benchmarks. 
Two benchmarks and representatives of the Anglo-Saxon/equity oriented financial 
systems, UK and USA, lead the numbers in the first group as they show the highest 
proportion of security dealers, brokers and flotation companies than any other country 
from the sample. UK, joined by another CEEC - Estonia, also shows high presence of 
miscellaneous business credit institutions. This suggests that firms in these two countries 
incur low transaction costs when searching for equity financing or other forms of credit 
than a bank loan. These countries simultaneously show a high proportion of national 
commercial banks, the presence of which is seen as a sign of a developed financial system 
and a necessary requirement for equity culture development. Next to Estonia, Latvia is 
another CEEC that belongs to this group in all time observations. The Czech Republic, 
although positioned close to this cluster, displays more average levels than any other 
country from this group. This observation suggests that in this country financial 
intermediaries of equity and bank nature are strongly present. 
On the other side of the graphical display is a group of countries 'surrounding' the 
bank financing representative - Germany. CEECs observed in this position in all time 
observations are Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. Lithuania joins this group in 2000 after 
a short-lived co-existence with group one - the equity and miscellaneous business credit 
representatives. This cluster displays high proportion of international banking institutions 
and above average levels of national commercial banks. Although the presence of brokers 
and flotation companies in these countries is low we notice the presence of some services 
related to the exchange of securities and commodities. This observation suggests an 
existing activity in the equity related sector, however, over-powered by the banking 
sector's dominance. 
Japan, accompanied in all time observation by one CEEC - Poland displays high 
proportion of miscellaneous business credit institutions and above average presence of 
foreign trade and international banking institutions. These two countries show the 
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composition of their financial intermediaries sector similar to that of Germany and its 
'followers', and show the presence of other than bank credit providing institutions. This 
indicates that the 'supply' side development in these two countries is 'steering' towards 
other forms of credit than bank loans and not equity type financial institutions. 
Bulgaria and Slovakia show opposite developments during the 1996-2008 time 
observation. Bulgaria starts in 1996 with a high number of national commercial banks and 
strong presence of brokers and flotation companies. However, the strong presence of 
equity supportive financial intermediaries gradually diminishes and the banking sector 
regains its dominant position. On the other hand, in the case of Slovakia, not only the 
presence of national commercial banks remains stable but also the number of security 
brokers, dealers and flotation companies is on the increase. This observation suggests that 
while firms in Slovakia would gradually incur lower transaction costs when arranging for 
equity financing. The opposite would be true for firms in Bulgaria. 
6.5.3.2. The Quality of the Banking Sector and Equity related Intermediaries 
Assessing the presence of financial intermediaries is important, however not sufficient. To 
be able to understand the financial institutions sector we also have to examine their quality. 
Therefore, we assess the quality (i.e. depth) of the banking sector and the quality (i.e. 
liquidity) of the equity related financial intermediaries (capital markets) sectors. We 
examine the following indicators: Banking Sector Assets IGDP (quality of the banking 
sector) (g8), Stock market capitalisation IGDP (liquidity of the capital markets) (g8), and 
Stock market capitalisation I Number of listed domestic companies (market capitalisation 
of the average firm) (gIO). 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
We evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on g = 3 (g8, g9, gJO). 
The raw data, a X14X3(8-10) matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all three variables the 
coefficient of alienation is 0.6 indicating 0.94 reliability for year 1996 (Fig.25), 0.4 
indicating 0.96 reliability for years 2000 (Fig.26) and 2004 (Fig.27) and 0.02 indicating 
above 0.99 reliability for year 2008 (Fig.28). The correlation coefficient shows and 
average of 0.88 for all four years. This result indicates that all variables contribute to the 
clustering of sample countries. 
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In all time observations the four benchmarks are positioned on the other side of the 
graphical display than the CEECs, showing high values on the observed indicators. 
Germany and Japan show a high depth of the banking sector, and UK and USA display 
high stock market capitalisation and high capitalisation of the average firm. To be able to 
visually distinguish between the performances of individual indicators in the CEECs we 
perform the Co-Plot analysis without the four benchmarks. Then retuming back to the 
individual Co-Plot with all 14 countries we cluster the CEECs bas.ed on our findings. 
Fig 25: n = 14, g =3(g8,g9, g10), 1996 
.... 
• 
Fig 27: n = 14, g =3(g8,g9,g10), 2004 
(;) .-• l' _ ....... ..-. . .--
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Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 














From the results gained by Co-Plots we are able to distinguish between three groups of 
countries that emerge toward the end of the observation period in terms of the quality of 
the equity financing related financial intermediaries: Firstly, countries that possess liquid 
capital markets and overall a good quality of equity related financial intermediaries; 
secondly, countries that show a better quality of the banking sector than the capital markets 




thirdly, countries that exhibit lower levels for the quality of banking and capital markets 
sectors than any other CEEC. 
Firstly, Estonia shows the best quality of the capital markets sector, i.e. high capital 
markets capitalisation and after 2004 also high capitalisation of the average firm. This 
suggests high liquidity of its capital markets and an active equity based financial sector. 
Slovakia seems to be also deepening its capital markets sector on a year by year basis and 
thus in this respect outperforms many other CEECs. 
Secondly, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, and Poland are CEECs with 
dominant bank-based financial intermediaries. At the beginning of our research period, 
year 1996, Czech Republic and Latvia perform strongly on the banking assets/GDP 
indicator and by 2000 also improved liquidity of their capital markets is apparent. The 
indicator of the average firm capitalisation is since 2000 improving on the year to year 
basis. Slovenia and Poland join this group in the second half of the observation period with 
deepening banking sectors and increasingly more active capital markets. 
Thirdly, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania are the three CEECs in which we observe 
less financial deepening than in other, above discussed, CEECs. In particular, Romania is 
the weakest performer. Although Hungary shows similarly illiquid capital markets sector 
comparable to Bulgaria, Lithuania or Romania, its slightly better deepening banking sector 
makes it a better overall performer out of the four CEECs. We observe that the financial 
deepening of the banks and capital markets in Hungary and Slovenia improves on a year 
by year basis but at comparatively lower levels than other CEECs. 
6.5.4. Ownership Patterns 
After having examined the financial intermediaries in individual CEECs, in the following 
section we cross-examine the equity culture development in individual CEECs by 
analysing the composition of the firm sector in terms of its ownership structure. We 
investigate and compare not only the proportions of private and public firms but also of 
firms that are private but have more than five shareholders as we consider private equity to 
be a contributor to the overall equity culture development. The analysis enables us to 
analyse the 'demand' for equity financing demonstrated by the corporate sector. As stated 
in our conceptual framework, we maintain that equity culture can only be developed if 
firms demonstrate a re-financing preference for equity financing and do not incur 
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incomparably higher transaction costs than in the case of opting for a traditional source of 
external capital. 
Therefore, in this section we evaluate the total set of countries with measurements on 
f variables in the fonn of ownership ratios /1: publicly owned firms/total number affirms, 
12: privately owned firms/total number affirms, 13: privately owned firms with more than 
five shareholders/total number of firms . Furthermore, we examine two intensity ratios /4: 
publicly owned firms/privately owned firms, /5: privaiely owned firms with more than fi ve 
shareholderlprivately ownedfirms. The analysis is performed for the total number of firms, 
i.e. collectively for all firm size groupsl 4, however, significant variations between 
individual groups (primarily large and SMEs) are noted. 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
We evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on f = 5 variables for each 
individual year (Fig. 29, 30, 31 and 32 respectively). The raw data, a X/ 4 x5 matrix is 
submitted to Co-plot. With all ] 4 variables the coefficient of alienation is between 0.039 
and 0.065 indicating above 99 per cent reliability for all four years. The average of 
correlations is 0.98 indicating that all variables are contributing to the clustering of our 
sample countries. 
Fig 29: n = 14,/= 5, J996 Fig. 30: n = 14, / = 5,2000 
-• 
14 The EU Commiss ion s ize criteria (2005) were applied in order to group indiv idual fin11s according to their 
size. For a detailed methodology on fill11 grouping see Chapter 4 . 
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Fig 31: n = 14,/ = 5, 2004 Fig. 32: 11 = 14, / = 5, 2008 
Source: Author 's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
Based on the Co-Plots results we are able to distinguish between three groups of countries: 
Firstly, countries that have developed a significant demand for equity financing; secondly, 
countries that have developed some demand for equity financing; and lastly, countries that 
have developed a small demand for equity financing. 
First group of countries - Bulgaria and Siovenia- displays a larger proportion of 
public firms than the majority of the sample countries. They are positioned closely in all 
time observations. When we observe the ownership structure for individual fim1 size 
groups in these two countries, it is the large firms that show a high proportion of public 
ownership. A large proportion of SMEs is also public in these two countries, but the 
difference is not as big when compared to other CEECs. However, it is important to say 
that the public firm proportion is decreasing and not increasing on a year to year basis. A 
significant decrease is noticed especially in the case of Bulgaria. We argue that this may be 
a result of equity financing being imposed on firms in Bulgaria in the transition period 
rather than it being the firms' individual choice. Indeed, the need to restructure economies, 
abolish state ownership and secure economic growth was a task individual CEECs handled 
differently. In many countries that basic tool of an economy's restructuring - the 
privatisation - did not deliver results many were hoping for and thus finns were pushed 
towards going public without them or their environments being ready. The then 
underdeveloped banking system was not offering an alternative to the idea of public 
financing, as firms aiming to grow and therefore looking for external finance were not able 
to obtain attractive bank loans. 
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The second group of countries - Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland - exhibit a 
higher proportion of private finns than the two finns in the first group and the number of 
their public finns is also higher than we notice in the rest of the CEECs. Slovakia is the 
strongest perfonning country in this group. A different size group analysis has shown that 
in the case of these countries, it is mainly the large finns, not the SMEs, that display public 
ownership. Hungary and Estonia also exhibit some public ownership, however to a lesser 
extent and therefore the Co-Plots do not display them fonning the same cluster with 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland. Although we observe that the number of public 
finns in these countries is also decreasing, it is not as radical as in the case of the first 
group. We argue that this is probably due to a better 'support' of the supply mechanism in 
the fonn of macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions. Once the analysis on 
the finn level is accomplished, such conclusions will be drawn more precisely in the 
following sections. 
The third group of CEECs - Latvia, Lithuania and Romania - shows the smallest 
proportions of public finns and moderate to low levels of private finns owned by more 
than five shareholders. Gennany and Japan, the banking system prototypes, are either 
directly (sharing a cluster) or indirectly (within the same area of the graphical display) 
linked with these countries. Lithuania shares the cluster with the benchmark of Gennany in 
all time observations as both individual group sizes show some presence of shared 
ownership within the private sector, while Latvia and Romania join the group later in the 
observation period. Romania initially starts with higher presence of large public finns 
(proportion almost comparable to Bulgaria), however, in the coming years displays a 
decrease of public finn ownership. Latvia adopted almost an opposite trend to Romania, as 
at the beginning it was positioned closely to countries with strong preference of bank 
financing and gradually started displaying a higher proportion of private finns with more 
than five shareholders, which would indicate the growing presence of private equity. 
However, towards the end of our research period it went again to higher number of private 
finns with limited public ownership. 
6.5.5. The Firm's Internal Environment - Managerial Capabilities 
The data analysis perfonned so far has helped us to explain macro-economic and 
institutional environments individual finns exist in and thus better understand the external 
conditions contributing to a financial system development. The financial intennediaries 
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sector analysis and the examination of the firm ownership patterns has enabled us to look 
closer at the progress of equity culture development within these external conditions. 
However, financing choices of firms and equity culture development as such are not only 
determined by the macroeconomic advancement (i.e. high national competitiveness) and 
institutional support of a country but equally by their intra-firm managerial 
resourcefulness. 
Academic literature confirms (Marris, 1964; Karolyi, 1996; Hutzschenreuter et aI., 
2007) that international experience of managers ~nd the presence of competent senior 
management suggest less risk averse business culture in the corporate sector of nations 
supportive of equity culture development. Based on Barney's (2006) Resource-based view 
theory we state in our conceptual framework that a strategic decision becomes viable if the 
internal resourcefulness - the internal resources and capabilities, are not only considered 
but also utilised to minimise the cost of the intended transaction. 
Therefore, in this section, we examine the internal environment of the corporate 
sector from the managerial capabilities perspective. The IMD database provides an 
invaluable resource of managerial data. For the purpose of our research we select the 
following indicators for managerial capabilities: mI - Worker motivation, m2 - Finance 
skills, m3 - Foreign high-skilled people, m4 - International experience, m5 - Competent 
senior managers, m6 - Adaptability of companies, m7 - Credibility of managers, m8 -
Entrepreneurship, m9 - Attitudes towards globalisation, mIO - National culture, mIl -
Flexibility and adaptability, mI2 - Need for economic and social reforms, mI3 -
Corporate values. 
a) Applying the Co-Plot Methodology 
We evaluate a total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on m = 13 variables for 
each individual year. The raw data, a Xl4 xJ3 matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all 14 
countries the coefficient of alienation is 0.12 for years 1996 (Fig. 33), 0.13 for 2000 (Fig. 
34), 0.13 for 2004 (Fig. 35) and 2008 (Fig. 36) indicating reliability of 87 percent and 
above. The average of correlations is 0.82 which signals a positive contribution of all 
thirteen variables. 
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Fig 33: n = 14, 111 = 13, 1996 
....... 
o 
Fig 35: n = 14, 111 = 13, 2004 
.,. 
Source: Author's Own 
b) Interpreting the Co-Plots 
Fig. 34: n = 14, m = 13, 2000 
-• .., •• f ... 





The Co-Plot graphical display enables us to distinguish between three groups of countries: 
Firstly, the UK-USA managerial capabilities followers; secondly, the Germany - Japan 
capabilities followers ; and thirdly, the underperformers - countries that exhibit 
comparatively lower values than all other CEECs. 
There are two CEECs that exhibit managerial values similar to the UK and the US: 
Estonia and Slovakia. We find that managers in these countries ' businesses are highly 
motivated, foreign high-skilled people are attracted to work for these countries' companies, 
and that the international experience of senior managers is genera Ily significant. Moreover, 
the adaptability of local companies is high, the flexibility of managers is high when dealing 
with new challenges and overall attitudes toward globalisation are very positive. Until 
2004 also Hungary is positioned in the same area of the graphical display but during the 
last years of our research period it changes its position completely and shows one of the 
lowest values on the previously well performing indicators. On the other hand, Bulgaria 




2004 but then start perfonning strong on a number of managerial indicators. The Co-Plot 
results suggest that entrepreneurship is starting to spread in the business, national culture is 
more open to foreign ideas and the adaptability and flexibility of managers when dealing 
with challenging decision-making improves. 
The number of countries displaying similar managerial capabilities to Gennany and 
Japan is also two: the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In these countries competent senior 
managers are not only readily available but also their credibility in the society is high. 
Furthennore, the need for economic and social refonns is generally well understood and 
corporate values take into account the values of employees. The last group of three CEECs 
- Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland displays managerial capabilities at values average and 
below average to Gennany and Japan. These countries are in most time observations 
positioned in the exact opposite to the UK and the US. This suggests the missing presence 
of managerial capabilities necessary for equity culture development. 
6.6. Leaders, Potentials, and Laggards: Who is Who? 
The results from the Co-Plot analysis allow us thus to put forward which CEECs have the 
potential for the development of an equity culture. Table 6.1. cumulatively displays results 
from the Co-Plots. In each observation countries are organised in an ascending order with 
the top position indicating low level, quality or presence of conditions identified as 
necessary for the development of an equity culture and low position indicating high level, 
quality or presence of the same conditions. Countries are in brackets if they share the same 
cluster and are at one horizontal level if they are in the same part of the graphical display. 
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Table 6.1.: The Summary of Co-Plots 
Environmrntal O uster 1996 2000 2004 
2008 
Conerp" 
N ational ( I) Buigan:. (Bl~gntia. Estonia, Latvia. (1_11' ';'. Ll hu:mia) Romania 
Bulgaria. ROIl''Cnn 
Competitive ness Lithuania) 
General (2) (Estonia. Latvia. LnhlCnia) 
(Pobnd. lIungary) Buig:lria.Pobnd (liungary. Lnhuania. Pobnd) 
Macroecononl;c (3) Pobnd. Ronnnia Ronnni:l 
(Czech Republic. I llUlgary. (Estonia. Latvia) 
Condiions (Czech Republic. Slovenia) Estonia. Slovenia) -
(4) (C= h Republic. Slovukia. Sk,w kia Sbw k" 
(C,ech Republic. SlovukD) 
ISb v.nia). IItBlgary -
(5) (Genrony. Japun, UK . USA) (UK , USA, Genrony) Jupan (Gernnny. Japan, UK. USA) 
Siovenil 
(6) 
(UK. USA. Jupan) Genrony 
Con"qJosit i:m of the ( I) Buigan:.. Il lUJgary. LatVD. Bulgarn. Ronnnia Bulgan:.. Ronnn" 
Bulgan:.. RonDnD 
Economy Lilhwnia, Rormno 
(2) (Pobnd. Llhu:tnk1) (Pobnd. Lithuank1) 
(Pot,,1<I. Lithuania) 
(3) (Czech Republic. Pobnd. (Czech Republic. Il lBlgary. (Czech Repuboc. I llUlgary. 
(Czech Republic. Ilungary. SbvakD). 
SbvakD) Slovakia. SlovenD) Slovakia . Slovenia, Slovene 
(4) (Estonia. SIo, enia) .~Estonia 
Latvia. Estonia Latvia. Es lon~1 
(5) Genrony.Jupun, UK ) USA (Genronv. Japun, UK ) USA (Genrony. Japun, UK ) USA 
(UK. USA. Jap3O) Genronv 
Tr.lnsition I ndc~ltors ( I) Buigan:.. Ronnnia (Lihuan'" Sloveni:1) (Buigaria. Latvia. Ron ... nD) SlovenD 
(2) (Lnt~l3nia , Sloveni:1) (Latvia. Ronnn") BulgarD Sloveni:1 
(Buigan:.. LatvD.Ronnnia) 
(Nationul (3) (LatV'" EstonD) ISlowkia 
Lihuania (L. hlk,n'" Slowht) 
COlllJelitivcness) (4) Il lUlgary. Pol:u1<l. SIo'<lkD (EstonD. 1'010,1<1) (Estoni:1. Pobnd. 
IowkD) (EstonD. Ilulgary. Pobnd) -
(5) Czech Republic Il utJgary IlutJgary 
C2£ch Republic 
(6) C=h Republic Czech Republic 
Institut ional ( I) Buig;ln:.. Ron ... nD. Slovak ia ROlltlnn 
(Buig;ln:., Llhlk1ni:t) Bulgan:.. RonnnD 
Environme nt (2) (EsIOna, Lawn. LithU3nb.. (Bulgan:.. Latvi:t . LithlCnD) ROl1"Ono (LlhuunD. Sioveni:t) 
,Slovenia) 
Quality of lnslitut ional (3) Pok,,1<1 (1'01 .. 1<1. Slova kD) (Poku1<l, Siovaki:t) 
(La,,';'. Eston,,) 
EnviromrcllI (4) Czech Republic ~",ch Republic I llDJgary (Ilungary. Pobnd. SlowkD) 
(5) (Genrony. Ilungary) (Estonn.SIo\'en" ) (Eslonia. La",n) C;rech Republic 
(6) (Jup"\ UK. USA) IlutJga ry (Czech Republic, b venia) (UK, USA) (Genrony, Japan) 
(7) (UK. USA ) Germmy. Jnpun (UK. USA) (Genmnv. Japan) 
Tr:lns i ion Indc:uors (I) Buig;ln:.. Ronnnn BuJg;1fO. RormniJ Bulgaro. Rormnc ROIl'IlIlD. Bulgarc 
(2) (l Mvn, Li lnlania) (Latvia, Lithllania. b\'CIln) lithu.1tl". SIo'~ni:t Sb,~ni:t 
(lnslitUliott:l l Quuluy) (3) (1'010,1<1, Iovuki1.SIo\'eni:t) ISIoV3ki:t Latvia Lalvia. Lithuania 
(4) (liUllg;>ry. Estoni:t) (II lDJgary. Eslonia), 1'01011<1 Pob,1<I. IovakD (1IwJgary, ( li lOlgary. Eston"). SIo\'''ki:t 
-
EstonD) 1'010,1<1 
(5) r = h Rep ublic C",ch Republic C;ech Reoublic C lech Republic 
Financhl l ( I) Czech Republic. Poland. Siovaki:t, Lilhwni..1, Pobnd, Jopan Poland. Japan Bulgan:. 
InlemK' dinries Japan 
1110 Presence of (2) l3ulgan:. (Genrony, IllDJgary. Ronnni:t. (Genrony. Ilulgary. L'hlCni:t , (Polu1<l. Japun) 
B3nking \IS. equiy- Sloveni:1) ROnnl1~1, Slovenia) 
rcbted fmane ial (3) (Gemnny. IllDlgary. RonDn.,. (Bulgaria, Slovakia) Czech Republic (l llBlgary. ROIr<1nia) 
ilSlitUI()IlS SlovenD) 
(4) (La,,';'. LihuanD) C2£ch Republic (BuIg;ln:.. SIoV3kn) (Gemnny. Lnt.l3nD. lo,eni:1) 
(5) (EslOn.,. UK) L..11vD Latvia C",cll Republic 
(6) USA (Estoni:t . UK) (Estoni:t, UK ) Sb w ki:t, Estoni:t, Lat\," . UK 
(7) USA USA USA 
11", Quutny of the ( I) (SlovakD, RonDnD. Slovenia, Bulgaril. IllIlgary. Siovenn (BuIg;ln:.. IllUJgary, LitJ~""" , Bu.I~ria. Ronnnn 
Bankulg Sector u,1<I Il u'Jgary. Bulg;> ria) ROlnlnia , SbveniJ) 
Eq uity Rebted (2) C=h Republic LaIV'1 Pobnd Lihuania 
Fi13nci:11 (3) (Genrony, Jup"n) Genrony. Jupan (Gcnmny. Jupan, La"'D) (Latvi:t , Pobnd) 
I ntcnrcdiades (4) (Lithuania. Pobt1<l) (Czech Republic. LilhunnD, (Slovakia , C",ch Republic) Gem"ny, Jap"n, Czech Republic, 
Slovak i:t, Ronnn,,) IlutJgary) 
(5) Latvia !:.sloni:1, Pob,1<I Estone (S lovukD. SIo' on,,) 
(6) (EstonD. UK ) UK , USA UK, U A ESIOIlD 
, (7) USA UK. USA 
O\'mcrsbip Pattc ms ( I) (Genrony. Japan, LatvD. (Gemnny. Li~1l1ani:t) (Gemnny, l 'huuni:t. Ro,ronia) (Genrony. Jopun, Latvi:t. uhuani:1. 
Llhuani:1) ROironD) 
Toto l Nunner o ffinns (2) ESlonb. ",eh Republic. Pol,,1<I), (E tOnD. Ilung.1ry, L1tvi:t. Jupan, (1IlDlgary, Es tonia) (1I lDlgary. Esloni:t) 
Ilwlgary Litllll3nc) 
(3) Japun, Il lDlgary (Siovaki:t. C2£ch Republic. (SlovakD. Cl'1!ch Republic, Pola,1<I) 
Slo vakD Pob,1<I) 
(4) (Bulson:., ROlronia. SIo,en,,) (Czech Repubhc. Pobnd) (Buig;l ro. La,,';', SIo, en,,) (BuIg;ln:.. Io \cnia) 
(5) (UK , USA) (EstonD, Siowkia) (UK. USA) UK. U A 
(6) (Buig:ln:., Ron ... nia. SIo,,,nia. 
La"'D) 
(7) (UK, USA) 
M anage ria l ( I) Poland (Poland.Sb\'enD) Pobnd Pobnd 
Resources Dnd (2) (Bulgaria, Latvia. Lithu.1ni:1, Rormnn (Latvia. Llhml1ia) (Bulgam, L..1fvn, LilhUlno, Ilungnry, 
Capabiliries Ronnnn, lovenia) ROm:lnia) 
(3) Gemnny. J:lpan (Bulgan:.. Lalvi:I, Lilhwn.,) S io vellb Gem..,ny (Jupa'\ Czech Republic. 
Sb\'enia) 
(4) Czech Republic. IIUlJgary C",ch Republic (Gemnny. Czech Republic) J. pun 
(5) (Estoon. SlovukD) Genrony. Jupan (Buig:ln:.. R01roni:l) Sb''3kD 
(6) UK, USA .EsIOI1". lIungary. Sbvak " EslonD ( Io,". ki:t. Ilungary) USA (UK, EstonD) 
(7) UK , USA (UK, USA) 
Source: Author 's Own 
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Drawing from the summary table we compare individual indicators across countries. 
We pose a question whether a specific country under observation has the necessary macro-
economic, institutional and managerial conditions in order for the equity culture to be able 
to develop. We state 'yes' if a CEEC shows the presence of identified conditions, 'some' if 
a CEEC shows a close position and thus good potential for the presence of the required 
condition, and we score 'no' if a CEEC is positioned far from the benchmarks (or in some 
instance close to benchmarks representing the bank-based system however not close to 
benchmarks representing the equity-based system). The results are offered in Table 6.2. 
(year 1996), Table 6.3. (year 2000), Table 6.4. (year 2004) and Table 6.5. (year 2008). 
It is important to note that in these tables we differentiate between two main groups 
of indicators: the conditions and demand for equity financing by firms. Firstly, the supply 
conditions affect the size of transaction costs which firms incur when opting for equity 
financing. As suggested in our conceptual framework, firms may apply for equity 
financing and thus contribute to the development of an equity culture if the presence of 
adequate conditions (macro-economic, institutional and managerial) results in a small size 
of such costs. Secondly, the demand for equity financing represents the number of firms 
which opt for shared ownership either through becoming a public fiml with its shares 
traded on public markets or a private firm with a higher than five shareholders ownership. 
Drawing on our conceptual framework, we believe that a sustainable equity culture can 
develop if the corporate sector's high demand for equity financing is met by the presence 
of high conditions stemming from macro-economic, institutional and managerial 
environments. 
Table 6.2.: Co-Plots Results 1996 
Manage rial 
:"lational Competitivene ss Institutional Conditions Conditions Demand for [ uity Financi~ 
Macro- Bankilg "". Equity· TIx:Qualityoftlx: 
economic Economy Tmnsilvn InslilUlDnal TraJ'bilion rcL1tcd Finane'lI Banking und &juiy· Mal'l<tbOCnal Total No Large Micro 
CEEC, Condnions Stmeturc Slnt", Quali.y SlnlUS I~tirutions rcb.cd FRlIlcial Sector Capabaitic, of Firm. Fim; SMEs Fim; 
BuJ!¥Iria no no no no no some no no yes yes yes yes 
Czech Rep. yes SOITC yes yes son..: some no yes sonx: yes no no 
Estonia no SO Il"C no no yes yes yes yes SOll£ sonx: no no 
H'.'g,"), yes SOI1"£ yes yes yes no no 501l£ no no no no 
Lalvlt no so,re no no sone yes SOl1"C no no so,re no no 
Ldhuania no no no no sonx: yes Mlm: no no sonl: no no 
Poland no no yes sonx: yes no SOIll: no sonx: SOIll: no no 
Rormn~1 no no no no no ,X> no ,x> yes yes sonx: yes 
Sklwkia yes SOIll: yes .X> yes sonl: ,x> yes yes )"s yes no 
Sklvcnia yes smre no no SOIll: no no no yes yes sonx: sonl: 
Source: Author's Own 
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Table 6.3.: Co-Plots Results 2000 
Manage rial 
~ ationa l Compctith'en('ss Ills tilutioml' Conditions Conditions De mand for Ec uity Fin.a ncing 
Macro· Bankilg "s. Equity. The Quatiry ofthc 
cconorric Economy Transition Instlllli:)!]al Transili>n related FU13ncial Banking and Equiry· Mana&'I:r,,1 otalNo Large Mera 
e EEes Conddions !Structurc Status Quality Status Institutions related Financial Sector Capabiliti:s ofFim; Firms SMEs Finns 
BII~ria no no 110 no no solre no no yes yes yes SOIl"C 
C=hRep. yes son" yes SOl1>' son" SOl1"C SOIl"C no SO Il'(: yes no no 
ESlon~1 son-c SOIl-C yes SOIl"C yes yes yes yes SOIl"C SOIl"C no no 
~hmgary yes SOIl"C ) S yes yes no no yes no som:: no no 
Latvia no SO"" no no som: yes SOIl"C t>J t., some ,., no 
Lithuania no no no no SO il": SO"" som:: no sonr yes ,., no 
Pobnd yes 110 yes yes yes SOIll: SOlll:: ,., some some no no 
Ron~nia son" no no no no no some no yes yes yes no 
Skwdkia yes SO"" SOl1>, yes some som: sorrr yes sone yes sClne no 
Sbvcnia yes sOll'r 110 so,re SO I1"C no no ,., yes yes son" ,., 
Source: Author 's Own 
Table 6.4.: Co-Plots Results 2004 
Manage rial 
~a tio nal Competit iveness Ins titutiona l Condilions Conditions D(' mand for Equil-v Financing 
Mucro- Bank Uig vs. Equiy· The Quality of the 
ccononic Economy Trarn.ilK)Il Institwional Transition related Fil\1.llCial Banking and Equity. Managerial Total No Lar&'C Micro 
e EEes Conditions SIn"n"" IStan" QlIabt}' IStatus I~unuio~ rcbted Financial Sector C'pablli!"s ofFil,.. Fltm, SMEs Fim; 
B~ria no no son..:: no no so,re no no yes yes so,re some 
Czech Rep. y"s so,re yes som: some sone so,re no some yes no no 
Estonia yes yes yes sorre yes yes yes yes no som: ,., no 
Hungary yes son" yes some yes no ,., yes no som: no no 
Latvia ,., so,,,, SOIl'IC som: so,re yes ,., no yes yes no no 
Litht .. nia ,., ,., sonX': no sorrc ,., no no no son"£ no no 
Poklnd no ,., yes som: yes some so,re ,., SOil);! so're no .., 
Ron~lIlia no no SOI1"C ,., no no ,., ,., ,., SO"" no ,., 
Sbvdk" yes SOIl'IC yes SOI1"(: some sorre sonX! yes 5011"£ yes sorn:: no 
ISbvcnia yes SOIl'IC no SOil":: SOI1X! no ,., ,., yes yes SOI1"C ,., 
Source: Author 's Own 
Table 6.5.: Co-Plots Results 2008 
Manage ri. 1 
National Com le lilive ness Institutional Co ndit tons Conditions Demand for E uilY Financing 
Macro- Banking ". Equity· The Qually oftl" 
econonic Eco,.,n1)' Trmt:.ition In<titullOnal Trnnsition rebted F'laI1CClI B:lI1kilg and Equity. Ma""b'C""I Total No L..1 'b'C Micro 
e EEes Conditio", Structure Slallb Qunliry Stant. I~titution~. related Fimncial Sector Capabmtics of FilTh Fil1l'b SME.. Fi"nl> 
Bu~ria ,., ,., no no no SO"" no ,., yes yes sone SOIl-c 
Czech Rep. yes SOIll:.: yes sorrc yes yes son" no !<>01l"C yes ,., no 
E:,tonia yes yes yes son"C yes yes yes yes no son" no ,., 
Ihu>gIIry som, SOIl"C yes yes yes ,., some ,., ,., no ,., ,., 
Latvia yes yes 110 SOllr ,., yes son);.! ,., no no ,., no 
Lithuania so,re no yes SOlre son" no no ,., ,., no ,., ,., 
Poklnd some no yes yes yes son" SOIl"C no son'C som: ,., no 
Ronnnia ,., no no no ,., no ,., no no ,., no no 
Sbvdkia yes some yes ) S son" yes son>:: yes yes yes yes ,., 
Sbvcnia yes some no SOIl"C ,., no sollr ,., yes yes SOIT" no 
Source: Author's Own 
To be able to graphically display the position of individual countries in terms of their 
corporate sector' s demand for equity financing and the macro-economic, institutional and 
managerial conditions these countries display we assign a numeric value to each of the 
possible answers: answer 'no' = 0, answer 'some' = 1, and answer 'yes' = 2. Then we 
individually sum up values for the demand and conditions side. These results are displayed 
below in Table 6.6. 
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T bl 66 S a e .. ummary T bl C PI t N a e 0- os- . I umenca va ues 
Conditions Demand of Firms 
CEECs 1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Bulgaria 1 1 2 1 6 5 4 4 
Czech Rep. 11 9 9 11 2 2 2 2 
Estonia 9 13 15 15 1 1 1 1 
Hlll1gary 10 11 10 9 0 1 1 0 
Latvia 5 5 6 8 1 1 2 0 
Lithuania 4 3 2 4 1 2 1 0 
Poland 6 10 7 9 1 1 1 1 
Romania 0 2 1 0 5 4 1 0 
Slovakia 10 11 11 13 4 3 3 4 
Slovenia 4 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 
Source: Author's Own 
This conversion to numerical values enables us to create scatter plots for year 1996 
(Fig. 6.2), 2000 (Fig. 6.3), 2004 (Fig. 6.4.) and 2008 (Fig. 6.5.). In these scatter plots the 
horizontal axis is represented by the demand of firms for equity financing (public firms 
and/or private firms with more than five shareholders) and the vertical axis denotes the 
presence of conditions necessary for the development of an equity culture. Thus the scatter 
plots reveal the position of each country in terms of the demand for equity financing and 
the supply conditions these firms are affected by. We divide each scatter plot horizontally 
into three sections. Firstly, the top part representing the highest level of conditions is 
referred to as the Leaders. Countries positioned in this part of the scatter plot show a high 
presence of conditions which we have identified necessary for the development of an 
equity culture. Secondly, the middle part of the scatter plot denotes a medium level of 
conditions important for the development of an equity culture. Countries that are 
positioned in this section of the scatter plot are referred to as the Potentials. Finally, the 
bottom part of the scatter plot represents a low level of conditions necessary for the 
development of an equity culture. We name countries within this section of the scatter plot 
the Laggards. 
The group of Leaders has gradually shaped into its 2008 final form, in which 
Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovakia assume their positions. While Slovakia enjoys this 
position through-out the whole observation period with a relatively high demand, the same 
cannot be said about Czech Republic and Estonia. Czech Republic, despite its 1996 
position in the leaders group, descends into the group of 'potentials' for the majority of the 
observation period and even when in 2008 it returns back to its initial group, it remains 
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close to the border line scoring only marginally better than some countries from the 
potentials group. On the other hand, Estonia shows quite the opposite trend. Despite a slow 
start in 1996 it moves into the leaders section and remains together with Slovakia the best 
performing country in this group. However, the demand for equity financing this country 
displays is much lower than that of its section co-members. 
The final 2008 group of Potentials consists four countries: Hungary, Latvia, Poland 
and Slovenia. Apart from Latvia, none of the other three countries is in this group for the 
whole duration of our observation period. In the first three observation periods Hungary is 
in the leaders until it finally in 2008 finds a position in this group. This suggests a 
descending trend of the quality and presence of conditions necessary for the development 
of an equity culture in this country. Poland is in this group for the majority of the 
observation period with a exception in 2004 when it briefly joins the group of leaders. 
Slovenia starts in 1996 in the least good performing group of laggards and after that moves 
into this group. However, despite its size of demand comparable to Slovakia from the 
leaders group, Slovenia shows the weakest supply conditions among its 'potentials' co-
members. 
In 2008 the group of Laggards is represented by three CEECs: Lithuania, Bulgaria 
and Romania. Bulgaria is the only country from this group that moves into a different 
group during the observation period. Indeed, Bulgaria joins the group of 'potentials' briefly 
in 2004. From the beginning of the observation period this country shows a high demand 
for equity financing. Our results suggest that this demand has not developed as a result of 
supportive external and internal conditions, but due to other transition economy specific 
events. Thus the development of an equity culture, as defined in this thesis, seems in the 
case of Bulgaria unattainable. 
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Figure 6.1.: Level of Equi ty Culture Development in the CEECs in 1996 
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Figure 6.2.: Level of Equity Culture Development in the CEECs in 2000 
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Figure 6.3.: Level of Equity Culture Development in the CEECs in 2004 
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6.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we benchmarked our sample countries - the CEECs against four 
benchmarks and created clusters when individual countries displayed similar indicator 
characteristics. We produced clusters in terms of the countries' macro-economic, 
institutional and managerial characteristics and offered snapshots of conditions leading to 
these countries' financial system developments. The observation of four benchmark 
countries representing two different financial systems enabled us also to identify factors 
necessary for the development of an equity culture in a country. 
We have cumulatively observed that in the case of the CEECs high presence of 
conditions stemming from the macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments 
do not always correspond with high demand for equity financing by the CEE firms. We 
believe this is due to specific transition-tied events which have had the effect of disturbing 
the co-existence of the demand and conditions side as defined in our conceptual 
framework. To be able to further explain these events as well as point out the differences 
between the three groups of Leaders, Potentials and Laggards we choose a representative 
from each group and perform a qualitative comparative analysis of three selected countries 
by bringing in new qualitative data. The comparative analysis is offered in Chapter 8. 
However, prior to that, in Chapter 7, we determine which of the macroeconomic, 
institutional and managerial conditions in particular have an impact, positive or negative, 
on the increased demand for equity financing measured as a proportion of public firms and 
private firms with more than five shareholders. The statistical tool of regression analysis 
enables us to determine the nature of such causal relationships. 
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Chapter 7: Regression Analysis 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we performed the first stage of our empirical analysis - clustering 
and benchmarking. We used the Co-Plot method to perform this analysis. The aim of this 
chapter is to build on the results from Chapter 6 and provide answers as to what specific 
external and internal factors have a causal effect on a firm's strategic decision to opt for 
equity financing and thus influence the development of an equity culture in the transition 
economies of the CEECs. This empirical analysis provides answers to our third research 
question introduced in Chapter 1. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, we discuss the methodology of our 
chosen statistical tool for the assessment of relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables - the fixed effects regression analysis l5 , we introduce our dependent 
variables, we discuss the selection process of our independent variables, and we perform 
the correlation analysis. Secondly, we carry out the regression analysis and discuss our 
findings by relating to our conceptual framework and relevant literature. Finally, a 
summary section concludes this chapter. 
7.2. Methodology 
To empirically test the effects of specific factors on the firms' demand for equity financing 
we employ a regression analysis. Regression analysis enables us to make inference on an 
encompassing framework of analysis that takes into consideration all countries and periods 
of time. In this respect regression analysis differs from the earlier Co-Plot analysis which 
was carried out with specific groups and for a single time period. In order to allow for 
specific individual effects (i.e. country and time effects), our study uses the fixed effects 
panel estimation technique. The value of each dependent variable individually for the ith 
unit at time I, Yit, depends on K exogenous variables (XAit, ••• XKit) = X'it that differ among 
individuals in a cross-section at a given point of time and also exhibit variation through 
time. 
15 We apply the fixed effects model as we do not deem the random effects model congruent with our type of 
data. The fixed effects model allows us to impose country and time independent effects for each entity that 
are possibly correlated with the regressors (Wooldridge, 2002). Our sample is not capturing the whole 
population but is measuring the difference between specific countries. 
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The general form of the model is: 
where i = 1 ... n, and represents the Central and Eastern European countries participating in 
the sample, and t = l, ... t (covering the relevant time period of 1996 - 2008). /3' is a 1 x k 
vector of coefficients constant over time and a j is a 1 x 1 scalar constant representing the 
effects of those variables peculiar to the ith individual in the same fashion over time. We 
formulate the error term Uit in a way that represents the effects of the omitted variables that 
are specific to both the individual units and time. 
We moreover assume that Uit is an independently identically distributed random variable 
with: 
E(ujlu;') = (j; I T where It is a Tx Tidentity matrix. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) (Filippaios 
and Papanastossiou, 2008). 
We perform the regression analysis by using a statistical computerised programme STAT A 
10. We opt for using a regression model with the xi: prefix as it handles fixed time and 
country effects in our regression models. We add the suffix ,robust as we want to control 
for the robustness of our estimations l6• We create a set of dummy variables for the 
categorical variables of year and country. Including these dummy variables enables us to 
see their coefficients, i.country - fixed effects, and i.time - time effects. However, we do 
not report these here in the interest of space and simplicity. Our regression command thus 
looks as follows: 
xi: reg dependent_variable independent_variables i.year i.country, robust 
In each estimation we report on the N number of observations included, we test for the 
statistical significance of the fixed (country) and time effects of our panel data with F 
statistics, and we test for the efficiency of our model with the coefficient of determination 
R2. R2 describes the variance in the dependent variable, which can be explained from the 
variance in the independent variable. Wooldridge (2002) suggests small effect size if R2 is 
16 For reference refer to: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statlrobustref.html 
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< 1 %, a medium effect if R2 is between 1 % - 10% and a large effect if R2 is > 10%. We 
also report the overall F statistic of the model, the likelihood function (11) and the akaike 
information criterion (aic) as further indicators of the model's performance. 
7.2.1. Dependent Variables 
Regression analysis is a statistical analysis tool, which enables us to investigate the 
influence of a specific predictor on a dependent variable (Dewberry, 2004). In our analysis 
we employ four different specifications for the dependent variable. These four variables 
reflect the demand for equity finance - the main driver of equity culture development in a 
country. The argument for a demand driven nature of equity culture is captured in our 
definition of equity culture in Chapter 1 and forms the core of our conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Firstly, we identify the dependent variable as the ratio of public firms over the total 
number of firms in a country. We call this variable RatioPublic. Secondly, we create a 
dependent variable which reflects an intensity relationship between public firms and 
private firms expressed as a ratio of public firms over private firms. We refer to this 
variable as Public ToPrivate. Results for this dependent variable are presented in an 
appendix (Appendix 8, Table 7, 8 and 9) as they do not differ from the RatioPublic 
variable. This is because the denominators in these two ratio type dependent variables (the 
total number of firms and the number of private firms) are very similar (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.9980). 
Thirdly, to account for perhaps a less obvious demand for equity financing, in our 
view, however, critical for a comprehensive assessment of equity culture development in a 
country, we construct a dependent variable which reflects the proportion of private firms 
with five or more shareholders over the total number of firms in a country. We label this 
variable RatioPrivate5. Lastly, in a similar way to our second dependent variable, we 
consider it important to include a variable denoting an intensity character and therefore 
generate our fourth dependent variable as a ratio of private firms with five or more 
shareholders over private firms. This variable is called Private5ToPrivate. For the same 
reasons as explained in the case of our second dependent variable (in this case the 
correlation coefficient is 0.9931), we provide results for this dependent variable in an 
appendix (Appendix 8, Table 10, 11 and 12). 
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7.2.2. Independent Variables 
The full set of all independent variables considered in our study are introduced in Chapter 
5. These independent variables correspond to the supply conditions argument, first 
mentioned in our definition of equity culture in Chapter 1 and then further developed in 
our theory building section in Chapter 3. We restate that these variables are of macro-
economic, institutional and managerial character. 
The first stage of our empirical examination, the clustering analysis in Chapter 6, has 
enabled us to identify three groups of CEECs in terms of their level of equity culture 
development (Leaders, Potentials, Laggards). To arrive at these results we benchmarked 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial indicators of the CEECs against four 
advanced economies representing two different financial systems, the bank-based model 
used in Germany and Japan, and the equity-oriented model used in the UK and the USA. 
This analysis proves useful for the second stage of the empirical examination, the 
regression analysis. To build the regression model we draw on our propositions in our 
conceptual framework in Chapter 3, and utilise our results from Chapter 6 - the Co-Plot 
analysis. This gives us a solid starting point for our estimations work. This enabled us to 
include variables which, based on our theoretical thinking supported by existing literature, 
have an impact (positive or negative) on the demand for equity financing in a country (e.g. 
inward FDI, lending interest rate, etc.), however, are not identified by Co-Plots as variables 
affecting such demand. The estimations are provided later in this chapter. 
7.2.3. Correlation of Variables 
We use the statistical technique of correlation to show whether and how strongly pairs of 
variables are related. Because the data we use is quantifiable with individual numbers 
bearing a meaning, and consists not only categorical but also ordinal variables we deem the 
correlation technique appropriate for the assessment of statistical relationship between 
individual variables. We assume that a + 1 correlation is in the case of a perfect positive 
linear relationship between two variables and a -1 correlation is in the case of a perfect 
negative linear relationship between two variables. The closer the coefficient is to either + 1 
or -1, the stronger the correlation between two variables under observation. Therefore, in 
our correlation analysis we look for correlation values somewhere between + 1 and -1 
indicating linear independence between individual variables under observation. 
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We report the correlation table for all variables in Appendix A. We did not see any 
significant correlation between variables examined in the further statistical analysis of 
fixed effects regression except for two exceptions. Firstly, the correlation between our first 
two dependent variables (RatioPublic and PublicToPrivate) is high with coefficient 
0.9980, and secondly between the last two dependent variables (RatioPrivate5 and 
Private5ToPrivate) the correlation is also high with coefficient 0.9931. For robustness 
checks we run the regression analysis for all four dependent variables but we note that the 
same results hold in the case of the regression between the first two dependent variables 
and the last two dependent variables. The correlation results thus further support our 
decision not to include the intensity ratio dependent variables in the main report. 
7.3. Discussion of Results 
7.3.1. Estimations: Dependent Variable RatioPublic 
7.3.1.1. Estimations RatioPublicfor the Total Number of Firms 
The four regressions in Table 1 (7.1.) cover the full period 1996-2008 for the full sample of 
CEECs. In these regressions we control only for the total number of firms. We start with a 
basic model which includes macro-economic independent variables (Model 1.1.), then add 
institutional variables (Model 1.2.), followed by variables representing the quantitative 
presence and quality of financial intermediaries (Model 1.3.) and finally managerial 
variables (Model 104.). Model 104. is the final model we arrive at in the estimation process 
and which we use for further analysis to estimate for different firm size (Large firms, 
SMEs, Micro firms) and country type (Leaders, Potentials, Laggard\'). This is explained in 
later sections of this chapter. 
Of the macro-economic indicators which we identified through the Co-Plot analysis 
important for the presence or the development of an advanced financial system, it is 
Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that emerges as consistently significantly 
negative in these regressions, with a significance value in the final model of 5%. This 
would suggest that in the case of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
the higher the level of inward FDI, the fewer firms opt for equity financing and consider 
less often the option of becoming publicly traded companies. This finding does not dispute 
the observation of Choi and Jeon (2007) who claim that higher levels of inward FDI 
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contribute to the development of a more advanced financial system. However, in the case 
of the CEECs, it seems that FDI coming from bank-based financial systems (Germany, 
Italy, Austria) is a factor contributing to the continuous presence of the bank-based 
financial systems. The phenomenon of a path-dependent behaviour of foreign investors and 
their capital providers is the reason for this. Therefore, we do not disagree with Kim and 
Kenny's (2007) conclusion that equity based financial systems flourish in countries with 
increased levels of FDI. However, we add that for the FDI to fulfil its function of a 
contributor to the development of an equity based system, it needs to be coming from a 
country with developed equity-based systems so that host firms bring with them not only 
their investments but also an appetite for equity-based financing. 
By contrast, another macro-economic indicator - GDP per head gains positive 
significance from the third model (Model 1.3.) and remains positively significant in the 
fourth model (Model 1.4.) at 1 % level. This would suggest that the higher the GDP per 
head the more firms opt for equity financing and 'go public'. Our finding corresponds with 
the observation of Bekaert et al. (2001) who conclude that higher levels of GDP per head, 
as a macro-economic indicator of a country's economic power, play a part in the 
development of equity markets in less developed economies. Furthermore, Lending interest 
rate displays positive significance in first (Model 1.1.) and second (Model 1.2.) model at 
1 % level and although with only a significance of 10% it remains significant in the fourth 
model (Model 1.4.). This would suggest that the higher the lending interest rate in a 
country the higher the number of firms opting for equity financing. This observation goes 
in line with our conceptual thinking in Chapter 3, as we reason that higher costs associated 
with a bank loan as a source of external capital (caused for example by an increased 
lending interest rate) m'ay result in firms considering equity financing as a feasible 
alternative. The last macro-economic indicator that is significantly positive in our 
estimations is Balance of trade. Although not significantly positive in the previous models, 
this variable gains positive significance in the fourth model (Model 1.4.) at 10% level. This 
indicates that the better macro-economic performance expressed as balance between 
imports and exports, the more firms opt for equity financing and consider the option of 
becoming publicly traded companies. This finding again corresponds with previous 
literature, which states that equity financing is more likely to become a favoured financing 
option for firms in countries with healthier and better performing economies (Bekaert et 
aI., 2001; Bekaert et aI., 2002). 
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The variable representing the proportion of the Services sector never approaches 
significance and in fact proves to have a distorting influence on the performance of other 
variables (i.e. affects their signs and significance). As the structure of the economy 
indicates the development stage of a country's economy (Hamalainen, 2003), the effect of 
this variable is likely to be captured by GDP per head. Therefore, we exclude this variable 
from our estimations after the first model. The Competition policy variable is positively 
significant in the first (Model 1.1.) and second (Model l.2.) model at 5% and 10% level 
respectively. It loses significance in the third (model 1.3.) and fourth (Model 1.4.) model as 
we add more variables to our estimations. We believe that this is because some of the later 
added institutional variables (e.g. Bureaucracy Quality with which it shares a correlation 
value of 0.6939) take on the explanatory power of this indicator. 
Through-out the Co-Plot analysis we noted the presence of a number of institutional 
variables related to our benchmarks representing the Anglo-Saxon equity based system. 
Also, existing literature has highlighted the presence of some institutional indicators 
necessary for the development of an equity-based financial model (Bakker and Gross, 
2004; Peng, 2004). In our estimations three variables emerge as consistently significant in 
Models 1.2. (when these variables are first introduced), 1.3. and 1.4. Firstly, Bureaucracy 
quality displays positive significance in the second (Model 1.2.), third (Model 1.3.) and 
fourth (Model 1.4.) models at 5% level and then at 10% level. This would suggest that the 
better the quality of bureaucracy in an economy, the higher the number of firms which opt 
for equity financing and 'go public'. Our finding confirms our conceptualisation that a 
good bureaucratic system reduces transaction costs and is in line with earlier observations 
of Bekaert et al. (2001) and Smith (2003) who state that financial systems in which equity 
based forms of capital are more popular, are characterised by an efficient bureaucracy-free 
system. 
Secondly, Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation demonstrate consistently 
negative significance in Models 1.2., 1.3., and 1.4. at 1 % level. This result implies that 
better banking rules and regulation possibly lower contracting and coordinating costs for 
firms when opting for debt finance as their external source of capital and thus makes 
borrowing a feasible or more attractive financing option. Thirdly, the variable of Securities 
markets and non-bank financial institutions is significantly positive in Models 1.2., 1.3. 
and 1.4. at I % and 5% level. This would suggest that the better the improvement in 
securities laws and regulation, the more firms opt for equity financing and more frequently 
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consider becoming publicly traded companies. The last two findings are consistent with 
our argument presented in Chapter 3 that the preference for either bank financing or equity 
finance depends on their relationship to transaction costs absorbed by firms. The lower the 
transaction costs associated with a particular source of external capital, the higher the 
preference for such source of capital by firms. 
Further for the indicators representing financial intermediaries National commercial 
banks are strong in the regressions in which it is considered a predictor for the behaviour of 
our dependent variable - the proportion of public firms in a country's corporate sector. It 
displays a positive significance at 1 % level in Models 1.3. and 1.4. This seems to suggest 
that a high proportion of national commercial banks in an economy relates to a higher 
number of firms opting for equity finance. At this point it is important to reiterate our 
finding (first noted in Chapter 6, in the Co-Plot analysis of the financial intermediaries 
sector) about the poor presence of commercial banks (other than national), branches and 
agencies of foreign banks as well as other short term business credit institutions in the 
transition economies of the CEECs (Orbis, 2008). Their absence in the financial sectors of 
the CEECs in the period 1996-2008 is significant to such an extent that we are not able to 
include these indicators in our analysis, as there is very little variance amongst this data (in 
some cases it being zero for the whole observation period). This confirms inadequate 
competitive conditions within the banking sector of the CEECs (EBRD, 2006). We reason 
that national commercial banks may take advantage of their monopoly-like position within 
the banking sectors of the transition economies and overcharge for their services. Indeed, 
as for instance Deidda and Fattouh (2008) observe, in less advanced economies, such as 
the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are typical for their 
underdeveloped financial markets, banks tend to exploit their dominant position and charge 
excessive interest rates for the credit they offer. Therefore, we suggest that such conditions 
in the banking sector may trigger firms' interest in an alternative source of external capital, 
such as equity. 
Next, our estimations confirm what the literature most commonly refers to as an 
indication of a functioning equity-based system and what practitioners regard as the most 
obvious sign of an existing equity culture: the presence of high Stock market capitalisation 
(Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2004; WEF, 2008). The nature of the related 
argument is that the more liquid the equity markets are the more firms opt for equity 
financing and consider becoming publicly traded companies. Liquid equity markets 
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provide an access to a large pool of investors and offer attractive ways of raising capital for 
listed businesses (Pagano and Roell, 1996). Such conditions instigate low searching, 
contracting and coordinating costs to finns. Our findings display 5% positive significance 
of this variable and thus in this respect not only complement existing literature but also 
correspond with our conceptualisation. 
For the managerial indicators International experience of managers is the only 
variable that is significantly positive in our estimations. This would suggest that finns 
which employ managers with international experience are more likely to consider 
becoming a publicly traded company. To our knowledge, this finding is specific to our 
study as managerial level indicators have not been previously included in this type of 
analysis. 
Based on our findings in this section we conclude that independent variables from 
the macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments assert a statistical 
influence on our dependent variable (RatioPublic). This finding goes in line with our first 
proposition from our conceptual framework: 
PI: Equity culture development in transition economies is shaped by a combination of 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments. 
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Table 7.1. : Estimations RatioPublic (Total Number of Finns) 
Table 1 Estimations RatioPublic (Total Number of Firms) 
Variable Name STATA Labe I Modell.l. Model 1.2. Model 1.3. Model 1.4. 
GDP per head Igdp_per_ 0.00284 ':.0.00166 0.01626*** 0.01926*** 
~0.00318 ) ~0 . 00196) ~0 . 00506) ~0 . 00447) 
r 
Lending interest lending_ 0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00002 0.00002* 
rate ~0 . 00001) ~0 . 00002) ~0 .00002) ~0 .00001) 
Inward FDI inwardJ -0.00032*** -0.00018** -0.00022** -0.00018** 
~0 .0001l) ~0.00008 ) ~0.00008) ~0 . 00008 ) 
r 
Balance of trade balance_ 0.00014 0.00008 0.00017 0.00016* 
0.00012) ~0 .0001l) ~0 . 00010) ~0 . 00009 ) 




Competition policy competit 0.00172 0.00189 
'10 .00193) ~0 .00131) ~0 . 00138 ) ~0 .00126) 
r r r 
Corruption corrupti 0.00041 -0.00012 0.00048 
~0 . 00043) ~0 . 00058) ~0 . 00066) 
r r r 
Lawandorder law_and_ 0.00072 0.00026 0.00018 
~0 . 00071) ~0 . 00064) ~0 . 00068 ) 
Bureaucracy bureaucr 0.00294** 0.00239* 0.00207* 
quality ~0 . 00132) ~0 . 00127) ~0 . 001 24) r r 
Large scale large_sc -0.00192 -0.00100 
privatisation ~0 .00196) ~0 . 00182) 
-0.00531 * 
r 
Small scale small_sc -0.00029 
privatisation ~0 .00292) ~0 . 00305) 
Banking reform & bankingl -0.00556*** -0.00536*** -0.00553*** 
interest rate Ii bera Ii . ~0 . 00159) ~0 . 00123) ~0 . 00129) 
Securities markets & securiti 0.00317* ** 0.00317** 0.00268** 
non-bank finan . inst. ~0 .001l4) ~0 . 00156) ~0 .00174) 
Nationa I rationational 
commercia l banks banks 0.04762*** 0.04801*** 
~0 . 01009) ~0 . 01l62) 
Miscellaneous ratiomisc -0.00995* -0.00747 
business cred it inst. (0 .00589) (0.00546) 
Stock ma rket stock_ml 0.00008** 0.00008** 
capitalisation (0.00004) (0.00003) 
Worker motivation worker_m 0.00069 
(0 .00060) 
I nternationa I in tern at 0.00156** 
experience (0 .00069) 
Ada pta bi I ity adaptabi -0.00093 
(0 .00062) 
Entrepreneurship en trepre -0.00055 
(0 .00050\ 
_cons 0.02521 0.08695*** -0.09230 * -0.12421 *** 
(0 .02951) (0 .01840) (0 .04673) (0 .03871) 
N 130 130 130 130 
F 281.02528 420.59848 275 .23492 255.11891 
R 0.9786 0.9836 0.987 0.9883 
II 609.58809 621.70581 641.65571 648.92178 
aic -1.16e+03 -1.20e+03 -1.2 1e+03 -1.22e+03 
Ti me effects 1.88** 1.06 2.16** 2.52** 
Included yes no yes yes 
Cou ntry effects 187.49*** 219.32*** 172.60* ** 145.66*** 
Included yes yes yes yes 
t-statistics are in parantheses 
*** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically signi ficant at 10% level 
Source: Author's estimations in Stata 
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7.3.1.2. Estimations RatioPuhlic Controlling for Different Firm Sizes 
The regressions in Table 2 (7.2.) seek to test how the final model from our previous 
estimations (Model 1.4. repeated in Table 7.2. as model 2.1.) 'behaves' when we control 
for three different firm sizes - the large firms, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
micro firms. Conceptually, in Chapter 3, we proposed that due to dissimilar adoption of 
and intentions behind strategic level decision-making and resourcefulness of these firm 
groups we expect heterogeneous sets of conditions affecting their demand for equity 
finance. We thus propose in terms of different firms sizes the following: 
P2: The impact of macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments is 
dissimilar for different firm sizes. 
P2a: The managerial environment has stronger impact for Micro firms than SMEs and 
Large firms. 
P2b: The institutional environment has strong impact for Micro firms, SMEs, and Large 
firms. 
P2c: The macro-economic environment has stronger impact for SMEs and Large firms 
than Micro firms. 
Thus in this section we aim to discuss our results regarding proposition 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
This type of analysis is novel, as to our knowledge, the type of predictors affecting a firm's 
demand for equity financing (in this case expressed as a ratio of public firms over the total 
number of firms) has not been investigated for different firm sizes. 
Our findings show that there is a number of variables which display at least 10% 
significance (positive or negative) for all three firm sizes. Firstly, in the case of GDP per 
head, large firms (Model 2.2.) and micro firms (Model 2.4.) display significance level at 
5% and in the case of SMEs (Model 2.3.) the significance level is at 1%. This would 
suggest that increased levels of GDP per head positively affect the number of firms 
choosing equity as their source of external capital irrespective of those firms' size. This 
result holds most significantly for the group of SMEs. Secondly, Lending interest rate is 
also significantly positive in the case of all firm sizes. The significance is strong in the case 
of large firms and SMEs (significance level at 1 %) and medium strong in the case of micro 
firms (significance level at 5%). This would indicate that the factor of high lending interest 
rate has a positive impact on the number of firms choosing equity irrespective of their size. 
However, this appears to be specifically the case for large firms and SMEs. We find that in 
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both cases it is the groups of large firms and SMEs which display high significance. Our 
findings endorse the line of reasoning earlier observed by Klapper et al. (2002) that despite 
the fact that all firms are to some extent affected by major macro-economic developments 
in a country, it is the SMEs and large firms, which seem to be the most sensitive to them. 
We claim that this applies especially to SMEs, the newly established group of the 'engines 
of growth' in Central and Eastern Europe, which do not have the same resources as large 
firms and are not 'protected' by the micro-economic performance of local communities as 
micro firms are (Reeb, 2007). Therefore, their exposure to any macro-economic event is 
more direct and impacts their strategic decision-making substantially. 
Thirdly, the institutional indicator of Banking reform and interest rate liberalisafion 
is significantly negative in the case of all three firm sizes. We note significance at 1 % level 
in the case of SMEs and micro firms. Significance at 5% level is noted in the case of large 
firms. This would imply that improved banking laws and regulation decrease the number 
of firms opting for equity finance irrespective of their size, but especially the number of 
SMEs and micro firms. Also, the variable of Securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions is significantly positive across all firm sizes at 10% in the case of large firms 
and SMEs or 5% level in the case of micro firms. This would suggest that the better the 
securities laws and regulation, the higher the number of firms choosing equity finance as 
their external source of finance irrespective of the firm's size. However, this argument 
holds most significantly in the case of large firms and SMEs. These results suggest that if 
the above conditions hold, large firms and SMEs are more likely to consider equity 
financing than micro firms. We draw on our conceptual framework and reason that micro 
firms need extra 'motivation' from the managerial level to consider equity financing in the 
presence of such institutional conditions. This is discussed in the subsequent section. 
In addition, from the financial intermediaries group, the indicator for National 
Commercial Banks emerges as consistently significantly positive in the regressions for all 
three firm sizes. The results are significant at 1 % level in the case of large firms and SMEs, 
and at 10% level in the case of micro firms. This would indicate that large firms and SMEs 
react to the dominant presence of national commercial banks by considering another 
alternative - equity. Micro firms react in the same way to a lesser extent. This finding 
reconnects with our earlier observation that micro firms although reacting to this condition 
in the same way as large firms and SMEs, might not be as 'quick' in making an equity-
oriented financing decision as their larger counterparts. The lack of formal strategic 
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planning and missing appetite for growth-related projects (Mead and Liedholm, 1998), 
contribute to the build-up of excessive costs which in most cases micro firms cannot afford 
to bear. Also, Stock market capitalisation is significantly positive across all firm sizes. We 
observe that the significance is equal for all firm sizes at 5% level. This finding suggests 
that liquid stock markets in transition economies encourage firms of different sizes to opt 
for equity capital and become publicly traded companies. Finally, of the group of 
managerial indicators International Experience is significantly positive in the case of all 
firm sizes, with 1 % significance level in the case of large firms and SMEs, and 10% 
significance level in the case of micro firms. This implies that the presence of managers 
'Yith international experience is always a factor which encourages firms to consider using 
equity capital and becoming a publicly traded company. International experience of 
managers ads to their managerial confidence and may encourage moving away from 
traditional ways of leading their business (Hutzschenreuter et aI., 2007). We add that this 
also applies to their financing decisions. 
So far, our findings have shown that there are factors which affect all firms in the 
economy irrespective of their size. However, we further observe that there some factors 
which influence more SME and micro firms and do not exhibit any effect on large firms. 
We find, congruent with our conceptualisation, that these factors are primarily institutional 
and managerial ones. We discuss these next. 
Firstly, we observe that in the case of micro firms the macro-economic variable of 
Inward FDI emerges as significantly negative (Model 2.4.) but displays no significance in 
the case of large firms (Model 2.2.) or SMEs (Model 2.3.). This would suggest that 
increased inward FDI decreases the number of micro firms opting for equity finance, but 
not large firms or SMEs. We reason that increased levels of FDI create more competition 
within the corporate s~ctor with the in-coming firms crowding out micro firms. By taking 
on the roles of micro firms in an economy, the new firms simultaneously remove some of 
their growth potential. This explains the limited interest of micro firms in equity finance in 
the case of increased levels of inward FDI. 
Furthermore, we note that the institutional indicator of Corruption is significantly 
positive in the case of micro firms (at 5% level) despite the fact that this indicator is not 
statistically significant in the case of large firms (Model 2.2.), SMEs (Model 2.3) or the 
total number of firms (Model 2.1.). This would indicate that in the case of micro firms a 
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less corrupt institutional system triggers these firms' interest in equity financing. Also, 
another institutional indicator, Bureaucracy quality, displays positive significance for 
micro firms (at 10% level), but not for large firms or SMEs. This would suggest that more 
in the case of micro firms than large firms or SMEs, a less corrupt institutional system with 
an efficient bureaucratic system leads to a higher number of public firms. We reason that 
while large firms and SMEs can easier absorb the increased contracting and coordinating 
costs associated with corrupt institutional systems and inefficient bureaucracy, micro firms 
do not have such resourcefulness. In their case, therefore, these institutional conditions 
playa primary role when making a strategic decision to adopt an equity-oriented financial 
model. 
We also observe that the managerial indicator of Worker motivation is significantly 
positive in the case of micro firms (at 5% level) and SMEs (at 10% level). This would 
indicate that if SMEs and micro firms possess a corporate culture of continuous 
improvement, such resource is likely to lead these firms to equity financing. This resource 
does not have to be embraced by managers in large firms for them to consider becoming 
publicly traded companies. Another managerial indicator - Adaptability, is significantly 
positive only in the case of micro firms. This would imply that the higher the number of 
micro firms with adaptable managers, the higher the number of firms which opt for equity 
finance as their external source of capital. Managers in large firms and SMEs do not have 
to possess this particular capability for their firm to opt for equity financing. These 
findings go in line with our conceptualisation that mostly micro firms, and to some extent 
also SMEs, require the presence of adequate managerial conditions for them to execute the 
decision to become publicly traded companies. 
Our last observation gives validity to our third proposition (Proposition 2c). We note 
a significant result for large firms and SMEs, but not for micro firms in the category of 
macro-economic variables. The variable of Balance of trade is significantly negative only 
in the case of large firms and SMEs (at 1 % level) and not significant in the case of micro 
firms. This would imply that the macro-economic performance of a country in terms of its 
imports and exports affects more the large firms and the SMEs. This observation also goes 
in line with our earlier proposition that strategic decisions of micro firms are to a larger 
extent affected by the conditions in their immediate (micro) environment than the national 
macro-economic environment. 
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Based on our findings in this section we conclude that the impact of macro-
economic, institutional and managerial conditions is dissimilar for different firm sizes. 
This observation is in line with our proposition 2. Furthermore, we observe the number of 
large public firms in the transition economies of the CEECs is driven primarily by the 
macro-economic and institutional conditions. We also note that the number of public 
SMEs depends on the quality of macro-economic, institutional, and managerial conditions. 
Lastly, we identify the institutional and managerial conditions as the primary driving 
forces of the strategic decision to become public in the case of micro firms. These findings 
are in line with our propositions 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
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Table 7.2.: Estimations RatioPublic for Different Finn Sizes 
Table 2 Estimations RatioPublic Firm Sizes 
ModeI2.1. Model 2.2. Model 2.3. Model 2.4. 
Variable Name STATA Label Total Large Firms SMEs Micro Firms 
GDP per head Igdp_per_ 0.01926*** 0.03669** 0.01638*** 0.00179** 
~0.00447) ~0 . 02583) ~0 . 00438) ~0 . 00078 ) 
Lendi ng interest lending_ 0.00002* 0.00017*** 0.00003*** 0.00002** 
rate ~0 . 00001) ~0.00005) ~0 . 00001) ~0 . 00001) 
-0.00018** 
,. ,. 
Inward FDI inwardJ -0.00022 -0.00011 -0.00006* 
"0.00008) ~0 . 00027) ~0 . 00007) ~0 . 00004) 
0.00016* 
,. 
Ba lance of trade balance_ 0.00150* ** 0.00029*** 0.00006 
"0.00009) ~0 . 00046) ~0 . 00008) ~0 . 00004) ,. ,. ,. 
Competition policy competit 0.00189 0.00205 0.00155 0.00034 
~0.00126) ~0.0089 9) ~00013 5) ~0 . 00059) 
II" ,. ,. 
Corruption corrupti 0.00048 -0.00059 -0.00003 0.00053** 
nO.00066) ~0 . 0023 9 ) ~0 . 0005 8 ) ~0 . 00024) ,. ,. ,. 
Law a nd order law_and_ 0.00018 -0.00198 -0.00001 0.00026 
~000068) ~0 . 00252) ~0 . 00054) ~0 . 00025) ,. ,. 
Bureaucracy bureaucr 0.00207* 0.00264 0.00107 0.00140*** 
quality ~0.00124) ~0 . 00496) ~0 . 00110) ~0 . 00043) 
Banking reform & bankingl -0.00553*** -0.01116** -0.00412*** -0.00281*** 
interest ra te liberali. ~0 . 00129) ~0 . 00552) ~0.00109) ~0 . 00053) 
Securities ma rkets & securiti 0.00268** 0.00156* 0.00191 * 0.00133** 
non-ba nk fi na n. i nst. "0.00174) ~0 . 00585) ~0 . 00147) ~0.00048) 
Nationa I commercia I rationational 
banks banks 0.04801 *** 0.13049*** 0.01415*** 0.1648* 
nO .01162) ~0.04740) ~0 . 01017) ~0 .00575) 
~0.00747 
,. ,. ,. 
Miscellaneous ratiomisc 0.01849 0.00181 -0.00111 
busi ness credit i nst. ~0 . 00546) ~0 .02466) ~0 . 00410) ~0 . 00222) 
Stock ma rket stock_ml 0.00008** 0.00024** 0.00007** 0.00002** 
capitalisation ~0 . 00003) ~0 . 00011) ~0 . 00003) ~0 .00001) 
~ ,. 
0.00097* Worker motivation worker_m 0.00069 0.00573 0.00037** 
~0.00060) ~0 . 00224) ~0 . 00052) ~000020) 
International in tern a t 0.00156** 0.00779*** 0.00167*** 0.00015* 
experi ence '10 .00069) ~0.00267) ~000058) ~0 . 00021) ,. ,. 
Ada pta bi I ity adaptabi -0.00093 -0.00378 0.00084 0.00034* 
"0 .00062) ~0 .00230) ~000052) ~0.00026) ,. ,. ,. 
Entrepreneurs hi p entrepre -0.00055 -0.00193 -0.00051 -0.00018 
1'!0.00050) ~0.00184) ~0 . 00042) ~0 . 00019) 
_co ns -0.12421 *** -0.05827 -0.09553 ** -0.00137 
~0 . 03871) ~0 . 20830) ~0 . 0 3 68 8) ~0.00674) ,. ,. ,. 
N 130 130 130 130 
... ,. ,. ,. 
F 255 .11891 339.41204 384.24526 209.93053 
R 0.9883 0.9873 0.9898 0.9847 ... ,. ,. ,. 
II 648.92178 467.83635 671.18411 750.71188 ... ,. ,. ,. 
aic -1.22e+03 -8.58e+02 -1.26e+03 -1.45e+03 
Ti me effects 2.52** 3.45** 3.27** 1.28 
Included yes yes yes no 
Country effects 145.66*" 99 .08 *** 153.96*** 69.33 *** 
Included yes yes yes yes 
t-s tatistics are in parantheses 
*** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level 
Source: Author's estimations in Stata 
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7.3.1.3. Estimations RatioPublic Controlling for Three Different Groups of CEECs 
The tests reported in Table 3 (7.3.) aim to reflect the nature of the relationship between our 
dependent variable and independent variables when controlling for three different groups 
of CEECs in terms of their equity culture development as concluded in the clustering 
analysis in Chapter 6. We tagged these groups Leaders (CEECs displaying the best 
potential for equity culture development), Potentials (CEECs displaying some potential for 
equity culture development) and Laggards (CEECs displaying little potential for equity 
culture development). Controlling for these different groups reduced our sample of 130 
observations to 42 in the case of Leaders, 45 in the case of Potentials and 43 in the case of 
Laggards. In these regressions we control for the total number of firms as breaking them up 
by firm size would result in a very small number of observations and thus not enough 
degrees of freedom. 
We notice that our estimations yield only one result when a variable is significant in 
all three groups. It is the macro-economic indicator of Lending interest rate that is 
significant in all three regressions (at 10% level). This would imply that a higher lending 
interest rate in a country leads to a higher number of firms opting for equity capital 
irrespective of that country's status of equity culture development. Other indicators affect 
primarily one or in some cases two groups. These are now discussed group by group. 
Firstly, our estimations show that in the case of the group of Leaders the better the 
securities laws and regulation, the more firms opt for equity financing and become publicly 
traded companies (Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions is significantly 
positive at 5% level). Also, in this group the number of public companies increases if there 
are liquid equity markets (Stock Market Capitalisation is significantly positive at 10% 
level) and if there is international experience within the management team of their firms 
(International experience is significant positive at 5% level). This implies that in the case 
of the group of Leaders it is the presence and functioning of equity-related financial 
intermediaries and the presence of adequate managerial capabilities which lead to an 
increase the demand for equity finance. 
Secondly, we observe for the group of Potentials that the number of public firms is 
higher the better the securities laws and regulation are (Securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions is significantly positive at 10% level), the stronger and more impartial 
their legal system is (Law and order is significantly positive at 5% level) and the more 
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efficient their bureaucratic system is (Bureaucracy Quality is significantly positive at 
10%). However, the presence of Miscellaneous business credit institutions causes a 
decreased 'interest' of firms in using equity finance as their external source of capital 
(negative significance at 10% level). This suggests, that firms in this group are likely to 
consider other sources of credit supply if they are incurring excessive costs related to bank 
loans rather than opting for equity as a straight forward alternative. Our next finding 
further advances this argument. 
In our earlier results (Table 1 (Model 1.4.) and Table 2 - all models) the macro-
economic indicator of CDP per head exhibits positive significance. This suggests that 
when we produce estimations controlling for our sample of ten CEECs as one group and 
also when we control for different firm size, the higher the GDP per head in a country the 
more firms opt for equity finance. However, we find that when we control for individual 
country groups, the indicator of GDP per head generates significantly negative result (at 
1 % level) for the group of Potentials. This would suggest that in this group increased GDP 
per head is not associated with an increased demand of firms for equity finance. The 
macro-economic advancement in these countries thus seems to be linked to firms' demand 
for sources of external capital other than equity. We reason that this is related to these 
countries' institutional systems, which in the case of this group's member countries (as of 
2008: Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia) are indeed similar to those observed in bank-
based systems (EBRD, 2006) and to the existence of other than bank loan credit providing 
institutions (Orbis, 2008). Thus, in this group macro-economic advancement 'fuels' 
demand for bank finance, for which there is an established institutional and financial 
intermediary support. Based on our observations for the group of Potentials we therefore 
maintain that the demand for equity finance may increase subject to adequate institutional 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the legal and bureaucratic systems coupled 
with the presence and functioning of equity related financial intermediaries. 
Lastly, we find that in the case of the Laggards group inward FDI emerges 
significantly negative (at 10% level), which is not the case for the groups of Leaders or 
Potentials. This would imply that more in the group of Laggards than the other two groups, 
increased levels of inward FDI have a negative effect on the number of firms opting for 
equity finance. National government statics of this group's member countries (as of 2008: 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania) state that investment flows from the OECD area account for 
over 90% of FDI in Bulgaria and Romania and about 88% in Lithuania (NIS-Romania, 
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2008; NSI-Bulgaria, 2008; SO-Lithuania, 2008). OECD (2009) states that the largest 
sources of FDI are these countries' main trading partners: Austria, Germany, Greece and 
Italy. Flows of FDI predominantly coming from these countries, which are characterised 
for their bank-dominated systems (Amable, 2003), explains the negative effect of inward 
FDI on the development of a healthy public corporate sector. 
Furthermore, the institutional variables of Banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation, National commercial banks, and Miscellaneous business credit institutions 
also display negative effects on the number of firms opting for equity finance (at 10% level 
and 5% level respectively). This would suggest that specifically in this group of CEECs an 
improvement of institutional conditions in the banking sector, a high proportion of national 
commercial banks, and the presence of miscellaneous intermediaries (offering other than 
bank loan short-term credit) decrease the number of firms choosing equity finance. We 
reason that improved banking rules and regulation together with an increased number of 
banking and other short-term credit providing institutions create competitive conditions in 
the banking sector. This contributes to lower transaction costs associated with bank finance 
for firms from the Laggards group, and therefore these firms do not have an incentive to 
consider an alternative source of finance - equity capital. 
However, we observe that in this group there are two indicators which exhibit 
positive significance on the dependent variable RatioPublic. Firstly, the institutional 
indicator of Corruption displays positive significance at 10% level which suggest that the 
less corrupt institutional systems these countries produce, the more firms opt for equity 
finance. Secondly, within the managerial variables the most notable result is the change of 
the negative sign on Entrepreneurship to a significant positive sigri in the case of the this 
group. This suggests that entrepreneurial characteristic of management teams in the group 
of Laggards leads to an increased demand for equity finance. Interestingly, although short 
of significance, the result remains negative in the case of Leaders and Potentials. This 
suggests that entrepreneurial qualities of managers are not associated with an increased 
demand for equity finance in these two groups. Based on our findings we observe that in 
the case of the Laggards group an increased demand for equity finance is determined by a 
combination of conditions stemming from fundamental macro-economic, and adequate 
institutional and managerial environments. 
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From the analysis of this section we can conclude that there are differences between 
our three groups of CEECs in terms of macro-economic, institutional and managerial 
conditions affecting the demand for equity finance. While in the first group of more 
advanced CEE economies - the Leaders, an increased demand for equity finance depends 
on the existence and proficient functioning of financial intermediaries, in the second group 
of Potentials it is in addition to these also a deeper institutional reform that is required. The 
group of Laggards is most complex, as in this group a number of macro-economic, 
institutional and managerial issues require reforming attention so that a sustainable 
increased demand for equity financing can be facilitated. 
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Table 7.3. : Estimations RatioPublic for Different Groups ofCEECs 
Table 3 Estimations RatioPublic EC Type 
(Total Number of Firms) 
Model 3.1. Model 3.2. Model 3.3. 
Variable Name STATA Label Leaders Patentials Laggards 
GDP per head Igdpyer_ 0.00604 -0.00363*** rO.00676 
~0 . 00861) , 0 .00083) ,0.01265) 
Lendi ng interest lending_ 0.00038* 0.00005* 0.00002* 
rate ~0 . 00019) ' 0.00003) '0.00001) ., 
Inward FDI inwardJ 0.00016 -0.00001 -0.00031 * 
'10 .00014) , 0.00003) , 0.00016) ., ., 
Balance of trade balance_ 0.00010 -0.00002 0.00037 
~0 . 0002 7 ) , 0 .00004) ,0 .00022) ., ., 
Competition policy competit 0.00699 0.00184 -0.00024 
~0 . 00395) , 0 .00079) ,0.00180) ., 
Corruption corrupti 0.00079 -0.00024 0.00335* 
~0 . 00125) , 0 .00014) , 0 .00153) 
0.00119** 
., 
Law a nd order law_and_ -0.00077 -0.00040 
! 0 .00204) , 0 .00044) ,0 .00148) ., 
Bureaucracy bureaucr 0.00067 0.00123* -0.00219 
quality ~0 . 00357) , 0 .00061) , 0 .00343) ., 
Banking reform & bankingl -0.00523 0.00057 -0.00367* 
interest rate liberali. ~0.00378) , 0 .00038) , 0 .00196) ., 
Secur iti es markets & securiti 0.00331** 0.00045* -0.00412 
non-ba nk fi na n. i nst. ~0 . 00291) , 0 .00029) ,0.00291) 
National rationational 
., 
commercia l banks banks 0.19382 0.00079 -0.01574* 
'10.11436) ' 0.00559) , 0.01659) 
Miscellaneous ratiomisc -0.02594 -0.00705* -0.04456** 
business credit inst. ~0.02936) , 0 .00356) ,0.01967) ., 
Stock ma rket stock_ml 0.00003* 0.00000** 0.00006 
capitalisation (0 .00007) (0 .00001) (0 .00007) 
Worker motivation worker_m 0.00127 0.00005 -0.00146 
(0.00147) (0.00019) (0.00346) 
International internat 0.00147** -0.00029 0.00073 
experience (0.00140) (0 .00023) (0 .00088) 
Ada pta bi I ity adaptabi -0.00077 0.00000 0.00084 
(0 .00081) (0 .00022) (0 .00133) 
Entrepreneurs hi p entrepre -0.00063 -0.00009 0.00187* 
(0 .00097) (0 .00016) (0 .00103) 
_cons -0.07698 0.02961 *** 0.00976 
(0 .082 27) (0 .00663) (0 .11597) 
N 42 45 43 
F 335.21298 1.46e+03 3.96e+03 
R 0.9976 0.9985 0.9983 
II 259.60855 312 .01907 260.08022 
aic -4.5 1e+02 -5.78e+02 -4.54e+02 
Ti me effects 4.27** 1.78 3.47** 
Included yes no yes 
Cou ntry effects 5.06** 181.20*** 90.69*** 
Incl uded yes yes yes 
t -stati st ics are in parantheses 
*** stati st ica lly signif ica nt at 1% level, ** stat is t ica lly signifi cant at 5% level, * statistica l ly significant at 10% level 
Source: Author's estimations in Stata 
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7.3.2. Estimations: Dependent Variable RatioPrivate5 
The next set of estimations is carried out for our second dependent variable expressed as 
the ratio of private firms with more than five shareholders over the total number of firms 
(RatioPrivate5). It is important to mention that although we regard this variable as another 
proxy to measure the level of equity culture development in a country (as conceptually 
explained in Chapter 3); we also see it as a competitive alternative to our first variable -
RatioPublic. This is to say, that we realise that in order for firms to access equity capital 
they do not have to go public but they can choose to remain privately owned. We see the 
'by equity financed yet privately owned' structure as an interim stage between being 
privately held with none or very small number of owners (less than five) and becoming 
publicly traded. It can be therefore said, we consider it being the first stage of equity 
culture development in a country. 
When we perform estimations for this dependent variable (RatioPrivate5) we notice, 
that a slightly different set of independent variables take on the role of predictors and that 
the performance of some replicated variables differs in terms of significance and/or signs. 
This is somewhat expected as in this instance we measure the demand for equity finance 
from a different perspective - examining firms that are not publicly traded yet have a 
higher than usual (for a private firm) number of owners (shareholders). In particular the 
indicators of Balance a/trade, Services and the managerial indicator of Worker motivation 
have a distorting effect on the performance of other indicators (i.e. changing the signs and 
significance levels of other regressors), and therefore we choose not to include them in our 
estimations. On the other hand, we find that some variables not applied in the RatioPublic 
model gain in significance in this model, and therefore we decide to include them in our 
estimations. These are the institutional indicator of Investment Advice and the managerial 
indicator of Finance skills. 
As with our first dependent variable in table 1 (7.1.) we start with a basic model 
which includes macro-economic independent variables (Model 4.1.), then add institutional 
variables (Model 4.2.), followed by variables representing the quantitative presence and 
quality of financial intermediaries (Model 4.3.) and finally managerial variables (Model 
4.4.). Model 4.4. (Table 7.4.) is the final model we arrive at in the estimation process and 
which we use for further analysis when controlling for different firm sizes (Table 7.5.) and 
different CEE groups (Table 7.6.). In the interest of simplicity and flow of argument we 
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extensively comment only on those results which differ from the first set of estimations or 
produce more material for our argument. 
7.3.2.1. Estimations RatioPrivate5 for the Total Number of Firms 
By contrast to our estimation results in Table 7.1., the macro-economic indicator GDP per 
head and the institutional indicators of Securities markets and non-bank financial 
intermediaries and Investment Advice emerge as significantly negative in our estimations 
(at 1 %, 10% and 5% levels respectively). This would imply that the higher the GDP in a 
country, the better the securities regulation and the more finance companies providing 
investment advice exist, the fewer firms in this country's corporate sector increase the 
ownership of their firms to five or more shareholders and stay private. Based on our earlier 
results we suggest that an improved economic performance of a country (here measured 
with GDP per head), better regulation of the securities markets and an increased presence 
of firms offering investment advice lead firms to increase their number of shareholders, opt 
for equity finance and become publicly traded companies rather than go through the 
'intermediate stage of transition' and increase the number of owners, use equity finance but 
remain privately owned. 
Furthermore, we observe that Corruption is consistently significantly negative at 5% 
level. This would imply that a less corrupt system does not necessarily increase the number 
of private firms with five or more shareholders. Our finding does not go against the 
empirically proven fact that equity financing is more popular in countries with less corrupt 
institutional systems (Kim and Kenny, 2007; Lau et aI., 2007), but merely suggests that 
uncorrupted institutional systems do not have a direct influence on the increase of firms in 
a country's private sector with a bigger shareholder base. We reason that a less corrupt 
institutional system provides assurance to their private firms that the existing system is 
efficient, that a fair competition within the financial intermediaries sector is present, and 
therefore, that the privately owned firms get a fair credit deal from their existing capital 
providers. However, we find that the institutional indicator of Law and order, has a direct 
positive influence (at 5% level) on the number of private firms with an increased 
'shareholder base. This indicates that a strong and impartial legal system and an effective 
application of law in a country affect the private sector in such a way that individual firms 
increase the number of their shareholders and thus adopt equity as an alternative option to 
their traditional sources of finance. When private firms increase their shareholder base they 
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do not have the level of legal protection and mandatory transparency which public firms 
gain and have to abide by under the umbrella of institutionalised stock exchanges. 
Therefore, in the case of private firms a stimulus from the legal system in the form of 
strengthened rules serves as an incentive for them to increase the shareholder base and 
benefit from equity finance. 
Finally, we find from our set of managerial variables that there are two variables 
which emerge significant in the final observation. These are Finance skills and 
Adaptability (positive significance at 10% and 5% levels respectively). Our findings 
suggest that private firms which employ managers who have the capabilities of good 
finance skills and are adaptable to new business conditions, are more likely to increase 
their ownership base and thus consider getting involved in an equity-based ownership 
relationship. In line with our conceptualisation, we reason that managers with such 
capabilities are more confident and willing to take new and riskier strategic decisions. 
Based on our findings in this analysis we find that a combination of macro-
economic, institutional and managerial factors influence the number of private firms with 
five or more shareholders in a country. This finding is congruent with our first proposition 
presented in our conceptual framework (Chapter 3) despite the fact that we adopted a 
different measure of a corporate sector's demand for equity financing. Nex~ we carry out 
estimations with the same dependent variable (RatioPrivate5) when controlling for 
different firm sizes (Table 7.5.) and different CEE groups (Table 7.6.). 
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Table 7.4.: Estimations RatioPrivate5 (Total Number of Firms) 
Table 4 Estimations RatioPrivateS (Total Number of Firms) 
Variable Name STATA Label Model 4.1. Model 4.2. ModeI4.3. Model 4.4. 
GDP per head Igdp_per_ -0.04480*** -0.04180*** -0.03706*** -0.03824*** 
~0 . 00287) ~0 .00290) ~0 .00357) ~0 .003 57) 
r' r' 
Lendi ng interest lending_ 0.00001 * 0.00002** 0.00001 0.00001 
rate ~0.0000 1) ~0 .00001) ~0 .00001) ~0 . 00001) 
r' 
Inward FDI inwardJ -0.00009 -0.00011* -0.00009* -0.00008 
'10 .00005) ~0 . 00006) ~0 . 00005) ~0 . 00005) 
r' r' r' 
Competition Pol icy competit -0.00279** -0.00165 -0.00105 -0.00133 
'10 .00133) ~0 . 00108) ~0 .00 124) ~0 .00 1 22) 
Corruption corrupti -0.00148** -0.00142** -0.00115** 
~0 . OO057) ~0 . 00055) ~0 . 00052) 
r' 
0.00160** 0.00144** La wand order law_and_ 0.00102 
~0 . 00067) ~0 .00067) ~0 . OO062) 
r' ,- r' 
Bureaucracy bureaucr -0.00119 -0.00050 -0.00070 
quality ~0 . 00118) ~0 . 00119) ~0.00103) ,- ,- ,-
Banking reform & bankingl 0.00053 -0.00069 -0.00088 
interes t rate Ii bera Ii . ~0 .00125) ~0 . 00137) ~0 . 00138) 
r' 
Securities markets & securiti -0.00342*** -0.00170 -0.00185* 
non-bank fin an. inst. ~0 .0009 7) ~0 . 00107) ~O .OO107) 
National commerc ial rationational 
r' r' 
banks banks -0.03163 0.02641 
~0 . 02680) ~0 . 02662) 
Miscellaneous ratiomisc -0.03426* 
r' 
-0.02829 
business credit inst. ~0 . 01814) ~0 . 01893) 
I nvestment advice ratioinvestment -0.19088* -0.16752** 
~0 . 06791) ~0 . 06821) 
Finance ski ll s fin on ce_ 0.00063* 
~0 . OO054) 
r' 
International in tern 0 t 0.00050 
experi ence ~0.00054) 
Ada ptabi I ity adaptabi 0.00118** 
'0 .00051 ) 
r' 
Entrepreneurs hi p entrepre -0.00100 
~0 . 00063) 
_cons 0.45927*** 0.43666 *** 0.41739 *** 0.42664 *** 
ITO.02448) '0 .02386) ~0 . 03262) ~O . 03084) 
r' r' ,-
N 130 130 130 130 
r' r' r' 
F 1.25e+03 1.18e+03 1.25e+03 1.06e+03 
R 0.9940 0.9951 0 .9956 0.9960 
" r' r' r' II 640.14416 652.49747 660.16002 666 .62261 ,- r' r' 
aic -1.22e+03 -1.24e+03 -1.25e+03 -1.25e+03 
Ti me effects 14.42 *** 16.83*** 9.26*** 10.77*** 
Included yes yes yes yes 
Country effects 1323.43 *** 777 .29*** 803 .94 *** 558.15 *** 
Incl uded yes yes yes yes 
t-stat is tics are in parantheses 
*** sta ti sti ca II y s ignif i ca nt at 1 % level , ** statis t i ca II y sign i fi ca nt at 5% level, * sta t i st ica II y s i gnifi ca nt at 10% level 
Source: Author's estimations in Stala 
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7.3.2.2. Estimations RatioPrivate5 Controlling for the Different Firm Sizes 
The regressions in Table 7.5. seek to test how the relationship between our dependent 
(RatioPrivate5) and independent variables evolves when we control for different firm 
sizes. These estimations thus examine whether our propositions 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c hold for 
dependent variable RatioPrivate5 as we earlier observed it is the case for the dependent 
variable RatioPublic. 
Firstly, we observe that there are some indicators which produce significant results 
for all firm sizes. The macro-economic indicator of GDP per head emerges strong in all 
three models - in the case of Large firms (Model 5.2.), SMEs (Model 5.3.) and Micro 
firms (Model 5.4.) at 1 % significance level. This suggests that the higher the GDP in a 
country the fewer private firms irrespective of their size increase their shared ownership to 
five or more shareholders. As explained in the previous section, we believe, that when 
macro-economic performance of a country improves, firms tend to directly opt for 
becoming publicly traded companies rather than private firms with an increased number of 
shareholders. 
Although Lending interest rate does not emerge significant when controlling only for 
the total number of firms, interestingly we observe significant results in the estimation 
work when controlling for three different firm sizes. In the case of large firms a 
significantly negative result (at 5% level) implies that an increased lending interest rate 
does not result in these firms increasing their shareholder base and yet remaining private. 
A strong significance in an earlier model (Model 2.2.) suggests that high lending interest 
rate triggers large finns' intention to go public. However, the same observation does not 
hold for SMEs and micro firms. Our results indicate that in these two firm sectors an 
increased interest rate, instigates private firms' interest in equity financing with an aim to 
remain in private hands. SMEs and primarily micro firms do not have the same resources 
as large firms (Filatotchev et aI., 2007), and therefore for them the strategic decision of 
becoming a public company is associated with high transaction costs. Thus they adopt the 
interim option of using equity yet remaining private which is for them more cost feasible. 
Next, we notice that there are a number of factors which influence the group of 
Micro firms specifically. Negative effect is observed from the macro-economic indicator of 
inward FDf (at 1 % level), institutional indicator of Securities markets and non-bank 
financial intermediaries (at 1% level), National commercial banks (at 10% level) and 
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Investment advice (at 5% level). This would suggest that increased levels of inward FDI, 
improved securities laws and regulation, and an increased number of national commercial 
banks or finance companies offering investment advice do not increase the number of 
private micro firms with a shareholder base of five or more. This finding confirms our 
earlier proposition that micro firms do not react to economic and institutional events 
stemming from the macro level to the same extent as SMEs and large firms. Indeed, our 
next findings confirm that specifically in the case of micro firms it is the presence of 
adequate managerial capabilities which may motivate these firms to move away from their 
traditional strategic choices. The managerial indicators of Finance Skills and Adaptability 
are significantly positive (at 10% level) only in the case of micro firms. This suggests that 
micro firms with managers who possess good finance skills and are adaptable to new 
business conditions are more likely to enlarge their shareholder base and benefit from 
equity finance. 
Lastly, we observe that there are some variables, primarily of macro-economic and 
institutional nature, which have an effect on large firms and SMEs but not on micro firms. 
Results from our estimations demonstrate that a less corrupt institutional system does not 
increase the number of large private firms and private SMEs with a shareholder base of 
five or more owners (Corruption is significantly negative at 1 % level). Our earlier results 
showed (Table 7.2.) that the same institutional condition does not have any effect on the 
number oflarge public firms and public SMEs (results exhibited the same (negative) sign 
but were short of significance). This suggests that a less corrupt system, when considered 
as a single indicator of institutional quality in a country, does not encourage more large 
firms or SMEs to use equity capital either through an enlarged shareholder base as private 
firms or public firm. On the other hand, we find that the presence of an impartial legal 
system has that effect, on large firms and SMEs (Law and order is significantly positive at 
10% level). This would suggest that in the case of large private firms and private SMEs an 
effective legal system encourages them to increase their shareholder base and thus benefit 
from equity finance. It is important to state that our results do not go against the empirical 
evidence provided in earlier works by, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (2002), Peng 
(2004) or Lau et al. (2007) that equity-based financial systems function better in 
transparent institutional systems characterised by the presence of an impartial legal system, 
low corruption and efficient bureaucracy, but merely suggest that the demand for equity 
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financing by large firms and SMEs may increase as a result of an improved legal system 
but not as a result of reduced corruption in a country's institutional system. 
Furthermore we find that in the case of private SMEs a substantial improvement in 
securities laws and regulation or an increased presence of finance companies offering 
investment advice does not provide an incentive to increase their shareholder base 
(Securities markets and non-bankfinancial intermediaries displays negative significance at 
10% level and Investment Advice shows significance at 5% level). In the case of large 
firms, these indicators display the same (negative sign), however are short of significance. 
Based on our earlier results from Table 7.2. we reason that an improvement in institutional 
conditions directly related to equity finance encourages large firms and SMEs to opt for 
equity finance through becoming a public company and not remaining private. 
Finally, we observe significant influence of one managerial variable in the case of 
large firms and SMEs. The indicator of Finance skills is significantly positive for SMEs (at 
5% level) and large firms (at 10% level). This finding suggests that the presence of 
management with good finance skills has a positive effect on private SMEs, and to lesser 
extent also large private firms, to increase their shareholder base and thus use equity 
finance for refinancing needs. Overall, however, managerial skills appear to be more 
important at the micro level. 
Our results in this section confirm our proposition 2, that different firm sizes are not 
affected to the same degree by macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions in 
their considerations to use equity capital. We also demonstrate that micro firms even with 
adequate institutional and macro-economic 'support' are not likely to opt for equity 
finance, unless they are motivated to do so as a result of more developed and adequate 
managerial capabilities. This finding is in line with our proposition 2c. We also find that 
large private firms and private SMEs are more likely to increase their shareholder base as a 
result of quality country legal system, however not necessarily as a result of low levels of 
corruption. The necessity of adequate managerial conditions is less important than it is in 
the case of micro firms. We also observe that in the case of large firms and SMEs adequate 
institutional and macro-economic conditions mean that these firms opt for becoming 
publicly traded companies rather than increasing their shareholders and remaining private. 
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Table 7.5 .: Estimations RatioPrivate5 for Different Firm Sizes 
Table 5 Estimations RatioPrivateS Firm Sizes 
Mode/S.l. Mode/S.2. Mode/S.3. Mode/ S.4. 
Variable Name STATA Label Total Lorge Firms SMEs Micro Firms 
GDP per head Igdp_per_ -0.03824*** -0.01212*** -0.03041*** -0.03231*** 
~0 .003 S7) ~0 . 00227) ~0 . 00426) ~0 . 00366) 
Lendi ng interest lending_ 0.00001 -0.00005** 0.00003** 0.00003*** 
rate '10.00001) ~0 . 00002) ~0 . 00001) ~0 . 00001) ,. ,. 
-0.00023*** Inward FDI inwardJ -0.00008 0.00006 -0.00009 
no .OOOOS) ~000007) ~0 . 00006) ~0 .00006) ,. ,. 
Competition Policy competit -0.00133 0.00243** 0.00113 -0.00313 
~0 . 00122) ~0 . 00107) ~0 . 001S6) ~0.00116) ,. 
Corruption co rrupti -0.00115* * -0.00262*** -0.00181*** 0.00065 
~0 .00052) ~o . ooos7) ~0 . 00060) ~0 . 00048) ,. 
Law a nd order law_and_ 0.00144** 0.00022* 0.00092* 0.00057 
~0 . 00062) ~0 . 00087) ~0 . 00068) ~o . ooos7) ,. ,. ,. 
Bureaucracy bureaucr -0.00070 -0.00626 -0.00047 -0.00175 
qual ity ~0 . 00103) ~0 . 00169) ~0 .00101) ~0 .00 108 ) ,. ,. ,. 
Ba nki ng reform & bankingl -0.00088 0.00353 -0.00091 -0.00257 
interest rate liberali. ~0 . 00138) ~0 . 00177) ~O .OOlSl) ~0.00119) 
Securities markets & securiti -0.00185* 
,. 
-0.00109 -0.00192* -0.00307*** 
non-bank finan. inst. ~0.00107) ~0.00204) ~0 . 00111) ~0 . 00113) 
National commercial ratianatianal 
,. ,. 
banks banks -0.02641 0.04141 0.07159 -0.01817* 
~0 . 02662 ) ~0 . 04021) ~002860) ~0 . 0238S) ,. ,. ,. 
Mi scell a neous ratiomisc -0.02829 0.02247 -0.06041 0.03055 
business credit inst. ~0 . 01893) ~0 . 02499) ~0.01934) ~0 . 01631) ,. 
I nves tment a dvi ce ratiainvestment -0.16752** -0.08887 -0.19123** -0.18476** 
~0 . 06821) ~0 . 12477) ~0 . 07455) ~0 . 075 9 7) 
Finance skills finance_ 0.00063 0.00183* 0.00064** 0.00079** 
~0.000S4) ~0.00073) ~o . ooos7) ~o . OOOSO) ,. ,. ,. 
International in tern a t 0.00050 0.00045 0.00051 0.00033 
experience ~0 . 000S4) ~0 . 000S8) ~0 . 00060) ~0.00048) ,. ,. 
Adaptability adaptabi 0.00118** -0.00015 0.00073 0.00068* 
~O . OOOSl) ~o . OOOSO) ~0 . 000S3) ~0 . 00046) ,. ,. ,. 
Entrepreneurship entrepre -0.00100 0.00080 -0.00050 -0.00053 
'10.00063) ~0 . 00054) ~0 .00067) ~0 . 00042) 
_cons 0.42664*** 0.2 1515 * ** 0.39134*** 0.32702 *** 
~0 . 03084) ~0 . 028 11) ~0 .03476) ~0 . 0 3 113) ,. ,. ,. 
N 130 130 130 130 ,. ,. ,. 
F 1.06e+03 3.21e+03 1.67e+03 393 .17254 
R 0.996 0.9976 0.9971 0.9915 
r ,. ,. ,. 
II 666.62261 608.12142 656 .01154 677.14345 
It- ,. ,. ,. 
aic -1.25e+03 -1.16e+03 -1.23e+03 -1.27e+03 
Ti me effects 10.77 *** 1.22 7.66*** 9.47 *** 
Included yes no yes yes 
Country effects 558.15*** 1469.49*** 616 .25*** 141.85 ** * 
Included yes yes yes yes 
t-statistics are in parantheses 
*** sta t istically significant at 1% level, ** statistically signif icant at 5% level, * statist ically signi f icant at 10% level 
Source: Author's estimations in Stata 
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7.3.2.3. Estimations RatioPrivate5 Controlling for Three Different Grollps of CEECs 
The tests reported in Table 6 (7.6.) seek to test how selected variables affect our dependent 
variable (in this case RatioPrivate5) when controlling for three different groups of CEECs 
(Leaders, Potentials, Laggards) in terms of their potential for equity culture development as 
concluded in the clustering analysis in Chapter 6. As in the earlier section, controlling for 
these different groups reduced our sample of 130 observations to 42 in the case of Leaders, 
45 in the case of Potentials and 43 in the case of Laggards. We perform the estimations 
controlling for the total number of firms, as breaking them up according to different firm 
size would reduce the sample size to a statistically unacceptable level. 
Our estimations demonstrate that different groups of countries are affected by 
different macro-economic, institutional and managerial variables. We also reveal that in 
some cases firms leave out the interim stage of using equity (through remaining privately 
owned) and directly opt for public ownership. We discuss these next, group by group. 
Firstly, in the group of Leaders we notice a significant presence of two variables. 
Firstly, the macro-economic indicator of CDP per head is significantly negative at 1% 
level. This would imply that specifically in the group of Leaders higher GDP per head does 
not cause an increase of private firms with five or more shareholders. We tentatively 
speculate that in this group, a higher GDP per head has the effect of leading firms to an 
equity model financial structure through becoming publicly traded companies rather than 
staying in private hands. The result from Table 3, Model 3.1. supports this as the macro-
economic indicator of GDP per head exhibits the correct sign although being short of 10% 
significance. Secondly, the managerial indicator of Adaptability displays positive 
significance at 10% level. This result is not observed in the groups of Potentials or 
Laggards. This finding suggests that the presence of management which has the capability 
to quickly adapt to new business conditions can encourage private firms to increase their 
shareholder base to five or more shareholders and thus benefit from equity finance. 
Secondly, we observe that in the group of Potentials private firms are encouraged to 
increase their shareholder base through the presence of competitive markets (Competition 
Policy is significantly positive at 5% level), and an impartial legal system (Law and order 
is significantly positive at 10%). However, the presence of effective bureaucracy suggests 
an opposite effect - a decreased number of private firms opting for an enlarged shareholder 
ownership. An earlier observation from Table 3, Model 3.2. confirms that firms in the 
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group of Potentials are more likely to choose becoming publicly traded companies rather 
than remain privately owned should the presence of effective bureaucracy occur. 
Thirdly, we notice in the group of Laggards that the number of private finns with 
five or more shareholders does not increase as a result of an increased Lending interest rate 
(negative significance at 5% level), low Corruption (negative significance at 5% level) or 
effective bureaucratic system (Bureaucratic quality is significantly negative at 10%). This 
finding confinns our earlier observation (when used the RatioPublic proxy) that in the case 
of the group of Laggards, macro-economic and institutional conditions playa much more 
significant role than we observed for the groups of Leaders and Potentials. 
Findings from this section are important for two reasons. Firstly, they confinn, that 
when measuring demand for equity culture using either the proxy of RatioPublic or 
RatioPrivate5, our results are consistent. The demand for equity finance is in the group of 
Leaders affected the least by macro-economic and institutional conditions. In the group of 
Potentials the demand is affected primarily by institutional conditions and in the case of 
Laggards it is a complex set of macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions 
which have an impact on the demand for equity. Secondly, our findings from this section 
suggest that finns in the group of Leaders are more likely not to go through the 
intennediate stage of using equity capital and remaining privately owned but opt for 
directly becoming publicly traded companies. 
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Table 7.6.: Estimations RatioPrivate5 for Different Groups of CEECs 
Table 6 Estimations RatioPrivateS EC Type 
(Total Number of Firms) 
M odel 6.1. M odel 6. 2. M odel 6.3. 
Variable Name STATA Label Leaders Potentials Laggards 
GDP per head Igdpyer_ -0.05860*** -0.00253 -0.00261 
~O . O1374) ~O . O1307) ~O . O2120) 
r 
Lendi ng interest lending_ -0.00012 -0.00009 -0.00003** 
rate ~O . OOO32) ~O . OOO16) ~O . OOOOl) 
r r 
Inward FDI inwardJ 0.00001 -0.00010 0.00010 
~O . OOOO8) ~O . OOO13) ~O .OOO14) 
r 
Competition Pol icy competit 0.00186 0.00368** 0.00078 
~O.OO434) ~O . OO159) ~O . OO242) 
r 
Corruption co rrupti -0.00007 -0.00300 -0.00051 ** 
~O . OO164) ~OOOO85 ) ~O . OO143) 
r 
Law a nd order law_and_ -0.00183 0.00128* 0.00149 
~O . OO180) ~O .OO178) ~O . OO157) 
Bureaucracy bureaucr -0.00749 -0.00534** -0.00323* 
quality ~O . OO669) ~O . OO178) ~O .OO310) 
r r 
Banking reform & bankingl -0.00293 0.00152 -0.00269 
i nterest rate l ibera l i . ~O . OO361) ~O . OO232) ~O . OO303) 
r r 
Securiti es markets & securiti -0.00294 -0.00136 -0.00443 
non-bank fin an. i nst. ~O .OO262) ~O . OO158 ) ~O.OO8 30) 
National commercial ratio national 
r r 
banks banks -0.00032 0.07919 0.08120 
~O . O7193) ~O . O8163) ~O.22844) 
r r 
Mi scell aneous ratiomisc -0.00435 0.01230 -0.12986 
bus i ness credit i nst . nO.07007) ~O . O3875) ~O . 22414) 
~0 . 32616 r r Investment advice ratioinvestment 0.15658 -0.12820 
~O . 452 8 6) ~O30349) ~O . 44654) 
r r 
Finance skill s fin an ce_ -0.00063 -0.00072 0.00132 
~O . OO1 9 3) ~O . OOO74) ~O . OO123) 
r r 
Intern at ional internat -0.00011 0.00037 0.00063 
ex peri ence ~O . OOO71) ~O . OOO78 ) ~O . OO116) 
r r 
Ad aptabi l ity adaptabi 0.00262* 0.00084 0.00075 
~O . OO185) ~O . OOO50) ~O . OO257) 
r r 
Entrepreneurship entrepre -0.00001 -0.00157 0.00033 
~O .OOO62) ~O.OO100) ~O . OOl77) 
_cons 0.60979** ~0.18793 0.19057* 
~O . 17291) ~O . 11788) ~O .O88 72) 
r r 
N 42 45 43 
r r 
F 3.23e+03 4.07e+03 2.97e+03 
R 0.9997 0.9995 0.9994 
r r 
II 266 .61943 291.28264 266.78659 
r r 
aic -4.61e+02 -5 .0ge+02 -4.64e+02 
Ti me effects 6.69** 10.23** l.24 
Included yes yes no 
Cou ntry effects 20.66** 22.60** 39 .64 *** 
Included yes yes yes 
t-statistics are in parantheses 
*** statisti ca lly significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level 
Source: Author 's estimations in Stata 
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7.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter we test the relationship of our independent variables stemming from the 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments on our dependent variable, 
which reflects the demand for equity financing and through our conceptualisation, the level 
of equity culture development in a country. We proxy for such demand in two ways. 
Firstly, we use the measure of the ratio of public firms over total number of firms in a 
country (RatioPublic). Then, we apply a second measure expressed as a ratio of private 
firms with five or more shareholders over total number of firms. We believe that this 
second measure reflects the first stage of equity culture development in a country (i.e. 
when firms opt for equity finance through their larger shareholder base, yet remain 
privately owned). The character of our sample, panel data, leads us to using a fixed effects 
regression analysis. This specific type of linear regression enables us to control for country 
and time effects specific to our sample. 
We carry out a three-stage regression analysis for each of our dependent variables. 
Firstly, we demonstrate how we create the model and comment on the nature of variables 
which assert significant influence on the dependent variable. Our results using either proxy 
for equity finance demand are consistent and confirm our proposition from Chapter 3 that a 
combination of macro-economic, institutional and managerial factors have an effect on the 
level of equity culture development in a country. Results from this model primarily 
confirm findings of existing literature and are in line with our conceptualisation. 
Nevertheless, our contribution lies in the inclusion of managerial indicators, which, to our 
knowledge, is a novel academic input. 
Secondly, we use our final model from the first stage of the analysis to estimate the 
significance power of the identified independent variables individually on each dependent 
variable when controlling for three different firm sizes. This investigation aims to provide 
answers to our second set of propositions from Chapter 3. Again, using either dependent 
variable as a proxy confirms that our results are consistent and verify that the impact of 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial environments is dissimilar for different firm 
sizes. We observe, that the managerial environment has a stronger impact on Micro firms 
and to a lesser extent on SMEs but a limited influence on Large firms. We further find that 
the institutional environment affects all firm sizes almost to an equal degree. Lastly, we 
empirically establish that the macro-economic environment has a stronger impact for Large 
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firms and SMEs, however exerts less impact on Micro firms. Results from this section 
offer new findings, as the examination of the demand for equity finance by controlling for 
three different firm sizes is original in itself. 
Lastly, in our final set of regressions we demonstrate that equity culture development 
does not depend and indeed does not require the presence of the same macro-economic, 
institutional or managerial factors for every CEEC from our sample. Based on our results 
we reason that in the case of countries belonging to the group of Leaders (identified in our 
preceding empirical analysis in Chapter 6 as a group WIth the best potential for equity 
culture development) the progress of this group's macro-economic and institutional 
conditions satisfies the requirements for equity' culture development. It is primarily the 
existence and adequate functioning (i.e. quality) of financial intermediaries 'supplying' 
equity capital and the progress toward a more risk-taking behaviour at the managerial level 
of the corporate sector on which a successful development of an equity culture will 
depend. Then, based on our observations for the group of Potentials (identified in our 
preceding empirical analysis in Chapter 6 as a group with medium potential for equity 
culture development) we maintain that for a successful equity culture development this 
group is 'a step behind' the Leaders group as the development of an equity-related 
intermediary sector has to be coupled with adequate institutional reforms which yet have to 
be adopted. Finally, based on our results for the group of Laggards (identified in our 
preceding empirical analysis in Chapter 6 as a group with low potential for equity culture 
development) there is a need for a complex reform process to take place at the macro-
economic, institutional and managerial level should the development of a sustainable 
equity culture be desired. 
We specifically observe that in the case of countries belonging to the group of 
Laggards, inward FDI from countries with bank-based systems anchors these economies in 
the traditional bank-based system. This observation reinforces the notion of path 
dependency which we presented in our conceptual framework. However, our results 
demonstrate that high lending interest rates act as a catalyst in equity finance demand as 
they are increasing the transaction costs associated with bank finance. Also, the presence 
of miscellaneous credit institutions appears to prevent the Laggards and also Potentials 
from developing an equity culture. Poor institutional development also seems to keep the 
development of demand for equity culture behind. In particular, corruption leads to 
countries becoming Laggards and poor Law and order and high bureaucracy leads to 
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countries getting trapped in the group of Potentials. Nevertheless, entrepreneurial 
capabilities appear to be necessary to overcome some of the barriers toward increasing the 
demand for equity finance in the case of the group of Laggards, such as the high costs of 
bank-based finance associated with corrupt institutional environments. Importantly, 
international experience of managers appears to trigger the change of countries' position to 
belonging to the group of Leaders (subject to the presence of remaining pro-equity culture 
development conditions). 
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Chapter 8: Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
8.1. Introduction 
The first two stages of our empirical investigation were thorough variable-based 
examinations of our data. In this chapter we perform the third and final part of our 
empirical examination: a qualitative comparative analysis of the selection of three CEECs. 
Our comparative analysis has the character of a qualitative narration and it serves the 
purpose of an interpretation of soft elements of our data which could not be captured 
quantitatively. As previously explained in Chapter 4, our Methodology Chapter, the 
application of this method fulfils the sensitising role of results gained from the dominating 
quantitative investigation. Comparative analysis is central to empirical social science as it 
produces explanations for complex phenomena under observation (Ragin, 2009). We 
consider equity culture development a complex phenomenon, and therefore, we employ the 
comparative analysis in the final stage of our empirical analysis to provide context to our 
conceptual and quantitative findings. This final examination also allows us to put forward 
policy recommendations. Clearly, without this our examination would not be complete. 
The Co-Plot analysis in Chapter 6 was concluded with an identification of three 
groups of CEECs in terms of their potential for equity culture development. We 
distinguished between the groups of Leaders, Potentials and Laggards. In Chapter 7 we 
employed this categorisation by controlling for each group individually when carrying out 
the regression analysis. This enabled us to establish the nature of causal significance (or 
non-significance) from one group to another. Our findings suggest that in order for equity 
culture to develop in these three groups a different combination and level of macro-
economic, institution~l and managerial conditions has to be satisfied. In other words, this 
analysis enabled us to identify what keeps equity culture in certain CEECs from 
developing. 
We propose that in the case of the countries belonging to the Leaders group, the 
macro-economic and institutional conditions are in place and that it is the strengthening of 
the presence and quality of equity related financial intermediaries together with continuous 
building of adequate managerial capabilities within the corporate sector which need 
attention so that an equity culture can be developed. By contrast, we find for the group of 
Potentials that a 'package' of institutional conditions, equity related financial 
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intennediaries and managerial conditions needs attention. The results for the last group of 
Laggards suggest, that countries in this group are economically, institutionally and 
managerially the furthest from the development of an equity culture and therefore 
conditions stemming from all the three environmental forces require improving. 
In this section we aim to further utilise this grouping by selecting one country 
representative from each group and perfonn a comparative analysis between these 
representatives. The three representatives are Slovakia for the group of Leaders, Hungary 
for the group Potentials and Bulgaria for the group of Laggards. The justification of this 
selection is provided in the next section. 
This chapter is organised as follows: firstly, we give reasons for the selection of our 
three country representatives introduced above. Secondly, we outline the structure of the 
comparative analysis we follow when providing answers to and soft interpretation of our 
findings from the quantitative analysis. Then, we perfonn the comparative analysis by 
drawing on our quantitative results, bringing in new qualitative supportive evidence and 
cross-comparing the three individual cases. Finally, we summarise our findings in a brief 
conclusion. 
8.2. The Rationale behind Our Choices of Country Representatives 
The selection process reflects two underlying principles. Firstly, the selected country is a 
member of a group which it is chosen to represent, for the majority of the observation 
period and in the final year of our examination - year 2008. Secondly, a closer analysis of 
the chosen country enhances our understanding of countries with which it shares a group. 
An added element for the justification of our selection is our belief that that the selected 
countries are specifically interesting in their nature. 
Firstly, from the group of Leaders we select Slovakia, a CEEC which displays high 
potential for equity culture development. This country is present in the Leaders' group in 
all years under observation. We observe that it differs from its other two co-members, 
Czech Republic and Estonia, in tenns of its corporate sector's medium to high demand for 
equity financing despite very similar levels of conditions these three countries appear to 
share by the end of 2008 (see Chapter 6, Figures 6.2.-6.5.). We believe that this important 
difference requires further attention. 
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Secondly, from the group of Potentials we choose Hungary, a CEEC which in the 
first half of our research period seemed to have developed some of the supply conditions 
necessary for the development of equity culture. This causes Hungary to be part of the 
Leaders' group for a short period of time (around year 2000 - see Chapter 6, Figures 6.2.-
6.5.). However, toward the end of the observation period Hungary becomes a member of 
the Potentials' group. Despite this country's 'membership' of the leading group and then 
the group of Potentials, it still displays low demand for equity finance. Therefore, in this 
case we are interested in providing answers as to what the reasons are for this observed 
'reversal' of equity culture development. 
Lastly, we include Bulgaria in our comparative analysis as a representative for the 
group of Laggards. Bulgaria exhibits limited presence of conditions necessary for equity 
culture development with an exception in year 2000 when it briefly joins the group of 
Potentials (see Chapter 6, Figures 6.2.-6.5.). However, we find Bulgaria to be a unique 
case, as it displays a high demand for equity financing when compared not only to its co-
members but also to other countries from the groups of Leaders and Potentials. We believe 
that this needs to be further examined. Our comparative analysis with the input of 
additional qualitative data presents an ideal opportunity to explore the specificities of these 
individual cases and highlights the importance of other qualitative factors in influencing 
financial system development and equity culture development in particular. 
8.3. The Structure of the Comparative Analysis 
The rationale of the comparative analysis is twofold. Firstly, we aim to provide a historical 
approach to the financial system development path of our three selected CEECs. Secondly, 
we intend to discuss key country characteristics of each representative by bringing in new 
qualitative data. The 'sources of data we primarily use are the EBRD, OECD and World 
Bank reports, and information from the National Statistical Offices of the selected three 
countries. Importantly, we consistently suggest links to equity culture development as 
proposed in our conceptual framework (Chapter 3) and empirically assessed through the 
clustering and benchmarking method of Co-Plots (Chapter 6) and regression analysis 
(Chapter 7). The structure of the forthcoming analysis is thus as follows: 
1. Transitional Process - this section provides information on the pre-transition and early 
transition period and the existence of historical or other (e.g. commercial) links with 
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other European countries. Information of this character is vital for the comprehensive 
understanding of the type of financial systems our chosen countries have selected, yet 
is not covered in our database. Therefore, it has its place in this analysis. In this section 
we mainly focus on the processes of democratisation, financial liberalisation, and 
privatisation in our selected countries. A closer analysis of the transformation process 
from centrally planned to market based and an examination of drivers and ways this 
transition was performed (e.g. the speed, type and level of the privatisation process) 
helps us to understand why and how the financial system has developed to its current 
form. The nature of this argument is captured in our conceptual framework in Chapter 3 
through the notion of path-dependency. 
2. Economic and Institutional Development - this section sheds more light on the macro-
economic and institutional trends, which, as we have observed through our earlier 
empirical examination in Chapters 6 and 7, emerged in the CEECs. We focus our 
discussion mainly on the issues of economic growth, stability and reforms. The 
selection of three representative countries enables us to achieve this in a more detailed 
approach for every country under observation. 
3. Development of the Banking and Market Sector - this section discusses interesting 
patterns that emerge from our sample specifically in the case of our three chosen 
countries in terms of institutions supplying equity capital - the financial intermediaries. 
We comment on issues related to this subject (e.g. the role of the Central Bank and 
regulation) which inevitably have an impact on the development of the banking and 
capital markets sectors, yet are not captured by our quantitative data. Again, the link to 
our conceptualisation is stressed in this section. 
4. The Corporate Sector: What Source of External Capital Do Firms Demand? - this 
section builds on our corporate data and discusses the financing patterns of firms, 
reflecting our conceptualisation and observations of our quantitative results. 
8.4. Three Countries - Three Different Stories 
8.4.1. Transitional Process 
One could argue that Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia due to their geographical proximity, 
communist past and the timing of the transition process have developed their financial 
systems in an identical way. However, the contrary is true. In fact, some argue (e.g. Shafik, 
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1995) that their communist past is the only feature these countries have in common. These 
three countries, just like other CEECs, have developed unique trade links, secured foreign 
investment from various sources and adopted different privatisation methods (Brown, 
1999; Stoian, 2007). Some imply that due to the 'individuality' of each post-communist 
country's transformation process it would be inappropriate to speak of one transition, 
rather than many distinctive transitions (Coricelli, 1998). 
Relevant literature suggests that there are two areas related specifically to the 
transition process of the CEECs, which have affected financing choices of firms and the 
direction of their financial system development (Hermes and Lensink, 2000a; McNulty et 
aI., 2007). These are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and its main driver - the 
privatisation process in the CEECs. We thus maintain that these two 'historical' influences 
need to be considered also in our analysis of the equity culture development in this 
geographical region. 
Privatisation 
Firstly, we address the process of transferring state ownership and government 
functions to the hands of the private sector - the privatisation (WorldBank, 1992). 
Universally, in our three selected CEECs the privatisation process was realised in two 
stages. In the first stage, privati sing was aimed at domestic buyers as the reluctance to sell 
home grown business to foreign hands was in the way of looking beyond individual 
countries' borders (Offe, 1996). Domestic buyers varied from individual citizens to various 
investment privatisation funds (IPFs). The establishment of IPFs enjoyed different success 
in our three selected CEECs. Therefore, this is where the similarities of the privatisation 
processes in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia end. 
While in Bulgaria IPFs enjoyed some success (Prohanska, 1997), still not to the same 
level of the Czech (i.e. Czech Republic) experience (Shafik, 1995). IPFs, as the first 
specific investment companies established in Bulgaria, had significant importance in the 
capital market development in this country and were the main drivers of the mass 
privatisation. They were expected to successfully fulfil the tasks of an intermediary for the 
formal transfer of state ownership to private hands (Prohanska, 1997). However, the 1999 
EBRD Transition Report (EBRD, 1999) concludes that in reality there were many 
drawbacks associated with the Bulgarian IPFs. The then existing Bulgarian banks 
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controlled most of the investment funds, which resulted in an over-concentrated and one-
sided ownership. Many of the privatised firms had outstanding loans to the banks, which 
resulted in price manipulation and false market creation. This points out to the corrupt 
environment of the Bulgarian newly democratised state. 
On the other hand, IPFs played a marginal role in Hungary and Slovakia and thus left 
the privatised interests in the hands of individual citizens (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997). 
However, while Slovakia sought to quickly undertake the privatisation process through a 
mass privatisation (Shafik, 1995), Hungarian privatisation was more careful and gradual 
(Kornai, 1997). In addition, we find other differences between the Hungarian and Slovak 
privatisation processes. While the privatisation by sale was almost exclusively the most 
preferred method in Hungary (and Bulgaria, for that matter), in Slovakia it was combined 
with another method - the voucher privatisation (EBRD, 1998). Bennett et al. (2007) find 
in their empirical work that voucher privatisation has been significantly associated with 
faster macroeconomic growth. However, they observe that privatisation by sale never 
exerts a significant independent influence on growth. 
Based on this brief comparison of Bulgarian, Hungarian and Slovak privatisation 
processes we can conclude that despite their close timing (i.e. early 1990s) they were 
dissimilar in their nature. Firstly, in Bulgaria, the private ownership was directed into the 
hands of newly established IPFs which dominated the privatisation market in an 
oligopolistic manner and thus created conditions for growing corruption and low 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the privatisation by sale adopted in Bulgaria did not lead to 
a significant macro-economic growth. Secondly, although Hungary avoided 'rushing' into 
privatisation and took a longer time to prepare the legal side for the upcoming transition 
changes (Wang, 1991), the method of privatisation by sale did not enhance macro-
economic growth. Lastly, Slovakia's state ownership was divided amongst its citizens, 
which led to a diffused type of corporate governance (Shafik, 1995). However, the 
combination of the method by sale and vouchers resulted in this country's faster macro-
economic improvement than in Hungary or Bulgaria. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
The second stage of privatisations came a few years later when the CEECs' 
governments realised the importance and significance of foreign investments for domestic 
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finns and economies (EBRD, 1999). As a result, privatisation became the main driver of 
FDI in these countries in the early transition period (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997). 
Nevertheless, in the early years of the transition process the infancy of the regulatory 
system together with insecure property rights and the return of the fonner communist party 
to power (to a bigger extent in Hungary than in Bulgaria or Slovakia) led to the generation 
of a poor FDI record (EBRD, 1998). Low FDI levels were also caused by the fact that 
these fonner centralised economies were still reluctant to make assets available to foreign 
investors. Selling countries' assets meant selling 'family silver' which encountered 
widespread political and public resistance. Furthennore, FDI meant purchasing of existing 
previously state owned assets rather than green-field projects which would require a lot of 
restructuring effort by the new investors (Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1997). 
In our conceptual framework we have demonstrated that depending on where the 
investment (inward FDI) is coming from has an impact on the financing choices domestic 
finns make and on the corporate practices they utilise. The phenomenon of path 
dependence is central here. We reason that individual countries and consequently finns 
within them either follow the established, 'tried-out' paths of business financing, or they 
assume the financing paths of their new owners or investors. Although in our previous 
empirical examination we were able include the indicator of inward FDI, which indeed in 
many cases exerted a significant influence on our dependent variable (Chapter 7, Tables 
7.1.-7.6), we suggested that in order to give our interpretation of quantitative results more 
validity a further investigation has to take place. This is where the 'strategy' of added 
qualitative infonnation adds value. 
The findings from our regression analysis (Chapter 7) imply that increased levels of 
inward FDI have a negative effect on the number of finns opting for equity finance. We 
further find that these results specifically hold in the case of the group of Laggards, for 
which Bulgaria is our chosen representative. We reason that this is caused by the bank-
dominated nature of the investor countries' financial systems. The National Statistical 
Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria (2008) reports that FDI flows primarily from the 
OEeD area counting for over 90% of the total inward FDI this country absorbs. The 
European countries of Gennany, Austria, Greece and Italy have been identified as the 
largest investors in this country (OECD, 2009). We maintain that as a result of these 
countries' bank-dominated systems (Amable, 2003), investors brought with them limited 
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home-grown appetite for equity finance. This explains why inward FDI has not been 
positively affecting the demand for equity finance. 
In the case of Slovakia, the primary sources of foreign investment were Germany, 
Austria and the Czech Republic, and relatively stable trading relations remained also with 
Hungary and Poland (Shafik, 1995). Later on, a new wave of investment came from France -
which was largely aimed at the automotive industry. The United Kingdom and the USA 
started to appear on the investors list only in the last few years (SO-SVK, 2008). As 
Germany, Austria and Czech Republic were significant investors, the governance models 
of the bank-oriented economies have had a chance to develop deep roots. However, the 
later increased investor interest from the UK and the USA appears to have started 'sowing 
the seeds' of equity oriented projects. Although this did not have an immediate governance 
changing effect on Slovak firms (EBRD, 2008b), the notion of equity finance started to 
playa more competitive role to bank finance than in the majority of other CEECs. 
FDI has played a vital role in the restructuring efforts of the Hungarian government 
since the beginning of the transition period in the early 1990s (Kornai, 1997). As in the 
other two CEECs, investors from the developed European countries account for the 
overwhelming majority of investments in Hungary. The Hungarian Statistical Office 
(2008) reports that for over a decade it annually amounts to 79%. Germany is by far the 
most important source of FDI, followed by Netherlands and Austria. USA is the largest 
non-European investor, its investment flow into this country is however smaller than that 
of Germany, Netherlands or Austria. The banking sector grew radically in the late 1990s 
and the FDI flow from almost exclusively bank-oriented European countries is by some 
seen as a reason for this. Nevertheless, the high concentration within the banking sector led 
to the sharpest fall of foreign investments in the first years of the new millennium and then 
again at even larger scale in 2008 that no other CEEC has experienced (EBRD, 2009). This 
was at a time when Slovakia, its neighbouring country, started to truly benefit from and 
during the crises was protected by a more diversified financial sector. 
Founded on the logic of inward FDI flows affecting the financing choices of local 
firms and thus the direction of a financial system development, we observe that our three 
selected countries vary in this respect. FDI flows to Bulgaria and Hungary primarily 
originated from countries with bank-dominated systems, while in the case of Slovakia the 
presence of investors from equity-oriented systems is noted. This is in line with our 
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findings in Chapter 7 which demonstrated that in the case of less transitionally progressed 
CEECs inward FDI from bank based systems led to a path-dependent behaviour and thus 
the dominance of banking systems. 
8.4.2. Economic and Institutional Development: The 'Must Haves' 
Capital structure in transition economies is affected by specific country factors (Booth et 
aI., 2001). We demonstrate in our conceptual framework (Chapter 3) that country factors 
are related to the macro-economic and institutional conditions in a country. Furthennore, 
through our previous empirical analyses we identify the nature of conditions which led to 
an advanced equity-oriented financial system model and thus to a developed equity culture. 
Results from our regression analysis (Chapter 7) suggest that the group of Leaders, 
represented in this section by Slovakia, have accomplished the macro-economic and 
institutional conditions necessary for the development of an equity culture. By contrast, the 
group of Potentials, represented in this section by Hungary, has the macro-economic 
environment suitable for equity culture development, however the institutional conditions 
need improving. In the case of the last group of Laggards, represented in this section by 
Bulgaria, both the macro-economic and institutional qualities require significant attention. 
This section sheds some light on the policies individual governments of these countries 
adopted. This enables us to understand better the successes and failures of the macro-
economic and institUtional conditions we have observed through our data. 
In 1996, Bulgaria experienced an economic crisis, to which the government reacted 
with the implementation of a radical stabilisation and structural refonn programme. By 
1997 the first bank was privati sed and the new stock exchange began trading (EBRD, 
1999). In the coming years Bulgaria applied to join the EU, however was not selected for 
the group of 'first wave' candidates. The then government realised that the macro-
economic instability was one of the reasons for this and imposed tight constraints on fiscal 
and monetary policies (OECD, 2009). Although the Bulgarian government made progress 
in accelerating enterprise restructuring, however this process was hampered by a weak 
legal system, high corruption and inefficient bureaucracy (EBRD, 2006). This observation 
is in line with our findings in Chapter 7 where we demonstrated that corrupt and 
bureaucratically inefficient systems in countries belonging to the group of Laggards 
present serious obstacles to the development of an equity culture. 
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The liberal government regime of Hungary in 1996 encouraged an early flow ofFDI. 
This increased the competition levels in the banking sector and quickened the process of 
bank privatisation. Hungary was the first country in Eastern Europe to reform its pension 
system. This act was greatly supported by The World Bank as a sign of a progressive 
system liberalisation (Bakker and Gross, 2004). As a result of these and other reforms 
Hungary was accepted for the first round of EU accession. However, in the second half of 
our observation period some policymaking contradicted earlier reforms and Hungary was 
accused of a loss of direction (Filatotchev et aI., 2007). 
By contrast to Hungary, Slovakia was put in a category of 'troubled democracies' in 
the early transition years, mainly due to its authoritarian political regime (Sikula, 2002). As 
a result of the political regression in the early 1990s, the new reform-oriented Slovak 
government stressed the need to catch up with other candidate CEECs ahead of the 
negotiations with the EU. Therefore, after 1998 in an effort to increase national 
competitiveness, radical steps were taken to liberalisc international capital flows, to reform 
the institutional environment, and to improve the macro-economic performance (OECD, 
2009). Reforms were introduced to accelerate privatisations, to design new tax system, to 
deregulate labour market and price, and to remodel the healthcare, pension and education 
systems. The flat-rate tax introduced by Slovak's center-right government c~eated a 
suitable business and investment climate for individuals and companies (Oravec, 2006). 
The newly reformed system with low labour costs, low taxes and political stability 
attracted a lot of foreign investment, which resulted in increased employment and overall 
economic growth. What was once a 'black hole' in Europe was with political reform-
oriented will transformed into a model of transition for other CEECs. 
The national policy-making affects the macro-economic performance of a country as 
well as institutional quality. The notion of a necessity for advanced macro-economic 
environment and adequate institutional quality are central to our conceptualisation. We 
find that a government's reluctance to assume the role of a co-ordinator rather than initiator 
in economic matters (in the case of Bulgaria) or a failure to follow up the reform work in a 
consistent manner (in the case of Hungary) lead to underperforming economic and 
institutional systems. However, an adoption of adequate inter-related macro-economic and 
institutional reforms leads to an improvement of an economy's competitive performance 
(in the case of Slovakia). 
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8.4.3. Development of the Banking and Market Sector: What is Available? 
The CEECs started the financial liberalisation process in the late 1980s followed by the 
transition period from centrally planned to market economies in the early 1990s (Brown, 
1999). Many believed that by the time these transition economies joined the European 
Union (EU), their financial systems would have gone through the whole financial 
liberalisation process. However, the majority of the CEE countries did not completely 
accomplish this process prior to their accession, and will be only regarded as fully 
liberalised when fiscal consolidation, economic macro-stability, the strengthening of 
institutions in the financial markets and prudent and pragmatic management of financial 
liberalisation are present (EBRD, 2008b). 
In the first few years of the transition period the banking sector in Bulgaria was 
dominated by five large state-owned banks, which accounted for about two-thirds of total 
bank assets (EBRD, 1998). Privatisation, as a core element of the reform programme 
advanced slowly, which impacted negatively on the competitiveness of this sector. The 
reasons for the delay of the reform in the financial sector were many. The state's reluctance 
to end its involvement in the banking industry (in scope and time) and the lack of 
continuity in the reform policy process which provided for an unstable institutional 
environment are named most often (e.g. Prohanska, 1997; Vincelette, 2001). Indeed, the 
continuing centralisation of the financial system, non-adequate banking regulation and 
supervision, and the lack of fair competition contributed to the underdevelopment of the 
financial sector. The real reforms started in 1997, when the first bank (United Bulgarian 
Bank) was privatised and the new stock exchange began trading. However, the 
underdevelopment of the legal framework leading to weak protection of minority 
shareholders and information disclosure were a clear sign of the fact that the Bulgarian 
stock exchange was in its infancy. The first decade after the fall of communism did not 
bring many changes in the transformation of the financial intermediaries sector and most of 
the reforming effort started emerging in the second decade. Although the centralised 
control has successfully moved towards a system with separate central bank and some 
regulation, political involvement in the reforming of the financial system was identified as 
the biggest hurdle on the route to a competitive and fully liberalised financial sector. 
By contrast to Bulgaria, Hungary initiated an early transitional privatisation and 
relatively early on started addressing the problems of inadequate regulation and poor 
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competition within its existing banking sector (Kornai, 1997). The first major reforms were 
undertaken quite early - the separation of the Hungarian National Bank and the national 
commercial banks happened in the early 1990s (EBRD, 1998). Foreign financial 
intermediaries were encouraged to invest in Hungarian banks and The World Bank (2002) 
reports that by 2001 foreign banking investors owned around 70 per cent of the equity 
capital held by Hungarian banks. Hungary took further steps toward financial sector 
modernisation by forming a national regulatory commission - Bank Supervisory Board 
and also another independent agency responsible for bank supervision - Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Agency (HFSA) (EBRD, 2006). Although the HFSA was initially 
seen as proof of a great reform in the transition process, later on it was criticised for not 
properly addressing many of the risks taken by banks. The dominance of the banking 
sector resulted in the Hungarian corporate sector's dependence on banking services. 
In the first ten years of the new Slovak Republic's (hereafter Slovakia) existence)7 
the financial industry went through significant systematic institutional, organisational and 
personnel changes (EBRD, 2006). The National Bank of Slovakia, as the central bank with 
the most important function of a regulatory body, was established in 1993. Despite the 
dominance of three state-owned banks within the banking industry in the early transition 
years (EBRD, 1998), later on an expansion within the commercial banking sector occurred 
and brought along necessary competition (EBRD, 2006). By the time Slovakia started 
actively preparing· for the EU accession in 2004 principal transition reforms were 
undergone and the strategic priorities of the banking industry changed their focus and 
turned to institutionally and managerially specific issues. It was recognised that achieving 
a stable standard and transparent legal and business environment within the banking 
industry was a necessary pre-condition for the development of an advanced financial 
system. Furthennore" Slovakia coordinated its efforts towards a successful adoption of 
international accounting standards, international tax system, and a new form of banking 
supervision (from mandatory to risk-oriented bank supervision) with the aim of achieving 
EU standards. Also, rationalisation in the organisation and working methods within the 
banking industry was called for by financial experts as active stimulation was believed to 
intensify communication and cooperation between Slovak banks and their foreign partners 
(Oravec, 2006). Once the conditions within the Slovak banking system improved, 
17 The Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1993 peacefully split into the Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic (Le. Slovakia). 
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attention was focused on the creation and further advancement of alternative financing 
services to support the growth of the corporate sector. In the case of equity-related 
financial intermediaries, some activity existed, however, poor liquidity and insufficient 
legislative support were identified as hurdles toward a better functioning of this financial 
sector (EBRD, 2008b). 
8.4.4. The Corporate Sector: What Source of External Finance Do Firms Demand? 
In our conceptualisation (Chapter 3) we suggest that in the case of equity culture 
development a high demand for equity finance has to be reflected in a high presence of 
adequate macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions. We thus see the 
corporate sector's demand for equity finance as the main driver for equity culture 
development. However, we find in the case of some CEECs from our sample (primarily the 
Laggards group) that corporate sector's high demand for equity finance is not always a 
reflection of adequate pro-equity culture conditions. Bulgaria, our representative for the 
group of Laggards, is a prime example of this. Through our earlier empirical examination 
(Chapters 6 and 7) we have observed that Bulgaria'S macro-economic, institutional and 
managerial conditions are not adequately developed for the development of an equity 
culture. Yet, the analysis of Bulgaria's corporate sector suggests that the demand for equity 
financing is present. The robustness of our conceptual framework is preserved by the fact 
that this high demand is rapidly decreasing (more than in any other CEEC) on an annual 
basis. We believe that there are two reasons for the high demand in the case of Bulgaria. 
Firstly, we believe that such demand was artificially created by Bulgaria'S transition 
government in an effort to progress the privatisation process unsuccessfully initiated with 
the sale method. Secondly, the reason for high demand was the underdevelopment of 
Bulgaria's banking sector. Bulgarian firms which wanted to benefit from the liberalisation 
process and were ready to grow their business hit the wall of the underdeveloped banking 
sector, and insufficient availability and excessive cost of capital. Thus for many of these 
firms the only choice they had was to 'experiment' with equity capital. The reality of 
inadequate macro-economic, institutional and managerial conditions resulted in the large 
drop-out rate of public firms that we observe. 
In the case of Hungary, our representative from the group of Potentials, we observe 
low demand for equity finance despite Hungary's position in a group identified as having a 
medium potential for equity culture development. We find, that despite the macro-
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economic advancement (although slightly decreasing towards the end of our observation 
period) and good institutional support (observed specifically in the case of Hungary not the 
group of Potentials as a whole) the demand for equity finance is low. The reason for this is 
links with countries characterised by bank-based system (Germany as the main source of 
FDI) and dominance of the banking sector in this country. Our earlier examination also 
shows that managerial capabilities are not congruent with managerial capabilities found in 
equity-oriented systems. 
Firms in Slovakia use primarily debt finance as their source of capital, however some 
demand for equity finance is present. The improving macro-economic conditions and 
institutional environment are the main reasons' for this. However, in order for equity 
culture to fully develop a further implementation of pro-equity culture managerial 
conditions is vital. 
8.5. Conclusion· 
The aim of this chapter is to provide additional qualitative information and analysis in 
order to enrich the interpretation of our results from previous variable-based empirical 
analyses. We discuss the influences from the pre-transition and the early transition period 
which, in our opinion, affect the financing choices firms make and the type of financial 
systems individual economies develop. We also suggest policy-related reasons which 
affected the macro-economic and institutional conditions in our sample of transition 
economies. In addition we examine issues related to the specifics of a financial system 
(regulation and competitiveness within the sector). Lastly, we briefly re-state how 
corporate sectors react to the combination of transition-specific macro-economic and 
institutional conditions. 
We observe that in the case of Bulgaria, our representative for countries with the 
smallest potential for equity culture development, delayed and ineffective privatisation, 
dominant position of the banking sector, and delays in implementing necessary macro-
economic and institutional reforms led to the creation of inadequate conditions for equity 
culture development. The paradoxically high demand for equity finance is explained 
twofold: by politically driven pressure on firms to become publicly traded companies and 
by the underdevelopment of the banking sector as the only refinancing alternative. In the 
case of Hungary, our representative for countries with medium potential for equity culture 
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development, we find a successful start to the transition process followed by an 
inconsistent reform process. When combined with a one-sided bank-oriented direction of a 
financial system and weak institutional support this results in medium to low demand for 
equity finance. In the case of Slovakia, our representative for the group of Leaders, we 
observe that a combination of consistent and appropriately timed reforms led to the 
development of an environment which may well support equity culture development. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1. Introduction 
In this final chapter we summarise our thesis argument and our research findings. We 
discuss research limitations and present explanations as to how we approached these to 
secure the robustness and validity of our study. Furthermore, we explain in which ways our 
study contributes to the academic literature and how it enriches the knowledge base of 
business practitioners and policymakers. We also suggest how this study can be used as a 
basis for future research. 
9.2. Summary of Thesis Argument 
In the introduction of this thesis we suggest that the issue of the CEECs' financial system 
development and its future direction requires academic attention. Traditionally, the bank-
based system unilaterally dominated in the immediate post-communist region of Central 
and Eastern Europe. However, academic (Hermes and Lensink, 2000a; Scholtens, 2000; 
Bakker and Gross, 2004) as well as business-based (EBRD, 1998; EBRD, 2006) evidence 
shows that the dominance of the banking sector has negatively affected the cost and 
availability of capital which firms need for corporate growth. Based on the notion that 
corporate growth is positively associated with national macro-economic growth (Beck et 
aI., 2000) we stress that a discussion about the most feasible and suitable advanced 
financial structure, which will contribute to the CEECs' efforts to catch up with their more 
developed neighbours, is necessary, timely and topical. We investigate whether the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe are able to move away from the 
dominating debt-driven financing structure and consider the equity-oriented model as a 
feasible alternative. 
To achieve this research aim, we approach the above discussed research problem 
from the equity culture development point of view. For the purpose of this study we define 
equity culture as a financing culture adopted by a country's corporate sector implying this 
sector's bigger freedom to opt for equity-oriented financing as a result of present feasible 
market conditions. Through the investigation of this phenomenon, seen as the bedrock of 
an equity-based financial system, we set out to examine which transition economies of 
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Central and Eastern Europe have the best potential to successfully adopt and benefit from 
an equity-based financial system. 
We develop a theory-bridging conceptual framework in which we propose that the 
demand for equity finance by the corporate sector is the driver of equity culture 
development in a country. We reason that such demand depends on the size of transaction 
costs firms incur when searching for equity capital, stepping into a contractual relationship 
with an equity provider, and maintaining and coordinating the contractual relationship with 
an equity provider. We then empirically test the propositions made in our conceptual 
framework using a combination of quantitative variable-based and qualitative research 
methods. 
The principal objectives of this research are formulated below: 
1. To identify the main environmental forces that shape the direction of a financial system 
development towards creating an equity culture in a transition economy. 
2. To examine the nature of conditions stemming from the environmental forces which 
guide the process of moving towards the development of an equity culture in a 
transition economy. 
3. To determine under what specific external and internal factors the creation of an 
equity culture is viable in the CEECs. 
4. To propose which strategies should befollowed by business practitioners andfinancial 
institutions, and which policies should be adopted by governments and financial 
organisations in order to support the development of an equity culture in the transition 
economies of the CEECs. 
In the following section we outline our research findings. 
9.3. Summary of Research Findings 
The main findings of our research are the following: 
We provided an answer to our first and partly to our second objective when we 
conceptually identified three environmental forces which have an effect on the size of 
transaction costs firms incur when seeking equity capital and which thus inherently have 
an impact on equity culture development. These are of macro-economic, institutional and 
managerial nature. Firstly, we reason that any form of an advanced financial system 
196 
(whether bank- or equity-based) requires the presence of a competitive macro-economic 
environment. In this respect The National Competitiveness concept theoretically underpins 
our view. Secondly, we state that equity culture development requires the presence of an 
adequate equity culture-oriented institutional system. This is to say that institutional 
conditions which support the proper functioning of an equity-based system together with 
the presence and sufficient quality of equity-based financial institutions which supply 
equity capital to the corporate sector, are necessary for the development of an equity 
culture. In this respect we employ the institutional theory of Varieties of Capitalism to 
strengthen our theoretical thinking. Lastly, we propose that in order for equity culture to 
develop, the managerial environment has to support the demand for equity finance and be 
aligned in terms of equity culture supportive managerial capabilities. The strategic theory 
of the Resource Based View provides a theory-building foundation in this respect. Perhaps 
most importantly, we maintain that it is the combination and interaction of equity culture 
supportive factors stemming from the above three environmental forces which have to be 
satisfied, in order for equity culture to be able to develop. 
By empirically applying our conceptual framework to a sample of ten CEECs we 
addressed our second objective in a more specific way. We found that the CEECs are at 
different stages of a financial system development and thus have developed the conditions 
necessary for the development of equity culture to different levels. Our first empirical 
examination - the cluster and benchmarking analysis (Chapter 6) confirmed that there are 
three different groups of CEECs. Firstly, we identified a group of CEECs which has the 
best developed conditions and thus have a high potential for equity culture development. 
We called this group The Leaders and the CEECs which belong to this group by the end of 
our research period (2008) are Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. Secondly, we 
identified a group of CEECs which has developed some conditions and thus has a medium 
potential for equity culture development. We called this group The Potentials and we 
found that Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are the four CEECs which belong to this 
group in 2008. Lastly, we established that there is the last group of CEECs which have the 
least developed conditions and thus the lowest potential for equity culture development 
(The Laggards). It is the countries of Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania which belong to 
this group. 
Furthermore, to respond to our third research objective we further empirically 
examined through a regression analysis in Chapter 7 the nature of conditions which need to 
197 
be developed for the existence of a successful equity culture in the case of each group of 
CEECs. We found that in the case of countries belonging to the group of Leaders the 
progress of their macro-economic and institutional conditions satisfies the requirements for 
equity culture development. It is primarily the existence and adequate functioning of 
financial intermediaries 'supplying' equity capital and the progress at the managerial level 
of the corporate sector on which a successful development of an equity culture depends. In 
the case of the group of Potentials we found that this group is 'a step behind' the Leaders 
group as the development of an equity-related intermediary sector has to be coupled with 
adequate institutional reforms which yet have to be adopted. Finally, for the group of 
Laggards we found that there is a need for a complex reform process to take place at the 
macro-economic, institutional and managerial level should the development of a 
sustainable equity culture be desired. 
We also found, through the last stage of our empirical examination - the qualitative 
comparative analysis in Chapter 8, that countries with the best potential for equity culture 
development (Leaders) have gone through a more successful model of privatisation, have 
benefited from consistently increasing FDI from both equity and non-equity-based systems 
and a progressive reform-process. On the other hand, countries with medium potential for 
equity culture development (Potentials) have experienced less successful privatisation and 
inward FDI was primarily one-sided from countries with rooted bank-based systems. In 
these countries also a bigger centralisation by the banking sector and inconsistency in the 
institutional refonn process was noted. In the case of the last group with lowest potential 
for equity culture development (Laggards) we observed strong political involvement in the 
privatisation process and a delayed and inefficient process of macro-economic and 
institutional reforms. 
Last but not least, we set out to empirically investigate whether factors which we 
found have an impact on equity culture development for the corporate sector as a whole, 
have the same influence (in terms of type and scope) on different firm sizes (Chapter 7). 
We adopted the European Commission (2005) finn size thresholds and divided our sample 
of the corporate sector into three groups: Large firms, SMEs and Micro firms (Chapter 4). 
We proposed in our conceptual framework (Chapter 3) that ultimately it is the groups of 
Large firms and SMEs which are the strongest drivers of equity culture development in a 
country. Nevertheless, we included the group of Micro firms in our empirical analysis as 
they represent a significant proportion of the total number of firms in transition economies. 
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In addition, we were interested to find out the nature of conditions which motivate the few 
exceptions from the group of Micro firms to use equity finance as their external source of 
capital. Our analysis found that when controlling for different firm sizes, differences occur 
in the nature of conditions which affect the demand for equity finance the most. We found 
that the managerial environment has stronger impact on Micro firms and to a lesser extent 
on SMEs but a limited influence on Large firms. We further observed that the institutional 
environment affects all firm sizes almost to an equal degree. Lastly, we established that the 
macro-economic environment has a stronger impact on Large firms and SMEs, however 
exerts less impact on Micro firms. 
9.4. Research Limitations 
We have identified some limitations associated with this study: 
Firstly, the paucity of previous research on equity culture development in transition 
economies required a macro-level approach. We realised that existing corporate finance 
theory (discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.) is not applicable to our context. The main 
reason for this is the multidisciplinary perspective we adopt with a specific focus on the 
domain of Strategic Management. Therefore we had to start by developing a conceptual 
framework. Then, in order to empirically test the validity of our conceptualisation we 
opted for the analysis of panel data which included ten CEECs and four benchmark 
countries (Germany, Japan, UK, and USA) observed within a thirteen year time period 
(1996-2008). Although we believe that the macro-level approach was the correct choice for 
our type of research problem, we are aware of the limitations that come with it. This 
macro-level approach did not allow us to go to as much depth and detail as a micro-level 
research would. However, because of our study's unique character (as discussed above) it 
was necessary to start at the macro-level, understand the forces and factors which influence 
equity culture development and thus provide a solid base for future micro-level research. 
Secondly, the uniqueness of our study presented another problem - the scarcity of 
studies with which we could compare our results. Although a number of studies that have 
been presented in our literature review (Chapter 2) have investigated financial system 
development in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the angle through 
which we investigated financial system development, the phenomenon of equity culture, is 
unique in its field. However, we believe that our chosen method for the first stage of the 
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empirical analysis, the benchmarking method (Chapter 6), provided the necessary 
comparative element which we were not able to achieve through a comparison with other 
studies related to the same research subject. 
The last limitation of our study is linked to the macro-level perspective that, as 
explained earlier, we adopted. Due to the complexity of our conceptual framework, we had 
to employ various kinds of data (macro-economic, institutional, managerial) for a large 
sample (ten CEECs) across a long time period (thirteen years). This meant that a 
quantitative analysis of secondary data was going to be our primary research method. One 
of the disadvantages of using secondary data is that the researcher does not have any 
influence over the accuracy and robustness of used data (Bryman and Bell, 2003). To 
mitigate the limitations associated with the use of secondary data we not only used 
reputable sources but we also used them in combination, as we were aware that basing a 
research on one source of secondary data may negatively affect the robustness of research 
results (Depka, 2006). 
9.5. Dual Contribution of the Study 
Our study makes a theoretical as well as practical contribution. In the following section we 
explain which academic areas we contribute to and what practical implications stemming 
from our study can enrich the knowledge base of business practitioners as well as 
policymakers. 
9.5.1. Contribution to Research 
Although there is evidence of various research performed on the financial system 
development (Hermes and Lensink, 2000a; Levine, 2002; Purda, 2008), growth - finance 
relationship (Levine, 1997; Beck et aI., 2000; Deidda and Fattouh, 2008), financial 
structures and their influence over long-run economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; 
Boot and Thakor, 1997; Nord, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004), some scholars point out the 
existence of gaps in previous research and call for more attention to the area of financial 
system development in transition economies. Bakker and Gross (2004) call for more 
attention specifically to the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe as 'these 
markets are particularly interesting since they provide us with a number of comparable, yet 
in many interesting respects, different cases' . 
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While, Hennes and Lensink (2000a) stress the need to provide empirical knowledge 
on factors affecting the CEECs' future financial systems' developments, Bekaert and 
Harvey (2002) are more specific as they stress the requirement for a better understanding 
of the combination of macro-economic and institutional factors influencing financial 
system refonns in transition markets. However, Purda (2008) warns about the dangers of 
extending results from research on financial systems of developed economies with well-
functioning financial markets to the context of transition and post-transition countries. 
Klapper and Love (2003), on the other hand comment on the methodological approaches 
adopted and emphasise the need to re-focus the research in transition economies from 
country-level to finn-level, or a combination of these two levels. 
As seen from the above, the literature review we presented earlier in this thesis 
(Chapter 2) as well as to our best knowledge, the subject of financial system development 
with the focus on equity culture development, has not been fully investigated. In order to 
provide valuable scientific evidence we carefully designed our research through 
constructing a conceptual framework on which we then designed an empirical model 
capturing our research questions. 
Our conceptual framework bridges the traditional theory used in the Economics and 
Finance research (The Transaction Costs Theory, The Pecking Order Theory) with new 
strategic, managerial and institutional theories (The National Competitiveness concept, 
The Resource Based View, and the Theory of Varieties of Capitalism). The conceptual 
framework provides answers as to what are the environmental forces which impact on the 
development of an equity culture in transition economies as well as what is the nature of 
conditions stemming from such environments that have to be satisfied so that equity 
culture is able to develop. The complexity of the conceptual framework is reflected in the 
empirical examination we apply. Firstly, we create a database which consists macro-
economic, institutional and managerial data by collating a number of databases. Secondly, 
we apply a three-tier research methodology through which we test our collated data. We 
start by clustering and benchmarking using the Co-Plot methodology, then we apply a 
fixed effects panel data regression analysis and as the last step of the empirical 
examination we perfonn a qualitative comparative analysis of three selected CEECs. 
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9.5.2. Contribution to Practice 
Evidence from business related publications (e.g. WorldBank, 2002; LSE, 2006) as well as 
our personal observations from the world of finance suggest that the financial system 
development in Central and Eastern Europe and specifically the subject of equity culture 
are important current issues. The question of which CEECs have the best potential to 
develop and adopt an equity culture requires attention so that correct managerial 
recommendations can be drawn and suitable policy implications can be proposed. 
Firstly, as equity-based financial institutions (e.g. AIM) are considering a business 
expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, and existing and potential investors in the CEE 
region are looking for new investment opportunities, it is essential to have the information 
as to which countries in this geographic area would be a viable expansion and investment 
target. Secondly, as the financial systems in the CEECs are still in the process of 
developing, it is appropriate to address the issue of equity culture so that focused domestic 
policies are formed in those countries wanting to develop an equity-based system. 
Furthermore, with the recognition of the significant role transition economies are expected 
to play in the future globalised world, bilateral international organisations have signalled 
their support for research related to macro-economic, institutional and financial 
advancement of these countries. 
The specific contributions our study generates and the recommendations which can 
be drawn for the above discussed business-related and policy-oriented bodies are provided 
in the next section. 
9.6. Recommendations 
Based on the findings from our examination of equity culture development in the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, we are able to propose managerial and policy 
recommendations. We start by identifying specific groups which may be interested in our 
study and we suggest the reasons Why. Then we make relevant managerial and policy 
recommendations. 
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9.6.1. Managerial Recommendations 
In terms of managerial recommendations we have identified two groups which, we believe, 
may benefit from the findings of our study. These are investors and potential investors in 
the CEECs, and financial institutions considering expansion in the European and 
specifically Central and Eastern European region. 
Investors and Potential Investors in the CEECs 
This research informs investors and potential investors as to the issues they are likely to 
face in the CEECs, and the degree of difficulty they may experience in making successful 
investments in these countries. Our study enables them to target investment areas that have 
a developing equity culture and thereby reduce their risk. We believe this research may be 
of particular interest to the larger investment funds and investment banks. 
Financial Institutions Considering International Expansion in the CEE region 
Financial institutions may find this research valuable for two main reasons. Firstly, it 
identifies countries with immature equity markets which may present opportunities for first 
mover advantage to financial investors prepared to take a long-term view. Secondly, it 
provides others, such as the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM), with a clear 
indication of those countries which may be requiring more liquid junior capital markets in 
the future. 
We believe that before making an investment decision and choosing their investment 
market individual investors and financial institutions would benefit from assessing the 
level of equity culture that is developed in their target market. By using the conceptual 
framework that we have developed and the empirical findings that we have discovered 
these two groups can determine the following: 
1. Firms with the best potential for equity culture development 
The nature of countries/markets which have the best developed equity culture reflected 
through a high demand for equity finance generated as a result of adequate macro-
economic, institutional and managerial conditions. In the case of the CEECs, this thesis 
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provides an answer to this. We identified the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia as 
CEECs with the best potential for the development of a sustainable equity culture. 
2. The realistic time frame as well as the potential for the development of an equity 
culture in a country 
If the target country does not have adequate macro-economic and institutional conditions 
in place, then it is unlikely that equity culture will be developed in the short term. This is 
because forming a stable economy and decreasing bureaucratic inefficiency and high levels 
of corruption are tasks which need many years to implement (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008). 
However, if the macro-economic and institutional requirements are satisfied, and it is the 
presence of financial institutions that is lacking, equity culture may develop in the medium 
term. In a situation when a country has all the necessary conditions and the managerial 
capabilities within the corporate sector are missing, then it is likely that equity culture 
development is achievable in the short-term. 
3. The type of firms (in terms of firm size) which are likely to demand equity finance 
If a country has suitable macro-economic and institutional conditions for the development 
of equity culture but not the managerial capabilities of individual managers, it is the large 
firms which are likely to opt for equity finance. On the other hand, the demand of SMEs 
for equity finance depends primarily on the presence of institutional conditions. Lastly, 
Micro firms even in the presence of adequate macro-economic and institutional conditions 
are not likely to opt for equity finance unless a strong presence of equity culture supportive 
managerial capabilities is noted. This provides information for financial institutions in 
terms of which section of the corporate sector should be targeted. 
9.6.2. Policy Recommendations 
With regard to our recommendations for policy makers we believe that our study can be of 
interest not only to domestic governments and the European Commission but also to some 
international bilateral organisations. 
Domestic Governments and the European Commission 
Both domestic governments in the CEECs and also the European Commission are 
concerned with improving economic growth rates of European member states. Our 
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research identifies those countries which are lagging behind in tenns of equity culture 
development and further, suggests causes of this. This research should give an impetus to 
countries from the Laggards and Potentials groups to continue with the refonns necessary. 
International Bilateral Organisations 
Organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and 
regional development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Intra-
American Development Bank (IADB) are concerned with economic· development of 
transition economies. Our study identifies key factors in the development of an equity 
culture in the CEECs which may be applied to other groups of transition countries. We 
believe that our research and methodology will be of considerable interest to this group of 
international finance and development institutions. 
Furthennore, based on our empirical results we are able to make the following 
recommendations: 
High levels of inward FDI in a transition economy have a negative effect on the 
number of Micro finns applying for equity finance. Our findings further show the same 
indicator does not affect large finns and SMEs to the same extent. Our results do not 
imply, that if a country wants an increased demand for equity finance (not just by large 
finns, SMEs but also by Micro finns), FDI should not be encouraged. We propose that 
inward FDI should be encouraged, however from nations known for established equity 
culture, so that some of the host finns' appetite for equity finance can transfer into local 
finns. 
The presence of an efficient bureaucratic system and an institutional system with low 
corruption levels is not a necessary condition in the case of SMEs and Large finns. This is 
to say that transition countries which do not satisfy the institutional conditions of efficient 
bureaucracy and low corruption can still have large finns and SMEs demanding equity 
finance (subject to the presence of the remaining conditions). However, in such 
institutional conditions Micro finns are less likely to demand equity finance. Therefore, if 
a country wants to start building equity culture at all levels of its corporate sector, 
improved quality of the bureaucratic system and low levels of corruption may enable it to 
achieve that (subject to adequate macro-economic and managerial conditions). 
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The presence of motivated staff with international experience and an ability to adapt 
are necessary preconditions for a high demand for equity finance at the micro level, but 
these managerial capabilities are not necessarily required in the case of large firms and are 
only to some extent necessary in the case of SMEs. We therefore suggest, that programmes 
enabling managers to gain knowledge from international exposure in foreign countries 
with a functioning equity-based system may help them to achieve the necessary managerial 
capabilities an equity culture requires. 
9.7. Recommendations for Further Research 
Now that the conceptualisation is in place, the main external forces which affect 
equity culture development have been identified, the conditions which have to be satisfied 
so that equity culture can develop have been named, and strategy-building and policy-
making recommendations for the development of an equity culture have been proposed, 
the research focus can change from a macro-level to micro-level. This is to suggest that 
equity culture development can be assessed with the input of qualitative methods more 
closely for: 
I. individual groups of CEECs identified in our study (Leaders, Potentials, Laggards) 
with the aim of understanding some of the differences in demand between countries 
which share a group with the same potential for equity culture development; 
2. a single country from our sample with the aim of examining its corporate sector's 
demand by assessing individually Large firms, SMEs, and Micro firms; 
3. or other transition economies outside the European region. In this case we would 
propose first applying the conceptual framework and methodology introduced in this 
study and then progress onto the micro-level research. 
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APPENDIX B: Regressions for PublicToPrivate and Private5ToPrivate 
Table 7 Estimations PublicToPrivate (Total Number of Firms) 
Modell.l. Modell.2. Modell.3. Modell.4. 
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yes yes yes no 
Country effects 132.46*** 81.06*** 145.38*** 66.84** * 
Incl uded yes yes yes yes 
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Country effects 4.88** 
Included yes 
Source: Author 's estimations in Stata 
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Table 10 Estimations PrivateStoPrivate (Total Number of Firms) 
Model 10.1. Model 10.2. Model 10.3. Model 10.4. 
Igdp_per_ -0.04481 *** -0.04167*** -0.03615*** -0.03824*** 
~O . OO 296) ~O.OO308) ~O . OO373) ~O .OO35 7 ) 
0.00002* 0.00003** 
,. ,. 
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competit -0.00263** -0.00144 -0.00102 -0.00133 
~O . OO137 ) ~O . OO113) ~O . OO128) ~O .OO l 22) 
corrupti -0.00137** -0.00131** -0.00115** 
~O . OOO63) ~O .OOO60) ~O.OOO5~) ,. 
law_and - 0.00096 0.00159** 0.00144** 
~O.OOO7 1 ) ~O . OOO70) ~O . OOO62) ,. ,. ,. 
burea ucr -0.00131 -0.00053 -0.00070 
~O.OO121) ~O .OO 1 22) ~O .OO103) ,. ,. ,. 
bankingl 0.00035 -0.00082 -0.00088 
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ai c -1.21e+03 -1.23e +03 -1.23e+03 -1.25e+03 
Ti me effects 13.44*** 15.30*** 7.99*** 9.19*** 
I ncl uded yes yes yes yes 
Country effects 1234.31*** 715.23*** 729.92*** 507.16*** 
Included yes yes yes yes 
Source: Author's estimations in Stata 
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Table 11 Estimations PrivateSToPrivate Firm Sizes 
Model 11.1. Model 11.2. Model 11.3. Model 11.4. 
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Table 12 Estimations PrivateSToPrivate EC Type 
(Total Number of Firms) 
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